

**STATE OF INDIANA**

**INDIANA UTILITY REGULATORY COMMISSION**

**VERIFIED PETITION OF INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER )  
COMPANY (I&M) FOR APPROVAL OF (1) ISSUANCE TO I&M )  
OF CERTIFICATES OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND )  
NECESSITY UNDER IND. CODE § 8-1-8.5-2 FOR THE )  
ACQUISITION AND DEVELOPMENT THROUGH PURCHASE )  
SALE AGREEMENTS (PSA) OF TWO SOLAR POWER )  
GENERATING FACILITIES TO BE KNOWN AS LAKE TROUT, )  
AND MAYAPPLE (CLEAN ENERGY PSA PROJECTS); (2) TO )  
THE EXTENT NECESSARY, ISSUANCE OF AN ORDER )  
PURSUANT TO IND. CODE § 8-1-2.5-5 DECLINING TO ) CAUSE NO. 45868  
EXERCISE JURISDICTION UNDER IND. CODE § 8-1-8.5-5(e) (3) )  
APPROVAL OF EACH PSA PROJECT AS A CLEAN ENERGY )  
PROJECT UNDER IND. CODE § 8-1-8.8-11; (4) APPROVAL OF )  
TWO SOLAR RENEWABLE ENERGY PURCHASE )  
AGREEMENTS FOR PROJECTS TO BE KNOWN AS ELKHART )  
COUNTY AND SCULPIN (CLEAN ENERGY PPA PROJECTS) AS )  
CLEAN ENERGY PROJECTS UNDER IND. CODE § 8-1-8.8-11; (5) )  
ASSOCIATED TIMELY COST RECOVERY UNDER IND. CODE § )  
8-1-8.8-11 FOR ALL PSA AND PPA PROJECTS; AND (6) OTHER )  
ACCOUNTING AND RATEMAKING AUTHORITY. )**

**DIRECT TESTIMONY OF BENJAMIN INSKEEP**

**ON BEHALF OF**

**CITIZENS ACTION COALITION OF INDIANA**

**MAY 19, 2023**

**Confidential Information Redacted**

**I. INTRODUCTION**

1 **Q. Please state your name, position and business address.**

2 **A.** My name is Ben Inskeep, and I am the Program Director at Citizens Action Coalition of  
3 Indiana, Inc. (“CAC”). My business address is 1915 West 18<sup>th</sup> Street, Suite C, Indianapolis,  
4 Indiana 46202.

5 **Q. Please describe your current responsibilities.**

6 **A.** I have served as CAC’s Program Director since March 2022. In that role, I work to advance  
7 CAC’s policy and programmatic priorities related to energy, utilities, and consumer  
8 affordability and protection.

9 **Q. Please briefly summarize your prior employment and educational background.**

10 **A.** I have more than a decade of experience working on energy and utility issues. My prior  
11 employment includes working as a policy analyst at the North Carolina Clean Energy  
12 Technology Center at North Carolina State University (2014-2016), where I co-created and  
13 served as lead author and editor of *The 50 States of Solar*, a quarterly report series tracking  
14 distributed solar policy developments in U.S. states. I also conducted policy research and  
15 contributed to the *Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency (DSIRE)*  
16 project and provided technical support, analysis, and workshops for state and local  
17 governments through the U.S. Department of Energy’s SunShot Solar Outreach  
18 Partnership.

19 I also worked for EQ Research LLC, a clean energy policy consulting firm, from  
20 2016-2022. I managed EQ Research’s general rate case subscription service, contributed  
21 as a researcher and analyst to other policy service offerings, such as legislative and  
22 regulatory tracking services, and performed customized research and analysis for clients.

1 In addition, my client engagements included participation in state utility regulatory  
2 proceedings, including analyzing utility proposals and serving as an expert witness on  
3 ratemaking and energy policy issues.

4 I earned a Bachelor of Science in Psychology with Highest Distinction from  
5 Indiana University in 2009 and both a Master of Science in Environmental Science and a  
6 Master of Public Affairs from the O'Neill School of Public and Environmental Affairs at  
7 Indiana University in 2012. I completed the EUCI's Utility Accounting 101 course in  
8 April 2023.

9 **Q. Have you previously filed testimony before the Indiana Utility Regulatory**  
10 **Commission ("IURC" or "Commission")?**

11 **A.** Yes. Attachment BI-1 identifies the cases in which I have previously filed testimony.

