FILED
August 3, 2022
INDIANA UTILITY
REGULATORY COMMISSION

STATE OF INDIANA

INDIANA UTILITY REGULATORY COMMISSION

PETITION OF SOUTHERN INDIANA GAS AND ELECTRIC)	
COMPANY D/B/A CENTERPOINT ENERGY INDIANA SOUTH)	
PURSUANT TO INDIANA CODE CH. 8-1-40.5 FOR (1))	
AUTHORITY TO (A) ISSUE SECURITIZATION BONDS; (B))	
COLLECT SECURITIZATION CHARGES; AND (C) ENCUMBER)	
SECURITIZATION PROPERTY WITH A LIEN AND SECURITY)	
INTEREST; (2) A DETERMINATION OF TOTAL QUALIFIED)	
COSTS AND AUTHORIZATION OF RELATED ACCOUNTING)	
TREATMENT; (3) AUTHORIZATION OF ACCOUNTING)	
TREATMENT RELATED TO ISSUANCE OF SECURITIZATION)	
BONDS AND IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITIZATION)	CAUSE NO. 45722
CHARGES; (4) APPROVAL OF PROPOSED TERMS AND)	CHOOL IVO ICIZZ
STRUCTURE FOR THE SECURITIZATION FINANCING; (5))	
APPROVAL OF PROPOSED TARIFFS TO (A) IMPLEMENT THE)	
SECURITIZATION CHARGES AUTHORIZED BY THE)	
FINANCING ORDER IN THIS PROCEEDING, (B) REFLECT A)	
CREDIT FOR ACCUMULATED DEFERRED INCOME TAXES,)	
AND (C) REFLECT A REDUCTION IN PETITIONER'S BASE)	
RATES AND CHARGES TO REMOVE ANY QUALIFIED COSTS)	
FROM BASE RATES; AND (6) ESTABLISHMENT OF A TRUE-UP)	
MECHANISM PURSUANT TO INDIANA CODE § 8-1-40.5-12(c).)	

INDIANA OFFICE OF UTILITY CONSUMER COUNSELOR

PUBLIC'S EXHIBIT NO. 8

TESTIMONY OF WITNESS STEVEN HELLER

AUGUST 3, 2022

Respectfully submitted,

T. Jason Haas

Attorney No. 34983-29 Deputy Consumer Counselor

TESTIMONY OF OUCC WITNESS STEVEN HELLER CAUSE NO. 45722 SOUTHERN INDIANA GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY D/B/A CENTERPOINT ENERGY INDIANA SOUTH

I. <u>INTRODUCTION</u>

1	Q:	Please state your name and business address.
2	A:	My name is Steven Heller. My business address is 3 Fairbanks Ct, Woodbury, NY
3		11797.
4	Q:	By whom are you employed and what is your position?
5	A:	I am President of Analytical Aid, and a consultant to Saber Partners, LLC, ("Saber
6		Partners") solely for purposes of evaluating this Indiana securitization petition.
7	Q:	Please describe your educational background and professional experience.
8	A:	I have a B.A: from Union College in Computer Science / Chemistry and an M.B.A:
9		in Finance from NYU. I have over 38 years of experience in structuring and
10		analyzing real estate and non-real estate asset backed securities ("ABS") while
11		being employed at firms including Salomon Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Credit Suisse,
12		and Andrew Davidson & Co. My real estate ABS experience includes well over
13		100 residential mortgage, commercial mortgage, and PACE assessment financings.
14		My non-real estate ABS experience includes several dozen Student Loan, Auto,
15		and Pharmaceutical Royalty transactions.
16		I also have extensive experience with non-ABS transactions such as
17		Stranded Cost / Rate Reduction Bond or Ratepayer-Backed Bond financings with
18		investor-owned utility securitization similar to the proposal by Southern Indiana
19		Gas and Electric Company d/b/a CenterPoint Energy Indiana South ("CEI
20		South'"'). With respect to Ratepayer-Backed Bonds similar to the recovery bonds

1		CenterPoint proposes, my experience includes being structuring agent on the		
2		following 7 AAA (S&P and Fitch) and Aaa (Moody's) rated investor-owned utility		
3		Ratepayer-Backed Bond transactions over 14 years:		
4		1. 2016 \$1.294 Billion for Duke Energy Florida ("DEF") Project Finance		
5		LLC);		
6		2. 2009 \$64 million Monongahela Power ("MP") Environmental Funding		
7		LLC;		
8		3. 2009 \$22 million for Potomac Edison ("PE") Environmental Funding		
9		LLC;		
10		4. 2007 \$652 million for Florida Power & Light ("FP&L") Storm		
11		Recovery Bonds (FPL Recovery Funding LLC);		
12		5. 2006 \$1.739 billion for AEP Texas Central (AEP Texas Central		
13		Transition Funding II LLC);		
14		6. 2005 \$115 million for West Penn Power ("WPP") Funding LLC; and		
15		7. 2005 \$1.851 billion for CenterPoint Energy Houston		
16		Transition Bond Company II, LLC		
17 18	Q:	Have you testified before in any financing order proceedings for ratepayer-backed bonds?		
19	A:	Yes.		
20	Q:	In which proceedings?		
21	A:	Duke Energy Progress and Duke Energy Carolinas (Docket No. E-2, Sub 1262		
22		Docket No. E-7, Sub 1243) and Southern California Edison ("SCE") (A 20-07-		
23		008).		

1 Q: Was Barclays the financial or structuring advisor to any of the applicants in 2 those proceedings? 3 A: Yes, in the SCE proceeding. 4 Q: WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY? 5 A: I discuss the function of the Ratepayer-Backed Bonds' modeler and structuring 6 agent and give some insight into the different perspectives and objectives of the 7 structuring agent when working for an investment bank, as opposed to when the 8 structuring agent is an independent member of the financing team, and the time it 9 takes usually to complete this process, especially for a new issuer. 10 I also discuss how these bonds would be marketed, whether as asset-backed 11 securities to a much smaller market as proposed by Barclays, or as corporate 12 securities which makes them eligible to a much broader and deeper market to lower 13 costs to the ratepayer. 14 Finally, I discuss what an "optimal" structure is for this issuance – a term 15 that Mr. Chang uses in CEI South's testimony and discussed in this case's recent Technical Conference with the Commission.¹ 16 17 To help the Commission and staff with any technical terms, except as 18 otherwise defined in this testimony, terms I use have the meanings assigned to them 19 in the Glossary, attached to the testimony of OUCC witnesses Joseph S. Fichera 20 and Paul Sutherland.

Was this similar to the testimony in the Duke Energy and SCE cases?

21

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Q:

A:

Yes.

¹ Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3, Direct Testimony of Eric K. Chang, p. 30, l. 23.

Q: What information did you review in preparation for this testimony?

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A: I reviewed CEI South's testimony and the descriptions of the securities, the 3 assumptions, and other aspect of the proposed structure, to evaluate the outcomes and conclusions CEI South put forth. In order to evaluate someone else's financial work product, it is necessary to understand what they did, their assumptions, which variables can be independently verified, and why they did it, to properly give an informed opinion regarding conclusions. Consequently, I reviewed Petitioner's witnesses Brett A. Jerasa's and Eric K. Chang's testimonies and responses to OUCC data requests to familiarize myself with CEI South's basic assumptions 10 regarding Ratepayer-Backed Bond securitization and the methodology employed to determine whether it was reasonable and accurate, based on my professional experience in similar situations. Correct financial analysis requires context as well as calculations.

II. HOW THE STRUCTURING AGENT/ADVISOR AFFECTS RATEPAYER **INTERESTS**

- 14 Q: As the structuring agent on the seven transactions previously referenced, did 15 vou perform alternative scenario analyses?
- Yes. I prepared analyses on timing of a transaction under different market 16 A: 17 conditions, different bond structures, and requirements of the issuer and 18 commission, to help the decision makers make informed decisions regarding 19 securitization bonds.
- 20 Q: As the structuring agent of those seven transactions and expert witness in three 21 others and, based on your review of the status of the current proposed 22 transaction, did you prepare many more scenario analyses to compare costs to 23 the ratepayer than those CEI South presents by in its testimony?
- 24 A: Yes. I normally run a number of structures, varying the number of tranches and

1		tranche sizes, to target different average lives to evaluate which produced the lowest		
2		cost and largest NPV savings to ratepayers.		
3 4 5	Q:	What data must be provided when structuring a utility securitization/Ratepayer-Backed Bond to compare costs to the ratepayer in alternate scenarios?		
6	A:	Generally, the first step is obtaining data from the sponsoring utility on the		
7		following:		
8		1. Long-term demand forecast by customer class to the		
9		expected final term of the financing;		
10		2. Historical collection curve by customer class;		
11		3. Targeted proceeds - how much money is to be raised		
12		including all recoverable expenses;		
13		4. Allocation of financing cost by customer class;		
14		5. Targeted term (maturity) of financing;		
15		6. Targeted Settlement Date of initial offering;		
16		7. U.S. Treasury yield curve and assumed pricing credit spreads for		
17		average lives of tranches of two years and up; and		
18		8. Historical demand variance - actual six-month vs forecast six-month.		
19 20	Q:	As the structuring agent, how do you prepare a model to compare costs to the ratepayer under different scenarios?		
21	A:	Using the data described above, an initial model can be set up to provide the		
22		required amount of financing that is paid back over the desired term. This is done		
23		by using a charge per class determined by the model so that when applied to the		
24		demand forecast and collected at the pace of the collection curves for each class, it		
25		allocates the cost of the financing across classes, as required, by the allocation		

	provided. Scenarios are then modeled based upon alternative inputs for targeted
	proceeds, cost allocation, and terms, to determine the structure with the lowest all-
	in cost of funds. Over the course of the pre-pricing period of a bond offering, many
	deal structures will be analyzed repeatedly, as benchmark U.S treasuries and credit
	spreads move around.
Q:	Were you able to review any scenario analyses prepared by CEI South or prepare your own additional scenario analyses that they say "optimizes" customer benefits?
A:	No, not in any great detail. This is because CEI South conducted very limited
	analyses and provided only some of the basic data needed for such a model.
Q:	Could this modeling be conducted in this case as part of a pre-bond issuance review process?
A:	Yes, the type of modeling I describe above can and should be conducted as part of
	a pre-bond issuance review process to ensure that customer costs be minimized and
	present value savings to customers maximized to the extent possible.
Q:	Would the underwriter perform an examination of alternatives to maximize present value for ratepayers and optimize the transaction for ratepayers?
A:	Possibly but not guaranteed. The underwriter's model is generally only reviewed
	for accuracy, not for policy objectives like minimizing the charge on customers or
	to ensure the lowest charge to the customer, which I would define as "optimal" for
	the ratepayer and CEI South. This is an important distinction.
	A: Q: A:

III. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST WITH RATEPAYERS' BEST INTERESTS ARE CREATED WHEN AN UNDERWRITER IS ALSO THE STRUCTURING AGENT

You have modeled Ratepayer-Backed bond deals at investment banks, and 1 Q: 2 reviewed testimony in three major utility applications and as an independent modeler. What differences have you experienced that are relevant for the 3 4 Commission to consider in evaluating CEI South's proposal? 5 A: At an investment bank, my typical direction came from a syndicate or trading desk 6 with a subjective guidance on average life targets and number of classes or tranches 7 including scheduled maturities. The objectives are usually the easy sale with 8 minimum underwriting risk. In contrast to this incentive to sell quickly, when 9 consulting with the active involvement of an independent financial advisor, I have 10 access to a full supply of spreads for different average lives (and potentially 11 payment windows/principal amortizations and scheduled maturities). Instead of 12 being told the structure to create, I evaluated a larger number of alternatives to 13 discover the best structure with the maximum present value savings for the 14 ratepayer, rather than the structure that is the most advantageous to the underwriters 15 and their sales and trading departments. 16 Q: Do you understand the meaning of an "optimal" outcome? 17 A: I define optimal as in the previous question as generating the maximum present 18 value savings for the ratepayer. I am not certain what meaning Barclays and CEI 19 South are using in this transaction when they use the term "optimal." In previous 20 testimony I saw in the SCE proceeding, Barclays defined optimal as lowest cost of 21 funds, meeting investor maturity preferences, etc. These are not necessarily the

same as maximizing present value savings for the ratepayers.

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1 2 3 4	Q:	Based on your experience, when an investment bank served as the structuring agent for a utility securitization, did the structuring agent recommend structures that facilitated the quickest sale and not necessarily the lowest charges to the ratepayer?
5	A:	Yes, that is correct.
6 7	Q:	Could you provide another example of this after the financing order was issued that wasn't decided before the financing order was issued?
8	A:	Yes. In the most recent Ratepayer-Backed Bond I modeled for Duke Energy Florida
9		("DEF"), the underwriters wanted a 4-tranche structure to provide larger tranche
10		sizes. However, the commission's independent financial advisor (Saber Partners)
11		and the utility asked for alternatives to be examined. Through my analysis (with the
12		underwriters providing credit spreads for the yield curve), Saber Partners
13		recommended a 5-tranche structure with sufficient tranche sizes and narrower
14		principal payment windows, which had a lower all-in cost of funds to the ratepayer.
15		This is the deal that went to market (after a modest amount of resistance from the
16		bank). Without an independent and experienced financial advisor in the process,
17		the underwriter's structure would have been used and the other alternatives not
18		examined. This particular transaction is also discussed in the testimony of OUCC
19		witness Paul Sutherland.
20 21 22	Q:	Are there any other material differences between structuring under the direction of an investment bank/underwriter, like Barclays, versus an independent modeler not employed by an underwriter of that transaction?
23	A:	Yes. Additionally, the investment bank typically charges a fee for structuring -
24		between \$300,000 and \$500,000 - and typically wants access to the underwriting
25		fees, which are higher in amounts since they are based on a percentage of the bond
26		size and not a fixed fee. This fee is roughly three to five times the fee I accept,
27		which is fair for the work involved. All transactions I worked on have achieved a

1 AAA rating from all three nationally recognized rating agencies in the same amount 2 of time as when I was at Credit Suisse, and all transactions I worked on were sold 3 to investors at tight spreads. 4 Q: How important is accuracy in modeling customer charges to achieving a AAA 5 rating while also achieving the lowest customer securitization charge? 6 A: It is very important to anticipate and respond to rating agency concerns regarding 7 sensitivity to changes in sales, write-offs, and other variables. Rating agencies 8 provide stress scenarios which specify stressed demand forecasts as well as stressed 9 collections. For each stress scenario, it is necessary to model what the charge for 10 each class would be at each true up. This is simulated in the model as accurately as 11 would be if the client was doing the true up in the future, in response to changes in 12 demand and collections. IV. CEI SOUTH RATEPAYER-BACKED BONDS SHOULD NOT BE TREATED AS ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES ("ABS")

identified in connection with structuring and marketing securitized utility
Ratepayer-Backed Bonds?

A: Any decisions to structure the proposed bonds as ABS when they should be
structured as corporate Ratepayer-Backed Bonds, as in the DEF Project Finance
securitization bond precedent in 2016 and SCE Recovery Funding ultimately were,

would likely reduce the potential savings to ratepayers.

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Q:

The two structures are different in all material ways that are of concern to investors. ABS are typically described with scenario analyses that certainly include prepayment risk and might also include risk of loss. Even AAA asset-backed securities with little or no risk of loss trade at a wider spread than AAA corporates,

In addition to the problems identified above, what other problems have you

at least in part, because of variability in the timing of principal return.

Generally, AAA Ratepayer-Backed Bonds have no material risk of loss and no material risk of timing variability because of the frequent true up mechanism. This is because utilities' forecasts for demand for a 6-to-12-month period are typically within a very modest variance from actual demand, which means cashflow is always very close to what is expected. The strength and benefits of the true up mechanism cannot be emphasized enough. Commissions' financial advisors have challenged underwriting firms' pricing utility securitization bonds based on ABS credit spreads versus high-quality corporate credit spreads, as well as other issues that could affect pricing. They have done so to negotiate credit spreads (and therefore the cost to the ratepayer), based on the power of the regulatory true up mechanism to set the charge on all customers in a way designed to ensure principal payment timing certainty and the legal protections from the state not to interfere in the transaction.

From my 38 years of experience, I cannot emphasize enough this fundamental difference: ABS begin with a fixed asset pool and investors will, generally, receive the cashflow from those assets (protected from credit loss though a subordination of claims involving a senior piece and a junior piece, but with no protection against variations in the timing of principal payments) whenever the payments happen to arrive. This represents a material prepayment and extension risk. It means either investors receive their money back sooner or later than expected, if at all. These risks and the complexities associated with them are either not present or not material in recovery bonds and other utility securitizations.

Ratepayer-Backed Bonds begin with a bond repayment schedule and have a true up mechanism to ensure that is what investors will receive on time. It makes up for losses or changes in demand by redistributing the charge on all consumers in the utility's service territory on a joint basis. Paying consumers make up for losses from non-paying consumers. That is not a fixed pool of receivables like ABS. It is a charge on an essential commodity and, if consumers leave the service territory, the charge goes up on the remaining customers. If more consumers come into the service territory, the charge goes down. All the Ratepayer-Backed Bonds I have been involved with prohibit prepayment, and the extension risk was not material.

A:

In contrast, ABS investors who buy a pool of auto loans, credit cards, or mortgages must look for repayment to a fixed pool. If one of the payors in the pool defaults on their mortgage, auto loan, or credit card, that loss is not redistributed to the mortgages, auto, loans or credit cards of others in the pool. Those mortgages, auto loans or credit cards are fixed. Their obligations do not go up to ensure the bondholders are paid on time. But, if that happens in a utility securitization, the charges on those who are paying do go up. It's an apples to oranges comparison when comparing ABS to utility securitizations like the securitization bonds CEI South proposes in the slides from the Commission's July 7, 2022 technical conference.

O: How long does it usually take to go from financing order to a sale?

It varies. A good example of what was thought up front and what later occurred is in the 2021 Duke Energy Progress transaction. In that proceeding Tom Heath, of

1		Duke Energy, who is the equivalent of Mr. Jerasa from CEI South, responded to
2		this exact question from a commissioner at an evidentiary hearing: "Three and a
3		half, four months kind of timeframe is really what we will need at a minimum from
4		the time the Financing Order is issued."2 It is important to note that he said, "at a
5		minimum".
6	Q:	How long did it actually take in that proceeding?
7	A:	Based on the issuance of financing order and the date of sale of the bonds in
8		November, about 6 months.
9	Q:	Does this conclude your testimony?
10	A:	Yes.

² Exhibit SH-1: North Carolina Utility Commission, *Duke Energy Carolina, LLC and Duke Energy Progress, LLC*, Docket No. E-2, Sub 1262 Docket No. E-7, Sub 1243, Tr., V. 1, p. 183 lines 16-19 (January 28, 2021).

