Q1. Please state your name, title, and business address.

A1. My name is David Saffran. My title is Generation Business Systems Administrator in the Operations Management Reporting division of Northern Indiana Public Service Company LLC (“NIPSCO” or the “Company”). My business address is 2755 Raystone Drive, Valparaiso, Indiana 46383.

Q2. Please describe your educational and employment background.

A2. I hold an Associate degree in Electronic Systems Technology from the Community College of the Air Force, an Associate degree in Aerospace Ground Equipment Technology from the Community College of the Air Force and have attended classes for three years working towards a Bachelor of Science degree in Computer Networking Information Technology at Purdue Northwest. I have been employed by NiSource Inc. or NIPSCO since May of 2004 in a variety of technical, supervisory, and administrative positions.

Q3. What are your responsibilities as Generation Business Systems
Administrator in the Operations Management Reporting division of NIPSCO?

A3. My current responsibilities include managing NIPSCO’s various business systems and programs, recording data concerning Generation’s operational and maintenance performance, and analyzing the results to identify adverse trends and recommend corrective actions to improve performance. In addition, I am responsible for submitting various NIPSCO Generation reports and filings to local, state, and federal agencies such as the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission ("Commission"), Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc., North American Electric Reliability Council, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") and Indiana Department of Natural Resources ("DNR").

Q4. Are you familiar with the Company’s Verified Petition, including the exhibits attached thereto, initiating this proceeding, a copy of which has been marked Attachment 1-A?

A4. Yes.

Q5. What is the purpose of your direct testimony in this proceeding?
A5. The purpose of my testimony is to provide information relevant to Paragraph 6 of Exhibit A - Settlement Terms, attached to the Stipulation and Agreement filed October 16, 2007 in Cause No. 38706-FAC71-S1 approved by the Commission on January 30, 2008 (“FAC71-S1 Agreement”) and Paragraph 6(f.) of the Stipulation and Agreement filed September 23, 2009 in Cause No. 38706-FAC80-S1 approved by the Commission on November 4, 2009 (“FAC80-S1 Agreement”) (collectively, the “Reporting Agreements”). Paragraph 6 of the FAC71-S1 Agreement calls for NIPSCO to submit testimony in its quarterly FAC proceedings regarding major forced outages that occur within the pertinent FAC timeframe. Under this provision, NIPSCO must describe the length and cause of each major forced outage, generating unit involved, and proposed solutions to prevent such outages from occurring in the future. In addition to the above provision regarding the details of each major forced outage, Paragraph 6(f.) of the FAC80-S1 Agreement calls for NIPSCO to file testimony describing the details of and the steps taken to minimize such major forced outages in the future. Paragraph 6(f.) of the FAC80-S1 Agreement defines a “major forced outage” as a unit forced outage lasting longer than three (3) consecutive days.
Q6. Are you sponsoring any attachments to your testimony?

A6. Yes. I am sponsoring Attachment 4-A and Confidential Attachment 4-B, both of which were prepared by me or under my direction and supervision. Attachment 4-A describes each major forced outage NIPSCO’s generating units experienced during the third quarter of 2022, which is the reconciliation period in this FAC proceeding. Confidential Attachment 4-B contains root-cause analysis reports regarding the outages listed in Attachment 4-A that were complete at the time of this filing.

Q7. Does Attachment 4-A comply with the Reporting Agreements?

A7. Yes. In the attachment, I explain each major forced outage and state the actions NIPSCO has already taken or is able to take to prevent each outage from occurring again.

Q8. Does Confidential Attachment 4-B comply with the Commission’s October 29, 2019 Order in Cause No. 38706-FAC-124 (“FAC-124 Order”)?

A8. Yes. In its FAC-124 Order, the Commission directed NIPSCO to provide in its future quarterly FAC filings, a root cause analysis for forced outages when such an analysis has been completed at the time of the FAC filing. That information is provided in Confidential Attachment 4-B.
1  Q9.  Does this conclude your prepared direct testimony?

2  A9.  Yes.
VERIFICATION

I, David Saffran, Generation Business Systems Administrator in the Operations Management Reporting division of Northern Indiana Public Service Company LLC, affirm under penalties of perjury that the foregoing representations are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.

David Saffran

Dated: November 14, 2022
**Major Forced Outage Report (Q3, 2022)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Description</th>
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| **Michigan City 12** | August 7 80 hours  
Boiler bottom ash submerged flight conveyor (SFC) system inner slag door failed to close in a timely manner and tripped the system due to high hydraulic pressure.  
The failure of the inner door to close caused an excessive water and slag built up and tripped the system. The unit had to be taken offline to clean out the SFC.  
A contracted service vacuumed the slag out of the SFC and the hydraulic pressure set point was lowered to allow more time for the inner door to close to prevent an excessive water and slag buildup. |
| **Michigan City 12** | September 11 182 hours  
Operators tripped the unit while bringing the unit online after an outage due to turbine bore stress and low steam temperatures.  
A thorough investigation determined the superheater spray valve stuck open and prevented steam temperatures from reaching their designed operating parameter.  
These valves are stroked prior to starting the unit to ensure they are operating correctly. A blocking valve has been installed and will be incorporated into the start logic during the 2022 Fall planned outage. |
| **R. M. Schahfer 16A** | January 1 4,343 hours  
During an annual planned turbine borescope inspection, significant damage to row 1 rotating gas turbine blades and row 1 stationary gas turbine vanes was identified. A further inspection is needed to determine the true extent of damage once the hoods are removed. This is a continuation from FAC-134.  
The earliest estimated return to service is currently scheduled for September 2022. |
| **R. M. Schahfer 17** | July 5 324 hours  
Unit was taken offline for a boiler secondary superheater pendant tube leak after boiler water makeup averaged 200 gallons per minute.  
The initial leak was a small “fish mouth” caused by short term overheating in a pendant. This leak caused collateral damage in surrounding areas.  
Dutchmen were installed and pad welds made where needed. A post repair hydraulic test was conducted on the boiler to ensure there were no more leaks while returning the unit to service. |
| **R. M. Schahfer 18** | August 4 168 hours  
Unit was taken offline when a boiler feedwater pump suction piping safety valve pipe connection broke.  
The failed connection occurred at the weakest point of the pipe and had been in service for over 40 years.  
The pipe connection was replaced, and the same location inspected on the other two boiler feedwater pumps. |
Operators took the unit offline for a boiler superheater pendant tube leak when the boiler water makeup increased to 350 gallons per minute. The initial leak was a small “fish mouth” caused by short term overheating in a pendant. This leak caused collateral damage in surrounding areas.

A dutchman was installed and pad welds made where needed. A post repair hydraulic test was conducted on the boiler to ensure there were no more leaks prior to returning the unit to service. Engineering will videoscope the header during the next planned outage.