12 **Q. On whose behalf are you testifying?**

13 **A.** I am testifying on behalf of CAC.

14 **Q. What is the purpose of your testimony in this proceeding?**

15 **A.** The purpose of my testimony is to respond to Indiana Michigan Power Company's  
16 ("I&M") request for approval of a) the acquisition through two Purchase and Sale  
17 Agreements ("PSAs") of the Lake Trout and Mayapple solar power generating facilities  
18 ("Solar PSA Projects"); and b) two solar Renewable Energy Purchase Agreements  
19 ("REPAs," also referred to herein as power purchase agreements ("PPAs")) for the Elkhart  
20 County and Sculpin Projects ("Solar PPA Projects").

21 **Q. Are you sponsoring any attachments to your testimony?**

22 **A.** Yes. I am sponsoring Attachment BI-1: Benjamin Inskeep's Expert Witness Experience.

## II. I&M's SOLAR PSA PROJECTS AND SOLAR PPA PROJECTS

1 **Q. What is I&M requesting in this proceeding?**

2 **A.** I&M is requesting approval of four solar projects, two of which are PPAs and two of which  
3 are PSAs. The projects total 749 MW of nameplate capacity.

### **a. Affordability and Environmental Sustainability**

4 **Q. Please explain the widespread bill unaffordability experienced by I&M's residential**  
5 **customers.**


6 **A.** I&M's customers have experienced soaring electricity bills, resulting in many families  
7 being unable to afford their bills, which has led to an alarmingly high number of  
8 disconnection notices and disconnections.

9 I&M's residential customers are paying much more for electricity now than they  
10 did in the past. As shown in Figure 1, I&M's bills have risen precipitously in the past two  
11 decades, going from approximately \$68.34 in 2004 to \$155.13 in 2022, a 127% increase  
12 for 1,000 kWh of usage. It is important to note that inflation only accounts for a fraction of  
13 this increase. Adjusting for inflation, a \$68.34 bill in 2004 is equivalent to a \$106.90 bill  
14 in 2022 dollars.<sup>1</sup> In other words, **I&M's residential ratepayers have experienced a real**  
15 **bill increase (i.e., after adjusting for inflation) of 45.1% since 2004.** Furthermore, as is  
16 evident in Figure 1, I&M had the lowest bills of any of Indiana's investor-owned utilities  
17 in 2004. That is no longer the case, and I&M has dramatically reduced the spread between  
18 its residential bills at 1,000 kWh of usage and those of the highest-cost Indiana utilities.

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<sup>1</sup> U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, "CPI [Consumer Price Index] Inflation Calculator,"  
[https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation\\_calculator.htm](https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm) (used to calculate that \$68.34 in July 2004 has  
the same buying power as \$106.90 in July 2022).

Figure 1. Residential Monthly Bill for 1,000 kWh



1           The rapid rise of I&M electric bills results in an increasing number of customers  
 2           who are unable to afford their electric bill, resulting in arrears or forcing families to  
 3           undertake risky coping strategies (e.g., forgo food and medicine) to be able to pay their  
 4           utility bills. When a Hoosier family cannot afford to pay their electricity bills, they are sent  
 5           a disconnection notice from I&M, and can be involuntarily disconnected from service  
 6           thereafter, jeopardizing their health and safety and creating a massive hardship that can  
 7           prevent them from participating in society.

8           Over the six-month period September 2022 through February 2023, I&M reported  
 9           that it issued more than 230,000 disconnection notices and disconnected residential  
 10          customers for non-payment 24,501 times.<sup>2</sup> **If this data is extrapolated to a annual**

<sup>2</sup> I&M reporting in Cause No. 45736.

1 **period, it indicates that I&M threatens to disconnect Hoosier families from essential**  
2 **utility service through disconnection notices 461,448 times each year – more**  
3 **disconnection notices than I&M’s total number of residential customers (418,580 as**  
4 **of February 2023).** It would also imply that I&M would disconnect Hoosier families more  
5 than 49,000 times each year.