2 24 23 22 20 19 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 21 10 9 ∞ \neg \circ $^{\circ}$ 4 ω \sim \vdash TIME: PLACE BEFORE: DOCKET NO. DATE: and Duke Joint Energy Commissioner Commissioner Commissioner Commi Commissioner Chair 10:00 Thursday, Commissioner Petition of leld Recovery 日 E-2, ∀1: Ø a.m. Charlot Ø Progress, <u>ب</u> ioner Z Videoconference dus dus January THE Duke Floyd Jeffrey Financing Kimberly († () VOLUME Daniel G. Lyons ToNola 2:0 \vdash .24 .262 MATTER ₽. LLC, IJ Energy 28, • \mathcal{B} Gray p.m. Mitchell, U. \mathbb{A} for ⊌. O McKissick, 2021 Clodfelter Orders Brown-Bland Hughes Carolinas, Duffley Issuance Presiding Чĸ 0 LLC, Н Storm

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1	TABLE OF CONTENTS					
2	EXAMINATIONS					
3	AFFIDAVIT OF JONATHAN BYRD					
4	THOMAS J. HEATH, JR.					
5	Direct Examination by Mr. Jeffries 25					
6	Prefiled Direct Testimony 29					
7	Prefiled Rebuttal Testimony 66					
8	Cross Examination by Mr. Creech120					
9	Redirect Examination by Mr. Jeffries162					
10	Examination by Commissioner Brown-Bland171					
11	Examination by Commissioner Gray172					
12	Examination by Commissioner Clodfelter175					
13	Examination by Commissioner Duffley187					
14	Examination by Commissioner McKissick189					
15						
16						
17						
18						
19						
20						
21						
22						
23						
24						

1	EXHIBITS
2	IDENTIFIED/ADMITTED
3	Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, and
4	Duke Energy Progress, LLC, Joint
5	Petition and Joint Petition Exhibits
6	A - D/14
7	Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, and
8	Duke Energy Progress, LLC, Notice of
9	Billing Compliance Procedure Letter/15
10	Byrd Attachments 1 - 3/15
11	Agreement and Stipulation of Partial
12	Settlement/22
13	Heath Direct Exhibits 1, 2a - 2f 27/
14	Heath Rebuttal Exhibits 1 and 2 27/
15	(Confidential filed under seal)
16	Public Staff Heath Cross Examination
17	Exhibit 1 138/
18	Public Staff Heath Cross Examination
19	Exhibit 2 157/
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	

Τ	PROCEEDINGS
2	CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. Good morning
3	everyone. Let's come to order and go on the record,
4	please. I'm Charlotte Mitchell, Chair of the
5	Utilities Commission, and with me via remote
6	connection this morning are Commissioners ToNola D.
7	Brown-Bland. Please announce your presence.
8	COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND: Good morning.
9	CHAIR MITCHELL: Commissioner Lyons Gray.
10	COMMISSIONER GRAY: Good morning.
11	CHAIR MITCHELL: Commissioner Daniel
12	Clodfelter.
13	COMMISSIONER CLODFELTER: Yes, good morning.
14	CHAIR MITCHELL: Commissioner Kimberly
15	Duffley.
16	COMMISSIONER DUFFLEY: Good morning.
17	CHAIR MITCHELL: Commissioner Jeffrey
18	Hughes.
19	COMMISSIONER HUGHES: Good morning.
20	CHAIR MITCHELL: And Commissioner Floyd
21	McKissick.
22	COMMISSIONER McKISSICK: Good morning.
23	CHAIR MITCHELL: The Commission now calls
24	for hearing Docket Numbers E-2, Sub 1262 and E-7, Sub

1243, In the Matter of Joint Petition of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, and Duke Energy Progress, LLC, for Issuance of Storm Recovery Financing Orders.

On October 26, 2020, Duke Energy Carolinas and Duke Energy Progress, to which I will refer to as the Companies, filed a Joint Petition for Financing Orders pursuant to North Carolina General Statute § 62-172 seeking authority from the Commission to finance the storm recovery costs incurred by each Company due to Hurricanes Florence, Michael, and Dorian, and Winter Storm Diego. The Petition was supported by testimony from Thomas J. Heath, Jr., Charles N. Atkins II, Melissa Abernathy, Johnathan Byrd, and Shana W. Angers.

On November 6, 2020 the Commission issued an Order scheduling the hearing, requiring filing of testimony, and establishing discovery guidelines. The Scheduling Order, among other things, set this matter for hearing on this date and at this time to be heard remotely using videoconference technology in light of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.

The participation of the Public Staff in this proceeding is authorized pursuant to North Carolina General Statute § 62-15.

And additionally, Petitions to Intervene in the proceeding were filed by Carolina Industrial Group for Fair Utility Rates II and the Carolina Industrial Group for Fair Utility Rates III, which Petitions were granted by Order of this Commission.

Each of these parties to the proceeding has consented, as evidenced by filing made in the dockets, to conducting this hearing remotely using videoconference technology.

On December 21st, 2020, the Public Staff filed the testimony of Calvin C. Craig, as well as the testimony and exhibits of witnesses Joseph Fichera, William Moore, Barry Abramson, Steven Heller, Rebecca Klein, Ryan Maher, Hyman Schoenblum, and Paul Sutherland on behalf of the Public Staff.

On December 22nd, 2020, the Public Staff filed the joint testimony and exhibits of Michael Maness and Michelle Boswell.

On January 6th, 2021, the Public Staff filed corrections to testimonies of witnesses Sutherland, Heller, Fichera, Maness and Boswell.

January 11th, 2021, the Companies filed the rebuttal testimony and exhibits of Thomas Heath, Charles Atkins, and Melissa Abernathy.

On January 13th, 2021, the Public Staff filed a revised version of the Public Staff direct testimony corrections which had been previously filed on January 6th to correct witness Heller correction Item 2, and witness Fichera correction Item 4, as well as the complete corrected testimonies of Public Staff witnesses Sutherland, Heller, Fichera, Maness and Boswell.

On January 25th, 2021, the Companies filed a Notice of Billing Compliance Procedure and the Affidavit and supporting exhibits of Jonathan Byrd.

On that same day, the Companies also filed an errata to Jonathan Byrd's direct testimony.

On January 27th, the Companies and the Public Staff filed a Stipulation of Agreement and Partial Settlement in this proceeding.

Also on January 27th, the Companies filed a motion requesting a temporary waiver of the statutory 135-day timeframe to receive a final order on the Companies' Joint Petition in this proceeding and requesting that the 135-day timeframe be extended by 30 days through and including April 9th, 2021. The Companies maintain that the 30-day extension will grant the Commission time to rule on the prudency of

the Companies' storm recovery costs and the Companies' ongoing respective general rate cases, which determination is required prior to the Companies being able to proceed with securitization.

Finally, and also on January 27th, 2021, the Companies and the Public Staff filed a joint motion to excuse witnesses Byrd, Angers, and Craig from appearing at the hearing today.

That brings us to today.

In compliance with the requirement of the State Government Ethics Act, I remind all members of the Commission of their responsibility to avoid conflicts of interest and inquire at this time whether any member of the Commission has a conflict of interest with respect to matters coming before us this morning.

(No response)

The record will reflect that no one indicated a conflict in this matter.

There appearing to be no conflicts, we will move forward, and I now call on counsel to announce their appearances, beginning with the Companies.

MR. ROBINSON: Good morning, Chair Mitchell, Members of the Commission. My name is Camal Robinson,

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Associate General Counsel, on behalf of Duke Energy
 1
 2
    Carolinas and Duke Energy Progress. Also appearing
 3
    with me from Duke Energy is Mr. Bo Somers.
 4
    Additionally, we have appearing with us from the Law
 5
    Firm of McGuireWoods, Jim Jeffries and Kristin Athens.
              All of our attorneys have filed their
 6
 7
    appearance sheets and have provided them to the court
    reporter via email. Thank you.
 8
 9
              CHAIR MITCHELL: Good morning, Mr. Robinson,
10
    Mr. Somers, Mr. Jeffries, and Ms. Athens.
11
              All right. CIGFUR?
12
              MS. CRESS: Good morning.
                                          This is Christina
13
    Cress with the Law Firm of Bailey & Dixon appearing on
    behalf of CIGFUR II and III.
14
15
              CHAIR MITCHELL: Good morning, Ms. Cress.
16
              All right. And Public Staff?
17
              MR. GRANTMYRE: Good morning Chair Mitchell,
18
    Commissioners. Bill Grantmyre for the Using and
    Consuming Public along with Zeke Creech, Using and
19
20
    Consuming Public. Thank you.
21
              CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. Good morning
22
    Mr. Grantmyre and Mr. Creech.
23
              Before we will begin, I will address the
24
    open motions. The Commission has no questions for
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witnesses Byrd, Angers, and Craig and, therefore, the motion to excuse these witnesses is granted. At the appropriate time, Counsel, I'll entertain motions to admit the prefiled testimonies and exhibits of these witnesses into evidence.

Next, turning to the Companies' motion for a waiver of the 135-day timeframe, I want to hear from the Public Staff, see if the Public Staff has a response to this motion.

Mr. Grantmyre you're -- okay.

MR. GRANTMYRE: We do not oppose it.

MR. CREECH: Madam Chair, just to clarify, you're speaking of which -- I'm sorry.

CHAIR MITCHELL: Mr. Creech, please announce your presence for purposes of our court reporter. I asked if the Public Staff has a response to the Companies' motion for a waiver of the 135-day timeframe.

MR. CREECH: Madam Chair, I'd like to add to my colleague Bill Grantmyre's comments. This is Zeke Creech with the Public Staff. We are actually still reviewing that and would like the opportunity to file some comments with the Commission on that particular point.

1 CHAIR MITCHELL: So Mr. Creech, just so I'm 2 clear, the Public Staff intends to file a response to 3 the Companies' motion? 4 MR. CREECH: I believe that we will. 5 CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. Well, I will refrain from holding on the motion until I receive the 6 7 comments from Public Staff. Do you anticipate those comments will be filed this morning or later today? 8 9 MR. CREECH: I do not know at this time. 10 Let me consult with Mr. Grantmyre and --11 CHAIR MITCHELL: Okay. 12 MR. CREECH: -- we will let you know. 13 CHAIR MITCHELL: Okay. 14 MR. CREECH: Thank you so much. 15 CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. Okay. One last 16 point, housekeeping matter, before I turn to counsel 17 to see if there are any other preliminary matters we 18 need to address before getting into the testimonies 19 scheduled for the day. We will -- obviously, we began 20 at 10 o'clock. We'll go until about 12 o'clock at 21 which point we'll recess for lunch til 1:30. We will 22 resume at 1:30 and we will go until five o'clock this 23 afternoon and we will take a break somewhere in there 24 for our court reporter.

All right. With that, any other preliminary 1 2 matters before we begin? 3 MR. ROBINSON: Chair Mitchell, this is Camal 4 Robinson. I have a few. 5 CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. Please proceed, 6 Mr. Robinson. 7 MR. ROBINSON: Thank you. So Chair 8 Mitchell, at this time we ask that the Companies' 9 Joint Petition, exhibits and appendices be entered 10 into the DEC and DEP records. 11 CHAIR MITCHELL: Mr. Robinson, hearing no 12 objection to your motion, it is allowed. 13 (WHEREUPON, Duke Energy Carolinas, 14 LLC, and Duke Energy Progress, 15 LLC, Joint Petition for Financing 16 Orders, Joint Petition Exhibits A 17 through D are received into 18 evidence.) 19 MR. ROBINSON: Thank you. Chair Mitchell, the next one I have on January 25th, 2021, as you 20 21 indicated, the Companies did file a letter notifying 22 the Commission of alternative billing compliance 23 procedure for DEP with the accompanying affidavit of 24 Jonathan L. Byrd and supporting exhibits. At this

1 time the Companies request that the letter, affidavit, 2 and exhibits be entered into the record. 3 CHAIR MITCHELL: Mr. Robinson, hearing no 4 objection, your motion is allowed. 5 (WHEREUPON, Duke Energy Carolinas, 6 LLC, and Duke Energy Progress, 7 LLC, Notice of Billing Compliance 8 Procedure and Byrd Attachments 1 9 through 3 are received into 10 evidence.) 11 (WHEREUPON, Affidavit of JONATHAN 12 BYRD is copied into the record as 13 if given orally from the stand.) 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA UTILITIES COMMISSION RALEIGH

DOCKET NO. E-2, SUB 1262 DOCKET NO. E-7, SUB 1243

BEFORE THE NORTH CAROLINA UTILITIES COMMISSION

In the Matter of		
Joint Petition of Duke Energy)	
Carolinas, LLC and Duke Energy)	
Progress, LLC for Issuance of Storm)	AFFIDAVIT OF JONATHAN BYRD
Recovery Financing Orders)	
)	
)	

- I, JONATHAN BYRD, first being duly sworn, do depose and state as follows:
- 1. I am the Director, Southeast Pricing & Regulatory Solutions for Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC ("DEC"), Duke Energy Progress, LLC ("DEP", and together with DEC, the "Companies"), and Duke Energy Florida, LLC. My business address is 550 South Tryon Street, Charlotte, North Carolina. I previously filed direct testimony in this proceeding on October 26, 2020.
- 2. The purpose of this affidavit is to explain how DEP will comply with the statutory billing requirements provided in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 62-172(d) prior to the implementation of DEP's new billing system, Customer Connect, planned for November 2021.
- 3. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 62-172(d) requires that a public utility that has obtained a financing order and caused storm recover bonds to be issued to:
 - (1) Explicitly reflect that a portion of the charges on such bill represents storm recovery charges approved in a financing order issued to the public utility and, if the storm recovery property has been transferred to an assignee, must include a statement to the effect that the assignee is the owner of the rights to storm recovery charges and that the public utility or other entity, if applicable, is acting as a collection agent or servicer for the assignee. The tariff applicable to customers must indicate the storm recovery charge and the ownership of the charge.

- (2) Include the storm recovery charge on each customer's bill as a separate line item and include both the rate and the amount of the charge on each bill.
- 4. The Companies' Joint Petition proposes a bond issuance date of June 1, 2021¹, and explains how in order to synchronize the collection of storm recovery charges with the first payment on the storm recovery bonds, the tariffs for DEC and DEP that apply the storm recovery charges will become effective as of the date of issuance of the storm recovery bonds.²
- 5. Accordingly, under the current timeline, DEP will begin billing customers for the storm recovery charge beginning July 1, 2021, or approximately four months prior to implementation of DEP's new billing system Customer Connect planned for November 2021.
- 6. DEP's current billing system, Customer Information Management or "CIM", that DEP will utilize to bill customers for the storm recovery charge prior to implementation of Customer Connect is not specifically capable of displaying for each customer a detailed bill with individual line item charges based on kWh usage. For example, rider charges such as fuel, demand-side management and energy efficiency, etc. are included in a customer's overall kWh charge and are not broken out separately or shown as independent line items. DEP's new billing system, Customer Connect, which again is planned to be implemented in November 2021, will be, however, able to display the storm recovery charge as a separate line item.
- 7. To reprogram and manipulate CIM to allow for the display of the storm recovery charge on each DEP customer bill as an independent, line item charge for the months prior to implementation of Customer Connect is not feasible or cost-effective. Such an endeavor would be expensive, resource intensive and require design, development, implementation and testing of material CIM program changes, all within a less than six-month

¹ Direct Testimony of Shana W. Angers, at 6, Docket Nos, E-2, Sub 1243 and E-2, Sub 1262 (Oct. 26, 2020).

² Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC and Duke Energy Progress, LLC's Joint Petition for Financing Orders, at 24, Docket Nos. E-2, Sub 1243 and E-2, Sub 1262 (Oct. 26, 2020).

timeframe. Moreover, the speed and complexity of such changes would introduce risk of error and failure, as well as the possibility that such implementation would jeopardize other initiatives currently stressing the limits on the CIM legacy billing system, including COVID-19 related billing activities, as well as other rate and regulatory changes required by the North Carolina Utilities Commission.

- 8. Therefore, to comply with the statutory billing requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 62-172(d) utilizing CIM from July to October, my team and I have created a temporary billing solution that is equivalent to the requirement of a separate line item charge and otherwise meets the billing requirements of the statute.
- 9. DEP will provide customers with a bill insert for the months of July, August, September, and October (based on the planned implementation of the Customer Connect billing system in November 2021) that describes the storm recovery charge as a separate charge from the customer's overall, main bill. The bill insert will also explain that the "storm recovery charges [were] approved in a financing order issued to [DEP]" and, if applicable, "a statement to the effect that the assignee is the owner of the rights to storm recovery charges and that the public utility or other entity, if applicable, is acting as a collection agent or servicer for the assignee."
- 10. In addition, the bill insert, as well as the Company's website, will include a bill message that directs customers to a simple website calculator that allows customers to calculate their storm recovery charges, or, alternatively, contact DEP via telephone for questions regarding storm recovery charges.
- 11. Last, DEP will provide general notice to customers regarding the storm recovery charge on the Company's website.

Cause No. 45722 Exhibit SH-1 Page 19 of 196

019

12. Based on my experience as Director, Southeast Pricing and Regulatory Solutions at Duke Energy Corporation, it is my opinion that this temporary and alternative billing procedure created by myself and my team will sufficiently address customer questions regarding storm securitization charges. Moreover, once Customer Connect is implemented, DEP customers will begin to receive a single, detailed bill with an individual line item storm recovery charge.

[FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT]

020

This the 25th of January, 2021.

BY:

onathan Ru

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

Lincoln COUNTY

I certify that Jonathan Byrd personally appeared before me this day, acknowledging to me that she signed the forgoing document.

Witness my hand and notarial seal on this the 25 day of January, 2021.

(Place Notary Stamp Here)

Sheila Lemoine
Notary Public
Lincoln County
North Carolina
My Commission Expires 7/21/2024

Sheila Lemoine
Print Name
Meila Lemoine
Notary Public

My Commission Expires: July 21, 2024

G.S. § 10B-41 NOTARIAL CERTIFICATE FOR ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Lincoln County, North Carolina

I certify that the following person(s) personally appeared before me this day, each acknowledging to me that he or she signed the foregoing document: <u>Jonathan Byrd</u>

Date: January 25, 2021

Sheila Lemoine, Notary Public

My commission expires: July 21, 2024

Shella Lemoine
Notary Public
Lincoln County
North Carolina
My Commission Expires 7/21/2024

I signed this notarial certificate on <u>January 25, 2021</u> according to the emergency video notarization requirements contained in G.S. 10B-25.

Notary Public location during video notarization: Lincoln County

Stated physical location of principal during video notarization: Union County

This certificate is attached to an Affidavit signed by <u>Jonathan Byrd</u> on <u>January 25, 2021</u> and includes <u>6 pages</u> inclusive of this certificate.

Thank you, Chair Mitchell. 1 MR. ROBINSON: 2 My next one, as you also indicated, on January 27th, 3 2021, the Companies and the Public Staff entered into 4 an Agreement and Stipulation of Partial Settlement. 5 At this time I request that the Agreement and Stipulation of Partial Settlement be moved into the 6 7 record. 8 CHAIR MITCHELL: Mr. Robinson, hearing no 9 objection, that motion is allowed as well. 10 (WHEREUPON, Agreement and 11 Stipulation of Partial Settlement 12 received into evidence.) 13 MR. ROBINSON: Okay. Thank you, Chair 14 Mitchell. A question with regards to the testimony, 15 prefiled testimony of Jonathan Byrd and Shana Angers. 16 Chair Mitchell, I'm happy to move those into the 17 record now or if you prefer that to be done at a later 18 time, you let me know. 19 CHAIR MITCHELL: Well, thank you, 20 Mr. Robinson, for the question. What I would like is 21 just for purposes of clarity of the record, have the 22 Company introduce the testimony of its witnesses 23 during the point in the hearing at which the Company 24 witnesses are testifying and then hold the Public

Staff's testimony until the point of the hearing when the Public Staff witnesses are testifying.