6 **Q. Of what relevance is electric bill unaffordability to this proceeding?**

7 **A.** The trend of rising electricity costs and large number of disconnection notices and  
8 disconnections demonstrates that customers are in need of bill relief now. In the context of  
9 this proceeding, it reaffirms I&M’s decision to move away from expensive coal-fired  
10 generation at its Rockport power plant and pursue a more cost-effective portfolio of  
11 replacement resources. It also highlights that any opportunities for near-term bill relief –  
12 such as by returning all production tax credit benefits to ratepayers as soon as possible –  
13 should be vigorously pursued. Finally, it emphasizes the importance of I&M pursuing the  
14 most cost-effective replacement resources, such as by using lower-cost renewable PPAs  
15 that pass through costs to ratepayers instead of more-expensive PSAs that significantly  
16 increase the cost of those resources as a result of I&M substantially increasing the revenue  
17 requirement to account for an annual rate of return.

18 I would also note that House Enrolled Act 1007 (2023) specifically adopted  
19 “affordability” as one of five pillars of the State’s policy regarding decisions concerning  
20 Indiana’s electric generation resource mix, energy infrastructure, and electric service  
21 ratemaking constructs. Affordability is a relative concept, with lower-income Hoosiers  
22 experiencing electric bill unaffordability at significantly higher rates than higher-income  
23 Hoosiers. Therefore, when evaluating a utility’s planned investments and spending, I urge

1 the Commission to consider affordability in the context of low-income residential  
2 customers in particular.

3 **Q. Please describe how environmental sustainability relates to this proceeding.**

4 **A.** Another one of the pillars of Indiana's electricity policy adopted in HEA 1007 is  
5 "environmental sustainability," which includes (but is not limited to) the impact of  
6 environmental regulations on the cost of providing electric utility service and demand from  
7 consumers for environmentally sustainable sources of electric generation.

8 I&M's plan to retire the Rockport plant and to procure a substantial amount of  
9 renewable energy this decade to replace a portion of this capacity, as identified in the  
10 preferred portfolio of its most recent Integrated Resource Plan, is consistent with Indiana's  
11 electricity policy of environment sustainability. In addition to reducing massive quantities  
12 of air, water, land, and climate pollution caused by coal-fired generation at Rockport,  
13 ceasing coal-fired generation at Rockport is prudent because it reduces regulatory risk  
14 regarding planned environmental regulations that could have costly impacts on coal-fired  
15 power plants. A notable example of this is the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's  
16 recently issued proposed rule under Section 111 of the Clean Air Act that would establish  
17 new Emissions Guidelines on existing coal-fired power plants, among other fossil fuel  
18 generators. For existing coal plants planning to operate in the long-term, the best system  
19 of emissions reductions is based on carbon capture and sequestration that would capture  
20 90% of carbon dioxide emissions from the facility, which would require costly new  
21 equipment to be installed and result in a substantial "parasitic load" to operate, adding  
22 further costs. In addition, I&M's decision to retire coal-fired generation at Rockport allows

1 I&M to shift investments to renewable generation, consistent with consumers' demands  
2 for more environmentally sustainability electricity generation.

3 **Q. What do you recommend?**

4 **A.** I recommend that the Commission consider the affordability of electricity bills paid by  
5 I&M residential customers, especially low-income customers, when making its findings  
6 and conclusions in this proceeding. I also recommend that the Commission take into  
7 consideration environmental sustainability, consistent with HEA 1007, when it evaluates  
8 I&M's resource decisions.

**b. Concerns with Solar PSA Projects**

9 **Q. Are there important differences between solar PPAs and PSAs?**

10 **A.** Yes. Under a PSA, the solar facility is developed and constructed by a separate entity, but  
11 then ownership and operation of the facility are transferred to the utility. In contrast, the  
12 utility purchases the output (e.g., energy, capacity, ancillary services, and environmental  
13 attributes) of a solar project under a PPA, but the utility does not take ownership of the  
14 solar facility.

15 Because utilities own and operate projects under the solar PSA model, they are  
16 typically responsible for paying various types of costs that they would otherwise not be  
17 directly responsible for under a PPA, including interconnection costs, operating and  
18 maintenance costs, and decommissioning costs. Likewise, under a solar PSA model, the  
19 utility will also directly receive the benefits of ownership, such as the ability to earn federal  
20 tax credits on the production or investment related to the facility. These types of costs and  
21 benefits would only indirectly be part of a solar PPA, as it would be incumbent on the  
22 counterparty to price in their costs and benefits to their pricing terms; should the



counterparty overestimate the benefits or underestimate the costs (e.g., of operating and maintaining the facility over the PPA term), the counterparty rather the utility and its customers would be on the hook for the cost increases unless otherwise specified by the contract. In this respect, PPAs can be a much less risky proposition for utility customers than PSAs.