So unless there are any other preliminary matters that we need to address we can move forward and, Mr. Robinson, you can move to introduce the testimony of the witnesses that have been excused.

MR. ROBINSON: Thank you, Chair Mitchell.

CHAIR MITCHELL: Okay. Any other preliminary matters, counsel?

MR. ROBINSON: Just one last FYI, Chair Mitchell. So some of our attorneys and witnesses will be receiving some help from our assistants to just get

be receiving some help from our assistants to just get them set up and to locate exhibits to minimize disruption of the flow of the hearing. So I just wanted to alert the Commission and of the intended practice as well as the parties and just ensure to the Commission and the parties that their role is an administrative one purely.

CHAIR MITCHELL: Okay. Understood and thank you for the -- thank you for the notice.

And just one last reminder from me. We are all well versed at functioning remotely these days, but just remember keep your mics on mute unless you are speaking just to minimize background noise and to

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allow our court reporter to hear everything that is
 1
 2
    being said.
 3
               All right. Any other -- counsel, any other
 4
    preliminary matters?
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               MR. ROBINSON: Nothing from the Companies,
 6
    Chair Mitchell.
 7
               CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. Hearing none,
 8
    the case is with you, Mr. Robinson.
 9
               MR. ROBINSON: Thank you, Chair Mitchell.
10
    Our first witness is Mr. Tom Heath and he will be
11
    presented by Jim Jeffries. Thank you.
12
               CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. Mr. Heath,
13
    there you are. Mr. Jeffries, let me see if I can find
14
    vou.
         There he is. All right. Mr. Heath, would you
15
    raise your right hand, please?
16
                     THOMAS J. HEATH, JR.;
17
                   having been duly affirmed,
                     testified as follows:
18
19
                         (WHEREUPON, the Court Reporter
20
                         interrupted due to audio
21
                         feedback.)
22
                   (OFF-THE-RECORD DISCUSSION)
23
               CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. Mr. Jeffries,
24
    you may proceed.
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Thank you, Chair Mitchell. 1 MR. JEFFRIES: 2 DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. JEFFRIES: 3 Mr. Heath, could you please state your name and 4 business address for the record, please? 5 Sure. It's Thomas Heath and my business address 6 is 550 South Tryon Street, Charlotte, North 7 Carolina, 28202. 8 And where do you work, Mr. Heath? 0 9 Α I work for -- I work for Duke Energy Business 10 Services, an affiliate service company of Duke 11 Energy Carolinas and Duke Energy Progress. 12 And what's your position with Duke Energy Q 13 Business Services? 14 I am employed as a Structured Finance Director in 15 our Treasury Department. 16 Thank you. Are you the same Tom Heath that Q 17 prefiled direct testimony in this proceeding on October 26, 2020, consisting of 37 pages, and 18 19 Heath Exhibits 1 and 2a through 2f? Yes, I am. 20 21 And Mr. Heath, was that testimony prepared by you Q 22 and were those exhibits prepared by you or under 23 your direction? 24 Α Yes, they were.

Do you have any corrections to your prefiled 1 Q 2 direct testimony or exhibits? 3 No, I do not. 4 Mr. Heath, if I asked you the same questions that Q 5 are set forth in your prefiled direct testimony while you're on the stand today, would your 6 7 answers be the same as is reflected in the 8 prefiled testimony? 9 Yes, they would. Α 10 All right. You're also the same Tom Heath that Q 11 prefiled rebuttal testimony in this proceeding on 12 January 11th consisting of 48 pages and Heath 13 Rebuttal Exhibits 1 and 2; is that correct? 14 Α Yes, I am. 15 And was that rebuttal testimony and were those Q 16 exhibits prepared by you or under your direction? 17 Yes, they were. Α 18 And do you have any corrections to your rebuttal 19 testimony or exhibits? 20 No, I do not. 21 And if I asked you the same questions set forth Q 22 in your prefiled rebuttal testimony while you are

the stand today, would your answers be the same?

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Α

Yes, they would.

Q All right.


MR. JEFFRIES: Chair Mitchell, we -- DEC and DEP would move that Mr. Heath's prefiled direct and rebuttal testimony be entered into the record as if given orally from the stand.

CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. Hearing no objection, Mr. Jeffries, to your motion, the prefiled direct testimony consisting of 37 pages of Mr. Thomas Heath filed on October 26, 2020, shall be copied into the record as if delivered orally from the stand. And additionally, the rebuttal testimony of Mr. Heath consisting of 47 (sic) pages filed on January 11th, 2021, shall be copied into the record as if delivered orally from the stand. The exhibits to those testimonies will be identified as they were when prefiled.

MR. JEFFRIES: Thank you, Chair Mitchell.

(WHEREUPON, Heath Exhibits 1 and 2a through 2f and Heath Rebuttal Exhibits 1 and 2 are marked for identification as prefiled and received into evidence.)

(WHEREUPON, the prefiled direct and rebuttal testimony of THOMAS



DOCKET NO. E-7, SUB 1243 DOCKET NO. E-2, SUB 1262

BEFORE THE NORTH CAROLINA UTILITIES COMMISSION

ENERGY PROGRESS, LLC)	Orders
CAROLINAS, LLC AND DUKE	Financing)	Issuance of Storm Cost Recovery Financing
FOR DUKE ENERGY	or)	And Duke Energy Progress, LLC for
THOMAS J. HEATH, JR.	, LLC)	Petition of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
DIRECT TESTIMONY OF	<u> </u>	
	_	In the Matter of:

I. INTRODUCTION

- 2 Q. PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.
- 3 A. My name is Thomas J. Heath Jr. My current business address is 550 South
- 4 Tryon Street, Charlotte, North Carolina 28202.
- 5 Q. BY WHOM ARE YOU EMPLOYED AND IN WHAT CAPACITY?
- 6 A. I am employed by Duke Energy Business Services, LLC, a service company
- 7 affiliate of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC ("DEC") and Duke Energy Progress,
- 8 LLC. ("DEP," collectively the "Petitioners," or the "Companies") and a
- 9 subsidiary of Duke Energy Corporation ("Duke Energy"), as Structured
- Finance Director.

- 11 Q. PLEASE BRIEFLY SUMMARIZE YOUR EDUCATIONAL
- 12 BACKGROUND AND PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE.
- 13 A. I have a Bachelor of Science degree with a major in Accounting from
- Southeastern Louisiana University and I am a Certified Public Accountant in
- the Commonwealth of Kentucky. My professional work experience began in
- 16 1995 with the public accounting firm of Price Waterhouse (now
- 17 PricewaterhouseCoopers), where my work focused on audits of GAAP and
- SEC-compliant financial statements, including those in the electric utility
- industry, and the performance of due diligence procedures over mergers and
- acquisitions. In April 2004, I joined Cinergy Corp. (a predecessor company to
- 21 today's Duke Energy) as a Lead Analyst in the Accounting Research Group
- where I was responsible for assessing the appropriate accounting and disclosure
- treatment for significant non-routine matters as well as certain regulatory

1		accounting interpretations. Over the next 10 years, I held various finance-
2		related positions of increasing responsibility. In August 2014, I accepted a
3		position as Corporate Finance Director in Duke Energy's Treasury Department,
4		where I was responsible for executing public debt offerings for Duke Energy
5		and its utility subsidiaries with primary focus on DEC and DEP. While in this
6		position, I led the approximately \$1.3 billion Nuclear Asset-Recovery
7		Securitization for Duke Energy Florida, LLC. Following the completion of that
8		financing, I assumed my current position as Structure Finance Director.
9	Q.	WHAT ARE YOUR RESPONSIBILITIES IN YOUR CURRENT
10		POSITION?
11	A.	I am responsible for the execution of project and structured financings of Duke
12		Energy, its subsidiary utilities, and its nonregulated renewable operations. This
13		includes the issuance, renewal, and refinancing of project and structured debt
14		obligations.
15	Q.	HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY TESTIFIED BEFORE THE NORTH
16		CAROLINA UTILITIES COMMISSION ("COMMISSION")?
17	A.	No.
18	Q.	WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY IN THIS
19		PROCEEDING?
20	A.	The purpose of my testimony is to: (i) present and evaluate DEC and DEP's
21		proposal to use storm recovery bonds to finance storm recovery costs as
22		permitted by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 62-172 (the "Securitization Statute"); (ii) support
23		the Joint Petition for Financing Orders (the "Joint Petition") requesting

1		approval of the proposed issuance of storm recovery bonds, which is DEC and
2		DEP's recommendation requested in this proceeding; (iii) provide an overview
3		of DEC and DEP's proposed securitization transaction based on utility
4		securitization bond transaction norms; and (iv) provide an estimate of financing
5		costs, both up-front and on-going.
6	Q.	ARE YOU SPONSORING ANY EXHIBITS TO YOUR DIRECT
7		TESTIMONY?
8	A.	Yes. I am sponsoring:
9		• Heath Exhibit 1 – estimated up-front financing and on-going financing costs
10		for storm recovery bonds; and
11		• Heath Exhibit 2a – Form of Storm Recovery Property Purchase and Sale
12		Agreement;
13		• Heath Exhibit 2b – Form of Storm Recovery Property Servicing Agreement;
14		• Heath Exhibit 2c – Form of Indenture;
15		• Heath Exhibit 2d – Form of Administration Agreement;
16		• Heath Exhibit 2e – Form of Amended and Restated LLC Agreement; and
17		• Heath Exhibit 2f – Form of the Declaration of Trust for the Finance Entity.
18		Each of these exhibits were prepared under my direction and control,
19		and to the best of my knowledge all factual matters contained therein are true
20		and accurate.

1	Ų.	PLEASE IDENTIFY THE COMPANIES OTHER WITNESSES AND
2		SUMMARIZE THE PURPOSE OF THEIR TESTIMONIES IN THIS
3		PROCEEDING.
4	A.	The following is a list of the other witnesses who have submitted testimony on
5		behalf of DEC and DEP and a brief description of the general subject matter
6		addressed by each witness:
7		• Charles N. Atkins II, Chief Executive Officer, Atkins Capital Strategies
8		LLC ("Atkins Capital" or "Co-Advisor") - Overview of the utility
9		securitization market; describes DEC and DEP's proposed transactions;
10		explains the collection and remittance process; discussion of key elements
11		of the Financing Orders; describes the rating agency process; describes the
12		marketing process; and explains the issuance advice letter process;
13		Melissa Abernathy, Director of Rates and Regulatory Planning for North
14		Carolina and South Carolina – Updates the storm recovery costs; identifies
15		and estimates the revenue requirements necessary to recover the storm
16		recovery costs through the proposed storm recovery charges; describes the
17		allocation methodology for the storm recovery charges; and demonstrates
18		how the storm recovery charge mitigates rate impacts as compared to the
19		traditional method of recovery;
20		• Jonathan Byrd, Director, Southeast Pricing & Regulatory Solutions -
21		Describes the changes to each Company's retail electric rate schedules;
22		quantifies the effect of these proposed changes on each Company's North
23		Carolina retail electric customers; discusses how each Company proposes

1	to	implement	the	storm	recovery	charges,	as	quantified	in	witness
2	Ab	ernathy's te	stimo	ony; and	d presents t	the propos	ed t	ariff sheets;	ano	d

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A.

 Shana W. Angers, Accounting Manager for DEP – Proposes a detailed framework for the true-up mechanism and the accounting entries for storm recovery financing.

II. SECURITIZATION RECOMMENDATION

Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE COMPANIES' REQUEST TO FINANCE STORM RECOVERY COSTS WITH STORM RECOVERY BONDS.

DEC and DEP propose that the Commission approve the issuance of storm recovery bonds to finance storm recovery costs. The proceeds from the storm recovery bond issuances will be used to relieve DEC and DEP's storm recovery costs and pay up-front financing costs. The amortization of the bonds will be structured to provide an annual revenue requirement (including recovery of ongoing financing costs) of approximately \$18.1 million for DEC and approximately \$58.1 million for DEP over the scheduled final term of approximately 15 years based on market conditions as of October 6, 2020. This annual revenue requirement estimate excludes any accrued carrying charges on the storm recovery costs subsequent to May 31, 2021 and excludes incremental up-front financing costs and on-going financing costs that may be incurred above DEC and DEP's current estimate of up-front financing costs and ongoing financing costs, if applicable. Customers will be billed on a kWh basis beginning with the first billing cycle of the month following the issuance of the storm recovery bonds.

Q. IS THE PROPOSED RECOVERY PERIOD FOR THE STORM RECOVERY BONDS CONSISTENT WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF

3 THE SECURITIZATION STATUTE?

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A.

Yes. The Securitization Statute requires that the Commission specify the period over which the storm recovery costs may be recovered. DEC and DEP propose that storm recovery bonds will be issued with a scheduled final payment date of approximately 15 years. The legal maturity date for each tranche may be longer than the scheduled final payment date for that tranche.

As discussed in witness Atkins' testimony, the scheduled final payment date of the storm recovery bonds represents the date at which the final payment is expected to be made, but no legal obligation exists to retire the class in full by that date. The legal maturity date is the date by which the bond principal must be paid, or a default will be declared. The proposed preliminary structure for this transaction utilizes a legal maturity that is approximately 24 months longer than the scheduled final payment date for each bond, but this will ultimately be determined in consultation with the rating agencies. The difference between the scheduled final payment date and legal maturity provides additional credit protection by allowing shortfalls in principal payments to be recovered over this additional time period due to any unforeseen circumstance. As such, this gap between the two dates, or "cushion," is a benefit to the structure and is a contributing factor to achieving a "AAA" rating, helping to lower the cost of funds on the bonds and therefore benefitting customers. Thus, the proposed scheduled final payment date of approximately

15 years is also consistent with the statutorily required Commission
determinations that (i) the proposed issuance of the storm recovery bonds and
the imposition and collection of storm recovery charges are expected to provide
quantifiable benefits to customers as compared to the costs that would have
been incurred absent the issuance of storm recovery bonds and (ii) structuring
and pricing of the storm recovery bonds are reasonably expected to result in the
lowest storm recovery charges consistent with market conditions at the time the
storm recovery bonds are priced and the terms set forth in the Financing Orders
(the "Statutory Cost Objectives").

This gap between the two dates will be driven by rating agency concerns. To that effect, the period of time between the two dates could potentially be shortened to one year, but that will not be known until the ratings process is complete and will depend on a number of factors, including but not limited to the size of the service territory and the length of the latest scheduled final payment date.

DEC and DEP also considered a structure of storm recovery bonds with a scheduled final payment date of approximately 20 years. However, the Companies believe that the 15-year proposal strikes the right balance between the length of the recovery period and the length and level of the recovery charges. Additionally, the proposed 15-year structure is consistent with the longest recovery period proposed by the North Carolina Utilities Commission—Public Staff ("Public Staff") in DEP's storm deferral docket, which was 15 years.

1	Ų.	PLEASE DETAIL THE AMOUNTS DEC AND DEP ARE SEEKING
2		APPROVAL TO FINANCE THROUGH THE ISSUANCE OF STORM
3		RECOVERY BONDS.
4	A.	DEC and DEP propose to finance, with the issuance of storm recovery bonds,
5		the full amount of DEC and DEP's storm recovery costs, which were outlined
6		in (i) DEC's petition and testimonies in Docket Nos. E-7, Sub 1187 ("DEC
7		Storm Deferral Docket") and E-7, Sub 1214 ("DEC Rate Case"); and (ii) DEP's
8		petition and testimonies in Docket Nos. E-2, Sub 1193 ("DEP Storm Deferral
9		Docket") and E-2, Sub 1219 ("DEP Rate Case"), accrued carrying charges
10		through the date of the bond issuance, and up-front financing costs. Witness
11		Abernathy's testimony provides further details on the calculation of the storm
12		recovery costs and the accrued carrying charges. My testimony will address the
13		estimated up-front financing costs and on-going financing costs.
14	Q.	WHAT AMOUNT OF STORM RECOVERY BONDS WOULD BE
15		REQUIRED TO FINANCE THE AMOUNTS DESCRIBED ABOVE?
16	A.	DEC anticipates the issuance of approximately \$230.8 million in storm
17		recovery bonds, which is comprised of DEC's storm recovery costs, which
18		includes \$18.6 million in capital investment, \$169.8 million in operation and
19		maintenance ("O&M") expense, plus \$37.2 million in carrying costs assuming
20		a June 1, 2021 issuance date, and approximately \$5.2 million of up-front
21		financing costs.

¹ N.C. Gen. Stat. § 62-172(b)(1)b. requires that a public utility petitioning the Commission for a financing order shall describe the storm recovery costs and estimates of the costs of any storm related activities that are being undertaken to be financed by issuing storm recovery bonds.

1		DEP anticipates the issuance of approximately \$748.0 million in storm
2		recovery bonds which is comprised of DEP's storm recovery costs, which
3		includes \$68.6 million in capital investment, \$556.6 million in O&M, plus
4		\$113.8 million in carrying costs assuming a June 1, 2021 issuance date, ² and
5		approximately \$9.0 million of up-front financing costs.
6		Up-front financing costs are described in more detail later in my
7		testimony. The amounts above do not include estimated carrying charges on
8		the storm recovery costs after May 31, 2021 or any up-front financing costs that
9		may be incurred above DEC or DEP's current estimate of up-front financing
10		costs; however, these amounts, if applicable, will be added to and included in
11		the storm recovery costs to be financed through the sale of the storm recovery
12		bonds.
13	Q.	WHAT WOULD BE THE IMPACT TO CUSTOMERS IF THE
14		COMMISSION APPROVES DEC AND DEP'S SECURITIZATION
15		PROPOSAL?
16	A.	For DEC, the estimated storm recovery charge as further explained in witness
17		Byrd's testimony and exhibits, under market conditions as of October 9, 2020,
18		would be approximately \$0.57 per month for a typical 1,000 kWh residential
19		bill for approximately 15 years.
20		For DEP, the estimated storm recovery charge as further explained in
21		witness Byrd's testimony and exhibits, under market conditions as of October

² See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 62-172(b)(1)b.

1		9, 2020, would be approximately \$2.81 per month for a typical 1,000 kWh
2		residential bill for approximately 15 years.
3		The actual average retail charge per kWh will vary based on changes in
4		customer growth and usage projections as well as changes in market interest
5		rates and the proposed bond structure, as well as for changes in the storm
6		recovery costs that could occur for items such as accrued carrying charges after
7		May 31, 2021 that may occur between now and the issuance date of the bonds.
8	Q.	PLEASE DETAIL HOW BOND PROCEEDS WILL BE USED.
9	A.	Bond proceeds must first be used to pay up-front financing costs associated with
10		the bond financing. Proceeds would next be used to reimburse DEC and DEP
11		for their relevant storm recovery costs plus the accrued carrying charges.
12	Q.	WHAT IF THE COMMISSION ISSUES A FINANCING ORDER BUT
13		THERE IS A DELAY IN ACTUALLY IMPLEMENTING THE
14		FINANCING OR THE FINANCING DOES NOT OCCUR?
15	A.	Subsequent to May 31, 2021, DEC and DEP will each continue to accrue the
16		carrying charges until the bonds are issued. Any delays will result in higher
17		accrued carrying charges and an ultimately higher bond issuance amount.