This distinction also has significant ramifications for the utility's ratepayers under utility accounting and ratemaking. Namely, utilities generally pass through to ratepayers without a markup of the costs of its purchases under a solar PPA, whereas utilities are typically authorized to recover a rate of return on solar PSA projects. PPAs can therefore offer a lower cost to customers, while still providing the same energy, capacity, and environmental attribute benefits to customers.

**Q. Are there significant differences in cost to ratepayers between I&M's Solar PSA Projects and Solar PPA Projects?**


**A.** Yes. As shown in Confidential Figure 2, the Solar PSA Projects have weighted average levelized cost of energy ("LCOE") of \$[REDACTED]/MWh, whereas the Solar PPA Projects have a weighted average cost of [REDACTED] \$[REDACTED]/MWh.<sup>3</sup> In other words, the Solar PSA Projects are [REDACTED]% [REDACTED] [REDACTED] than the Solar PPA Projects. Furthermore, the lowest-price Solar PPA Project ([REDACTED]) has an LCOE of \$[REDACTED]/MWh, which is [REDACTED]% [REDACTED] than the \$[REDACTED]/MWh LCOE of the highest-cost Solar PSA Project ([REDACTED]). While there are many variables that can affect the LCOE of a solar project, these differences are quite large. Furthermore, these project costs are significantly [REDACTED] than other solar projects that have been recently approved by the Commission that are indicative of current utility-scale solar costs. For

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<sup>3</sup> Calculations based on data provided by I&M in Confidential Figure MAB-4.

example, the Commission approved an updated levelized cost of \$65.65/MWh to \$67.11/MWh (depending on bonus tax credit eligibility) for CenterPoint's Pike County Solar Project in Cause No. 45754.

**Confidential Figure 2. Capacity-Weighted LCOE Comparison of Solar PSA Projects to PPA Projects**



**Q. Do you have any concerns about why the Solar PSA Projects are [REDACTED] than the Solar PPA Projects to ratepayers?**

**A.** Yes. While there can be legitimate differences that explain the differences between LCOE across solar projects, a major reason appears to be a result of I&M's proposed ratemaking differences between the PSA and PPA projects. For the Solar PSA Projects, I&M has included in revenue requirement a return on rate base; whereas for the Solar PPA Projects, I&M is passing through the cost to ratepayers without a similar markup. While this difference may sound modest, its impact to ratepayers is actually extraordinary: **Overall, I&M would earn a return on rate base associated with the two Solar PSA Projects of**

1 nearly \$ [REDACTED]<sup>4</sup> over the 35-year expected life of the facilities, which is  
 2 approximately [REDACTED] % of the \$ [REDACTED] total revenue requirement over the 35-year  
 3 expected life.<sup>5</sup> This calls into question I&M's overall proposal in this proceeding that is  
 4 more heavily weighted toward PSA projects (469 MW, or 63% of total nameplate capacity)  
 5 than PPA projects (280 MW, or 37% of total nameplate capacity), as this finding suggests  
 6 that I&M's decision is motivated by I&M's desire to increase profits rather than benefit  
 7 ratepayers.

8 **Q. What other concerns do you have about the difference between Solar PSA Projects**  
 9 **and Solar PPA Projects?**

10 **A.** The [REDACTED] [REDACTED] of the Solar PSA Projects is amplified for residential  
 11 customers in particular because of the different cost allocation mechanisms that would be  
 12 used for cost recovery in this proceeding. The Solar PSA Projects are recovered from  
 13 ratepayers through the Solar Power Rider ("SPR"), whereas the Solar PPAs are recovered  
 14 through the Fuel Adjustment Clause ("FAC"). Since the SPR allocates a larger share of  
 15 costs to residential customers (41.8%) than the FAC (35.9%), I&M's portfolio of solar  
 16 projects that is more heavily weighted towards PSAs than PPAs means that residential  
 17 customers are paying a higher proportionate burden of the net revenue requirement  
 18 collected from ratepayers. Specifically, the Solar PSA Projects have a 2026 residential  
 19 revenue requirement of [REDACTED] million, whereas the Solar PSA Projects' revenue  
 20 requirement is only \$ [REDACTED] million. Put another way, the Solar PSA Projects account for  
 21 63% of the nameplate capacity and [REDACTED] % of the expected annual generation of the four solar

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<sup>4</sup> I&M Confidential Workpaper AJW-3 (where the sum of cells B31 through AJ31 in tab "PSA OPCO Rev Req Levelized" is \$ [REDACTED]).