1	Q.	SINCE DEC AND DEP ARE EACH REQUESTING PERMISSION TO
2		FINANCE STORM RECOVERY BONDS, DO THE STORM
3		RECOVERY BONDS HAVE TO BE SOLD TO INVESTORS IN
4		SEPARATE TRANSACTIONS, OR MAY THEY BE CONSOLIDATED
5		INTO ONE TRANSACTION?
6	A.	As discussed further in witness Atkins' testimony, the preliminary structure
7		reflected in DEC and DEP's Joint Petition does assume a consolidated or
8		combined transaction. The DEC and DEP transactions involve the creation of
9		bankruptcy-remote special purpose entities ("SPEs") wholly owned by their
10		respective utility, which each issue storm recovery bonds. Under the
11		anticipated structure, DEC and DEP bonds will be issued to a third SPE, a
12		grantor trust that is wholly owned by Duke Energy Corporation ("SRB Issuer").
13		SRB Issuer will issue to the market secured pass-through notes (the "SRB
14		Securities") that are backed by the separate storm recovery bonds issued by
15		DEC and DEP. The structure of the DEC and DEP storm recovery bonds and
16		the SRB Securities are to be designed to be identical, with respect to tranching,
17		payment dates, scheduled and legal maturities. The true-up adjustment
18		effective dates for the DEC and DEP bonds are also to be the same dates. The
19		debt service payments from the DEC and DEP bonds are to be passed through
20		to service the debt service on the SRB Securities.

1	Q.	WHY DO YOU ANTICIPATE USING THIS STRUCTURE?
2	A.	As discussed further in witness Atkins' testimony, this structure is expected to
3		assist in achieving the Statutory Cost Objectives under the Securitization
4		Statute.
5		III. TRADITIONAL METHOD OF RECOVERY
6	Q.	DID THE PASSAGE OF THE SECURITIZATION STATUTE, WHICH
7		PROVIDES FOR THE ISSUANCE OF STORM RECOVERY BONDS,
8		ALTER THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK FOR STORM COST
9		RECOVERY?
10	A.	No. The Securitization Statute simply provides the Commission with an
11		additional option for recovery of storm recovery costs. Under the Securitization
12		Statute, recovery of storm recovery costs would be achieved through the
13		issuance of storm recovery bonds, which are repaid by customers through a
14		nonbypassable charge.
15	Q.	PLEASE EXPLAIN THE USE OF THE TRADITIONAL METHOD OF
16		RECOVERING THE STORM RECOVERY COSTS IF DEC AND DEP
17		DECIDE NOT TO ISSUE THE STORM RECOVERY BONDS OR IF
18		THE COMMISSION DOES NOT APPROVE FINANCING ORDERS
19		FOR THE ISSUANCE OF STORM RECOVERY BONDS.
20	A.	The traditional method of recovery for the storm recovery costs is addressed in
21		witness Abernathy's testimony. If DEC and DEP do not issue the storm
22		recovery bonds or if the Commission determines that the storm recovery costs
23		should not be securitized and instead should be recovered through the

traditional means, DEC and DEP will request recovery of the storm recovery
costs, plus accrued carrying costs, related to storms by filing petitions
requesting an adjustment to the storm cost recovery rider proposed in the
Companies' respective rate cases, Docket Nos. E-7, Sub 1214 and E-2, Sub
1219, in accordance with the Companies' Agreements and Stipulations of
Partial Settlement with the Public Staff.
N.C. Gen. Stat § 62-172(c)(2) provides that, after receipt of a financing
order, the public utility retains sole discretion regarding whether to cause the
bonds to be issued, including the right to defer or postpone such sale,

IV. COMPARISON OF SECURITIZATION TO THE TRADITIONAL

12 <u>METHOD</u>

assignment, transfer, or issuance.

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Q. WHAT ARE THE COMPARATIVE BENEFITS OF SECURITIZATION RELATIVE TO THE TRADITIONAL METHOD OF RECOVERY?

As provided in witness Abernathy's testimony and exhibits, the estimated cumulative revenue requirement calculated in accordance with the Partial Settlement and Stipulation between DEC and the Public Staff in Docket No. E-7, Sub 1214 is \$180.1 million on a present value basis (\$285.6 million on a nominal basis). Also, as provided in witness Abernathy's testimony and exhibits, the estimated cumulative revenue requirement amount over the total period of outstanding bonds is \$122.1 million on a present value basis (\$209.5 million on a nominal basis). These amounts are based on a bond structure with a scheduled final term of approximately 15 years) and based on market

conditions that existed as of October 9, 2020. The resulting net benefits to DEC's customers is \$58.1 million or 32.2 percent on a present value basis (\$76.1 million on a nominal basis).

As provided in witness Abernathy's testimony and exhibits, the estimated cumulative revenue requirement calculated in accordance with the Partial Settlement and Stipulation between DEP and the Public Staff in Docket No. E-2, Sub 1219 is \$599.3 million on a present value basis (\$951.9 million on a nominal basis). Also, as provided in witness Abernathy's testimony and exhibits, the estimated cumulative revenue requirement amount over the total period of outstanding bonds is \$400.3 million on a present value basis (\$682.4 million on a nominal basis). These amounts are based on a bond structure with a scheduled final term of approximately 15 years) and based on market conditions that existed as of October 9, 2020. The resulting net benefits to DEP's customers is \$199.0 million or 33.2 percent on a present value basis (\$269.6 million on a nominal basis).

Thus, based on current market conditions, the issuance of storm recovery bonds, and the imposition of storm recovery charges, is expected to provide quantifiable benefits to DEC and DEP customers. The amount of quantifiable benefits to DEC and DEP may change based on changes in market conditions between October 9, 2020 and the date the storm recovery bonds are issued. As a result, actual quantifiable benefits to DEC and DEP customers could be more or less than the amounts stated above.

V. DEC AND DEP'S PROPOSED STORM RECOVERY BOND

2	TRANSACTION

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Q. PLEASE PROVIDE AN OVERVIEW OF DEC AND DEP'S PROPOSED STORM RECOVERY BOND ISSUANCE.

As noted above, DEC and DEP will each form a bankruptcy-remote SPE to acquire storm recovery property and issue and sell the storm recovery bonds. These SPEs will be capitalized by DEC and DEP in an amount equal to at least 0.50 percent of the storm recovery bond issuance amount. DEC and DEP's capital contributions will be deposited into a Capital Subaccount, which allows the utility to treat the bond issuance as a financing for tax purposes and also acts as a credit enhancement mechanism. As described in greater detail below, under an Internal Revenue Service revenue procedure (2005-62) (provided as Atkins Exhibit 2), a 0.50 percent equity contribution will be sufficient to assure this desired tax treatment. This capital contribution will be made available to cover any shortfalls in storm recovery charges and to make payments on the storm recovery bonds, if necessary. These equity contributions will be returned to DEC and DEP at the time all storm recovery bonds, and related financing costs, are paid in full.

In addition, DEC and DEP will be permitted to earn a return on their capital contribution equal to the rate of interest payable on the longest maturing tranche of the storm recovery bonds. This return on invested capital will be paid to DEC and DEP in accordance with a priority of payments. This payment

to DEC and DEP will be an on-going financing cost to be recovered through the storm recovery charges.

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DEC and DEP will receive the net proceeds after the payment of upfront financing costs. The net proceeds will be used to relieve DEC and DEP's storm recovery costs. DEC and DEP will each act as a servicer and will collect an irrevocable, nonbypassable storm recovery charge to recover from its respective customers the amounts necessary to pay principal and interest on the storm recovery bonds as well as on-going financing costs associated with the transaction. DEC and DEP, as servicer, will transfer the storm recovery charges deemed collected to a collection account with the Indenture Trustee on a periodic basis, such basis to be determined after consultation with the rating agencies. The Indenture Trustee will then distribute such amounts to bondholders and other parties in accordance with the payment waterfall for the payment of principal and interest on the bonds and on-going financing costs (described below), such as servicing fees, legal and accounting costs, trustee fees, rating agency fees, assessments (i.e. regulatory assessment fees) and administrative costs. The transaction documents provide more detail on the payment waterfall.

Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE TERMS OF THE STORM RECOVERY BONDS.

A. The storm recovery bonds will likely be issued in multiple tranches with varying maturities to attract a greater number of investors. The targeted ratings on the storm recovery bonds are expected to be AAA from at least two rating

1	agencies. Exact pricing, interest rates, terms, tranches and other characteristics
2	will be determined at the time of issuance and will depend on prevailing market
3	conditions.

4 Q. WHEN ARE THE STORM RECOVERY BONDS EXPECTED TO BE

ISSUED?

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DEC and DEP expect to start marketing the storm recovery bonds as promptly as possible after the last of the following events have occurred: 1) issuance of a final, non-appealable financing order acceptable to DEC and DEP; 2) delivery of any necessary SEC approvals under the Securities Act of 1933; and 3) completion of the rating agency process. Upon completion of these events, DEC and DEP expect to pursue an appropriately aggressive schedule to market, price, and issue the bonds, subject to market conditions. DEC and DEP recommend the storm recovery bonds be issued as soon as practicable and will work to do so prior to May 31, 2021; however, the exact issuance date cannot be determined at this time and depends on many factors, including those mentioned above.

Q. HOW WILL THE STORM RECOVERY BONDS BE SOLD?

As shown in witness Atkins' testimony, since 2010, all utility asset securitization transactions of a similar nature have been offered for sale to investors through a group of underwriters, and of the transactions since 1997, all but one of the utility securitizations have been offered to sale to investors through a negotiated sales process. Therefore, based on this history of utility securitization transactions, DEC and DEP's primary plan is to pursue a

negotiated sales process for issuance of the bonds, but other avenues may be
considered. DEC and DEP will select underwriters with extensive debt capital
markets experience and sales distribution workforce, specific experience in the
marketing of utility securitization issuances, and broad experience in the
marketing of asset-backed securities and corporate bonds. A thorough
marketing and price discovery process will be used to determine the most cost-
effective structure for issuing the storm recovery bonds. Witness Atkins
testimony provides more detail on the standard process for marketing and sale
of the storm recovery bonds.