<sup>5</sup> I&M Confidential Workpaper AJW-3.

1 projects, yet they account for █ % of the total Indiana jurisdictional revenue requirement  
2 and █ % of the forecasted 2026 revenue requirement for residential customers specifically.  
3 This illustrates how the Solar PSA Projects are not only █, but that █  
4 expense is borne in larger proportion by residential customers.

5 **Q. Could I&M have procured the Solar PSA Projects using a PPA structure instead of**  
6 **a PSA structure?**

7 **A.** Based on information provided in I&M's confidential Workpaper MAB-1C, █

8 █  
9 █  
10 █  
11 █  
12 █

13 **Q. Do you have any other observations about the Solar PSA and PPA Projects?**

14 **A.** It has been conventional wisdom that larger generation projects can offer an "economies  
15 of scale" benefit to ratepayers. █

16 █  
17 █  
18 █

19 █ In my review of the projects, I did not reach a conclusion as to whether this result  
20 was due to specifics of these four projects or a larger market trend.

21 Regardless, I believe the other headwinds identified by I&M in its testimony with  
22 respect to procuring renewable capacity further reinforces the relevance of distributed  
23 rooftop solar and community solar as solutions warranting far greater attention and analysis

1 in future IRP processes. Likewise, the LCOEs of the projects call into question the fairness  
2 of the current, much smaller and extraordinarily volatile compensation rates provided to  
3 distributed solar and small power production facilities under I&M's current tariffs. These  
4 types of solar can benefit from avoiding lengthy PJM and MISO interconnection queues  
5 that often entail expensive interconnection costs that can easily result in the tens of millions  
6 of dollars in project costs. While the methodology for setting the compensation rate for  
7 Excess Distributed Generation tariffs is provided by statute, I&M has considerable  
8 discretion to propose additional options for consumers through the Alternative Regulatory  
9 Plan statute. CAC would welcome the opportunity to discuss such options further with  
10 I&M and other stakeholders so that smaller resources that can complement I&M's utility-  
11 scale resources can also be pursued to the benefit of ratepayers.

12 **Q. What do you recommend regarding the Solar PSA Projects?**

13 **A.** I recommend that the Commission deny the Solar PSA Projects and approve the Solar PPA  
14 Projects. In lieu of the Solar PSA Projects, I&M should pursue more cost effective solar  
15 PPA projects and/or wind PPA projects as well as creating one or more tariff options for  
16 distributed solar and third-party community solar.

**c. Federal Production Tax Credit ("PTC") Benefits**

17 **Q. What is I&M proposing for the Solar PSA Projects regarding federal tax credits?**

18 **A.** I&M is proposing to utilize the federal production tax credit on both of the Solar PSA  
19 Projects. I&M proposes that it forecast the total value of the PTCs earned over the first ten  
20 years and levelize those costs over a twenty-year period. As PTCs are earned, I&M would  
21 defer the difference between the produced PTC value and the annual amortized PTC  
22 expense as a regulatory liability.

1 **Q. What is the impact to ratepayers if I&M’s proposal to levelize the PTC over a 20-year**  
2 **period is approved?**

3 **A.** This approach would result in ratepayers experiencing a higher revenue requirement and a  
4 larger bill increase during the first ten years of the Solar PSA Projects and a lower revenue  
5 requirement and lower bill increase during the subsequent 10-year period relative to a  
6 traditional ratemaking approach that would pass along the benefits of the PTC to ratepayers  
7 as they are earned (i.e., over the first 10 years of operation).

8 **Q. Does this approach benefit I&M?**

9 **A.** Yes. While I&M tries to frame its proposal as benefitting customers by smoothing and  
10 reducing associated rate volatility, I&M states that this approach “increases I&M’s cash  
11 flows and reduces risk that I&M’s credits metrics will decline.”<sup>6</sup>

12 **Q. Do you have concerns about I&M’s approach?**

13 **A.** Yes. As detailed above, I&M’s residential customers are already facing widespread bill  
14 unaffordability and need bill relief now. Yet, I&M’s proposal to spread the production tax  
15 credit benefits over a longer time period would result in a higher immediate bill impact to  
16 I&M ratepayers. The acute, real affordability concerns of I&M’s ratepayers today and in  
17 the near future outweigh the more speculative benefits associated with I&M’s proposal ten  
18 to twenty years into the future. Therefore, it is in the best interest of ratepayers and  
19 residential customers in particular for I&M to pass along all production tax credit benefits  
20 earned by the Solar PSA Projects to ratepayers as quickly as possible.

21 **Q. What do you recommend?**

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<sup>6</sup> Williamson Direct Testimony, p. 11, line 11, through p. 12, line 6.

1    **A.**    I recommend that, if the Commission approves the Solar PSA Projects contrary to my  
 2            recommendation, it direct I&M to return all production tax credit benefits to ratepayers  
 3            over a 10-year period instead of I&M’s proposed 20-year period. Furthermore, I  
 4            recommend that any increase in federal tax benefits not included in I&M’s cost estimates,  
 5            such as any bonus adders that might ultimately be realized but not fully reflected in I&M’s  
 6            estimates, be fully passed on to ratepayers as quickly as possible.

### III.    IRP and RFP

7    **Q.**    **Does CAC participate in opportunities regarding I&M’s resource planning?**

8    **A.**    CAC actively participates as a stakeholder in I&M’s Integrated Resource Plan (“IRP”)  
 9            process, including I&M’s 2021 IRP. CAC’s staff and consultants attend I&M’s public IRP  
 10           meetings and technical stakeholder meetings, serve informal data requests, provide  
 11           informal comments in response to many public IRP meetings, and submit comments on  
 12           I&M’s final IRP and the subsequent draft Director’s Report. CAC also reviews and  
 13           provides input on draft Requests for Proposals when I&M allows for this opportunity,  
 14           which CAC greatly appreciates. In summary, CAC is a very active and constructive  
 15           participant in I&M’s IRP and RFP processes, while advocating for outcomes consistent  
 16           with our priorities as a consumer and environmental advocate.

17           While CAC’s comments<sup>7</sup> on I&M’s 2021 IRP pointed out some flaws and  
 18           disagreements with the process, assumptions, data, and methodologies used by I&M, CAC

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<sup>7</sup> Chelsea Hotaling, et al., “Report on Indiana Michigan Power Company’s 2021 Integrated Resource Plan,” submitted to the IURC on August 3, 2022, 2020,  
[https://www.in.gov/iurc/files/IM-IN-2021-IRP-CAC-Earthjustice-VS-Comments-8-8-2022\\_Redacted.pdf](https://www.in.gov/iurc/files/IM-IN-2021-IRP-CAC-Earthjustice-VS-Comments-8-8-2022_Redacted.pdf).

1 does not dispute that it is reasonable and prudent for I&M to close the Rockport power  
2 plant on the schedule identified and procure at least 2,100 MW of solar and wind generation  
3 and 60 MW of battery storage by 2028. However, I do have concerns about the high  
4 demand and low supply of wind projects in Indiana, and I urge I&M to continue its efforts  
5 to procure cost-effective wind PPAs that can benefit customers and complement its solar  
6 resources. I believe this highlights the urgency of addressing local siting barriers in Indiana  
7 and expanding regional transmission capacity to increase Hoosier access to low-cost out-  
8 of-state wind facilities to the extent demand cannot be fulfilled by in-state projects at a  
9 reasonable cost.

10 **Q. Do you have any concerns about the Request for Proposals from which the Solar PSA**  
11 **Projects and Solar PPA Projects were selected?**

12 **A.** Yes. I&M applied unduly restrictive criteria that limited potential bidders. These provisions  
13 result in fewer projects bidding into the RFP, meaning there is less competition between  
14 projects. Ultimately, consumers could pay higher costs as a result of restrictions that  
15 prevent more cost-effective projects from participating or being selected.

16 **Q. Please describe the concerns you have regarding the RFP's geographic restrictions.**

17 **A.** I&M applied restrictive geographic requirements in its RFP. Wind projects were limited to  
18 Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, or Illinois. Solar (and storage) projects were limited to Indiana  
19 and Michigan.

20 I&M's restrictive geographic siting requirements means that projects that are  
21 potentially more cost-effective and provide better value to ratepayers, but are located  
22 outside of those states, would not be eligible for consideration by I&M. The arbitrary nature  
23 of these restrictions is evident from the differing geographic restrictions between wind and



1 solar. If a wind project in Illinois or Ohio is eligible, so too should a solar project located  
2 in these states. In comments submitted to I&M regarding its draft 2022 RFP, CAC  
3 recommended that Ohio be an eligible location for solar projects. While I recognize there  
4 are benefits to I&M procuring a portion of its resource portfolio from resources in-state  
5 and located closer to load, and I do not object to I&M's stated preference for projects that  
6 provide economic benefits to Indiana and Michigan,<sup>8</sup> that does not mean I&M should not  
7 consider adding some resources from other locations if they can provide value to ratepayers  
8 without creating an undue risk with respect to deliverability. In an inflationary environment  
9 where there is high demand for both new solar and wind projects, I&M should cast as wide  
10 a net as possible when considering potential resources to ensure it is not inadvertently  
11 excluding many beneficial projects from consideration.

12 **Q. Please describe the concerns you have with respect to the RFP's interconnection**  
13 **requirements.**

14 **A.** In both its 2022 and 2023 All-Source RFPs, I&M required projects interconnecting to have  
15 completed Phase 3 of MISO's Definitive Planning Phase ("DPP") and have the Final DPP  
16 SIS and Network Upgrade Facilities Study and have secured Firm Transmission into PJM.<sup>9</sup>  
17 These are very restrictive requirements, as projects will have had to have been quite far  
18 along the interconnection process in order to qualify. While it is understandable that I&M  
19 seeks to mitigate interconnection cost and delay risks, a more nuanced and flexible  
20 approach would be to allow for projects earlier in the interconnection process to still be  
21 eligible to respond to RFPs, but to score them lower in this category when evaluating these

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<sup>8</sup> 2022 I&M All Source RFP, Section 3.6.


<sup>9</sup> 2022 I&M All Source RFP, Section 3.9.3.

1 projects relative to projects that are farther along the interconnection process. This would  
2 allow I&M to consider more projects that could still come online by the timeline needed  
3 while still taking into consideration that projects earlier in the interconnection process have  
4 additional risks.

5 Another issue CAC commented on in response to I&M's draft 2022 and 2023 RFPs  
6 pertains to the issue of interconnection rights at I&M's Rockport power plant. None of the  
7 four solar projects proposed by I&M in this proceeding utilized these interconnection  
8 rights. Yet, as Rockport's capacity is retired – all of it by 2028 – it will allow for alternative  
9 resources to take its place. Repurposing Rockport's current interconnection rights for  
10 renewable energy and battery storage resources in the future would allow those new  
11 resources to skip the lengthy interconnection queue and avoid grid improvement costs,  
12 delays, and other unexpected modifications.

13 Making this proposition even more valuable is the fact that southwestern Indiana  
14 where Rockport is located is the area of Indiana most likely to qualify for significant  
15 additional federal tax credits and can reduce resource costs passed on to customers.  
16 Specifically, the Rockport site and all of the entire area surrounding it appear to qualify as  
17 federally designated Energy Communities, making solar, battery energy storage, and other  
18 types of clean generation sited in these areas eligible for a bonus 10% federal investment  
19 tax credit or production tax credit. The cost- and time-saving aspects of repurposing  
20 Rockport's interconnection rights in combination with the availability of lucrative,  
21 additional federal tax incentives for these projects provide a huge upside for I&M's  
22 customers for locating renewable energy and battery energy storage projects at the  
23 Rockport site or using its interconnection rights.

**Figure 3. Rockport Power Plant Relative to Federally Designated Energy Communities<sup>10</sup>**



1           While I&M’s 2022 RFP did not expressly allow for use of its Rockport injection  
 2           rights, I&M’s 2023 RFP did expressly allow for natural gas combustion turbines or battery  
 3           energy storage systems to propose using a portion of the Rockport site, while prohibiting  
 4           other technologies from using the Rockport site. To its credit, I&M did also clarify that  
 5           certain off-site projects are eligible for Rockport’s injection: “I&M will offer the Rockport  
 6           injection point to offsite projects of any generation type, however, such proposals will need  
 7           to demonstrate site control that does not introduce an unacceptable level of risk and

<sup>10</sup> This figure currently shows areas that the U.S. Department of Energy has determined meet the following eligibility requirement: “Census tracts and directly adjoining tracts that have had coal mine closures since 1999 or coal-fired electric generating unit retirements since 2009.” Additional Energy Communities not currently shown will also be designated later in May 2023. In addition, brownfields are eligible but are not shown.

<https://arcgis.netl.doe.gov/portal/apps/experiencebuilder/experience/?id=a2ce47d4721a477a8701bd0e08495e1d>

1       uncertainty with respect to execution, schedule, and cost.”<sup>11</sup> However, I&M limited both  
2       the use of its Rockport site and injection rights only to projects using a PSA model and  
3       expressly prohibited PPAs.<sup>12</sup> This means that a solar facility sited nearby the Rockport  
4       plant could not bid a PPA project into the 2023 RFP, and all solar or solar-plus-storage  
5       facilities sited at the Rockport plant were ineligible.

6       **Q.    What do you recommend regarding I&M’s interconnection requirements in its All-**  
7       **Source RFPs?**

8       **A.**    I recommend that I&M not include any undue barriers or restrictions for project  
9       interconnection as part of its All-Source RFPs, including allowing projects earlier in the  
10      interconnection queue to bid into the RFPs and using scoring criteria as appropriate to  
11      reflect the higher risk of earlier-stage projects. I also recommend that I&M utilize existing  
12      interconnection rights at its Rockport power plant for renewable energy and/or battery  
13      storage projects.

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<sup>11</sup> 2023 All-Source RFP, Section 2.16.

<sup>12</sup> 2023 All-Source RFP, Section 2.16.

#### IV. CONCLUSION

1    **Q.    What are your recommendations?**

2    **A.    I recommend that the Commission:**


- 3            •    Deny the Solar PSA Projects and direct I&M to procure more renewable energy  
4                    through cost-effective PPAs;
- 5            •    Approve the Solar PPA Projects;
- 6            •    If it approves the Solar PSA Projects, deny I&M's request to levelize the PTC  
7                    over a 20-year period and instead direct I&M to return the full benefits of the PTC  
8                    to ratepayers as they are earned (i.e., over a 10-year period).
- 9            •    Direct I&M to "cast a wide net" as it procures additional resources to replace  
10                   Rockport, including allowing projects from a broad geographic area to submit  
11                   bids, removing undue restrictions on the use of the Rockport site and  
12                   interconnection rights for prospective replacement projects, and to create new  
13                   tariffs that enable consumers to invest in distributed generation and community  
14                   solar while receiving a stable and fair compensation rate for their excess  
15                   generation.

16   **Q.    Does this conclude your testimony?**

17   **A.    Yes.**

**VERIFICATION**

I, Ben Inskeep, affirm under penalties of perjury that the foregoing representations are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Ben Inskeep

May 19, 2023\_\_\_\_\_

**Attachment BI-1: Benjamin Inskeep's Expert Witness Experience****Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission**

<b>Cause No.</b>	<b>Case Description</b>
38703 FAC 133-S1	AES Indiana Eagle Valley Outage
45504	AES Indiana Excess Distributed Generation Tariff
45505	NIPSCO Excess Distributed Generation Tariff
45506	I&M Excess Distributed Generation Tariff
45508	Duke Energy Indiana Excess Distributed Generation Tariff
45700	NIPSCO Michigan City Coal Ash Compliance Project
45701	I&M Demand-Side Management Plan 2023-2025
45722	CenterPoint Securitization of AB Brown
45740	Duke Energy Indiana and International Paper Special Contract
45749	Duke Energy Indiana Coal Ash Compliance Project
45772	NIPSCO Electric Rate Case
45775	Duke Energy Indiana Low-Income Consumer Protections
45795	CenterPoint Culley East Coal Ash Compliance Project
45797	NIPSCO Schahfer Coal Ash Compliance Project
45803	Duke Energy Indiana Demand-Side Management Plan 2024-2026
45836	CenterPoint Wind Project CPCN
45843	AES Indiana EV Portfolio

**Kentucky Public Service Commission**

<b>Case No.</b>	<b>Case Description</b>
2020-00174	Kentucky Power's 2020 Rate Case
2020-00349	Kentucky Utilities' 2020 Rate Case
2020-00350	Louisville Gas & Electric's 2020 Rate Case