VI. <u>UP-FRONT FINANCING COSTS AND ON-GOING FINANCING COSTS</u>

- Q. PLEASE PROVIDE A DESCRIPTION OF THE UP-FRONT FINANCING COSTS THAT WILL BE FINANCED WITH THE PROCEEDS OF THE STORM RECOVERY BONDS.
 - Up-front financing costs, which will be financed from the proceeds of the storm recovery bonds, include the fees and expenses to obtain the Financing Orders, as well as the fees and expenses associated with the structuring, marketing and issuance of each series of storm recovery bonds, including: external and incremental internal legal fees, structuring advisory fees and expenses, any interest rate lock or swap fees and costs (including the cost, if any, associated with interest rate hedges), underwriting fees and original issue discount, rating agency and trustee fees (including trustee's counsel), accounting fees, information technology programing costs, servicer's set-up costs, printing and marketing expenses, stock exchange listing fees and compliance fees, filing and

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5	Q.	PLEASE PROVIDE AN ESTIMATE AND DISCUSSION OF THESE UP-
4		such costs.
3		include reimbursement to DEC and DEP for amounts advanced for payment of
2		retained by the Commission or the Public Staff. Up-front financing costs
1		registration fees, and the costs of the outside consultant and counsel, if any,

FRONT FINANCING COSTS FOR EACH INDIVIDUAL ITEM

EXPECTED TO BE IN EXCESS OF \$50,000.

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DEC and DEP estimate the up-front financing costs associated with their recommended issuance of storm recovery bonds to be approximately \$5.2 million and \$8.9 million, respectively, based on the approximate mid-point of the range included in my Heath Exhibit 1. DEC and DEP reviewed several asset recovery securitization filings made by other utilities and developed an estimate of up-front financing costs with the assistance of its co-advisors. These numbers are subject to change, as the costs are dependent on the timing of issuance, market conditions at the time of issuance, the outcome of requests for proposals for certain fees and other events outside the control of DEC and DEP, such as possible litigation, incremental legal fees resulting from protracted resolution of issues, possible review by the SEC and rating agency fee changes and requirements.

20 Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE ESTIMATED UNDERWRITING FEES AND EXPENSES.

22 A. Underwriting fees and expenses are shown in line 1 of Heath Exhibit 1 and 23 represent the amount that the underwriters will receive for underwriting and

selling the storm recovery bonds, assuming DEC and DEP issue the bonds in the manner previously discussed. This estimated range of fees and expenses is consistent with those paid under recent, similar transactions.

4 Q. HOW WILL UNDERWRITERS' FEES BE DETERMINED?

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Assuming DEC and DEP issue the bonds in the manner that all other utility securitization transactions have been issued since 2010, underwriting fees will be incurred for the services previously discussed. The underwriters' fees will be updated through the issuance advice letter procedure, as described in witness Atkins' testimony, after the transaction is priced. Underwriters' fees of 40 – 50 basis points of the principal amount of the bonds are consistent with individual utility securitization transactions with comparable issuance sizes that have occurred in the market, based on DEC and DEP's review of a list of recent, comparable transactions. Because the level of underwriting fees is uncertain at this time, the actual costs will be updated through the issuance advice letter procedure. As previously discussed, DEC and DEP will select underwriters with specific experience in the marketing of utility securitization issuances.

Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE SERVICER SET-UP FEES (INCLUDING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMMING COSTS).

Section 62-172(a)(4)c. of the Securitization Statute includes information technology programming costs in the definition of financing costs for a storm recovery bond transaction. DEC and DEP intend this amount to recover the cost of information technology systems modifications to bill, monitor, collect, and remit securitization charges. The amount included in line 2 of Heath

1	Exhibit 1 represents DEC and DEP's current estimate of the costs of these
2	information technology systems modifications. This amount will be updated
3	through the issuance advice letter procedure.

4 Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE AND EXPLAIN DEC AND DEP'S PROPOSED 5 TREATMENT OF LEGAL FEES.

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Legal fees are a function of the legal work necessary to issue the storm recovery bonds. External and incremental internal legal fees are based upon the expected hours devoted to the financing order procurement and bond issuance processes rather than a fixed dollar amount. This category (line 3 of Heath Exhibit 1) includes the fees and expenses of external and incremental internal counsel for DEC and DEP and the SPE, the underwriters and DEC and DEP's co-advisors. Counsel will advise on the storm recovery bond transaction structure, including bankruptcy, regulatory and tax matters; issue various transaction opinions, including bankruptcy opinions; and draft most other documents related to the financing, including, among other tasks, the SEC registration statement, the storm recovery property purchase and sale agreement, the indenture, the servicing agreement, the administration agreement, the SPE organizational documents, and any other necessary agreements (drafts of the storm recovery property purchase and sale agreement, the indenture, the servicing agreement, the administration agreement, the limited liability company agreement establishing the SPE and the declaration of trust are included as Heath Exhibits 2a-2f). These estimated expenses are based on discussion with our internal legal counsel and estimates from external counsel. DEC and DEP's co-advisors

and underwriters' counsel also advise on the transaction structure, review all storm recovery bond transaction documents, and perform due diligence reviews of the transaction in connection with the underwriters' initial purchase of the bonds. The legal fees (over and above those incurred to date) will be affected by events between the date of the filing of the Joint Petition and the date of bond issuance, including the extent to which this proceeding is contested by intervenors, the scope of any appeals, the extent of any comments received during the SEC review, the requirements of underwriters, trustees, rating agencies, regulators or the Commission's Designated Member, if applicable, for any requested revisions to documents, the use of additional credit enhancements, and other factors that cannot be foreseen. Thus, aggregate amount of legal fees and expenses to be securitized will not be known until closing. However, these costs will be estimated to the best of DEC and DEP's ability and updated through the issuance advice letter procedure.

Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE RATING AGENCY FEES.

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In order to sell the storm recovery bonds at the most favorable interest rate reasonably achievable, the bonds should be rated by a minimum of two of the three major rating agencies. Typically, a fee is required by each of the rating agencies to rate the bonds. The fees charged by the rating agencies are subject to change at any time and are typically a function of the size and structure of the offering. The fees are typically calculated by applying a base rate charge to the initial principal balance, subject to a required minimum fee. Neither DEC or DEP nor the Commission has any effective control over the fees charged by

the rating agencies, however, DEC and DEP will use commercially reasonable
means to negotiate the lowest possible rating agency fees. The amounts shown
on line 4 of Heath Exhibit 1 reflect an estimate of the rating agencies fees to be
incurred for a transaction of the size contemplated by DEC and DEP. The low
end of the range presented is estimated at 7.5 basis points (or 0.075 percent) on
the principal amount of bonds issued, which represents Moody's Investor
Service's pricing guidance, payable to two rating agencies. This estimate
assumes no additional fees charged for the Trust Issuer. The high end of the
range includes a full 7.5 basis point fee charged for the Trust Issuer by two
rating agencies. Accordingly, the possibility of a change due to either the size
of the offering, or modification of the agencies' fee requirements must be taken
into account in determining the level of rating agency fees, and any increase in
these fees should be recoverable by DEC and DEP, pursuant to the issuance
advice letter procedure.
PLEASE DESCRIBE AND EXPLAIN DEC AND DEP'S PROPOSED
TREATMENT OF THE PUBLIC STAFF'S FINANCIAL ADVISOR
FEE.
The Public Staff has retained a professional advisor and the costs of this advisor
and its legal counsel, if any, should qualify as an up-front financing cost in this
proceeding. The total cost of the Public Staff's financial advisor and its legal
counsel, if any, is not within DEC and DEP's control or influence and may not
be known until closing. The estimate on line 5 of Heath Exhibit 1 and the Public

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1		Staff's legal counsel fees on line 6 are estimates and will be updated through
2		the issuance advice letter procedure.
3	Q.	PLEASE DESCRIBE THE FEES OF THE CO-ADVISORS TO DEC
4		AND DEP.
5	A.	After conducting a request for proposal ("RFP"), DEC and DEP selected
6		Guggenheim Securities, LLC ("Guggenheim") to act as their structuring
7		advisor in connection with structuring the transaction(s) and providing related
8		services in connection with this proceeding. Witness Atkins served as Senior
9		Advisor at Guggenheim at the time of the RFP and was a key factor in DEC
10		and DEP's decision to select Guggenheim as structuring advisor. Subsequent
11		to Guggenheim's engagement, witness Atkins transitioned to his chief
12		executive role at his company, Atkins Capital. DEC and DEP restructured its
13		engagement with Guggenheim and executed a separate engagement with Atkins
14		Capital. As a result of these changes, Guggenheim and Atkins Capital are
15		currently serving as co-advisors to DEC and DEP.
16		We expect Guggenheim to have the opportunity to continue as an
17		underwriter until the bonds are issued, but all structuring fees are expected to
18		be earned upon commencement of the ratings process. The fees and related
19		expenses to be paid to Atkins Capital and Guggenheim have been agreed upon

and reflect the required payments to Atkins Capital and Guggenheim under their

respective contracts. These fees and related expenses are consistent with the

amounts in recent transactions that have taken place in the market. However,

it is not known with precision when Atkins Capital and Guggenheim's services

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as co-advisors will end. Following issuance of the Financing Orders, and assuming DEC and DEP pursue the marketing and sale of the bonds consistent with how all utility securitization transactions of a similar nature have been offered to investors since 2010, DEC and DEP expect to name book-runners who will perform advisory services as part of the services normally performed by a book-running lead underwriter. For these services, it is expected that the book-runner(s) will not seek fees beyond those underwriting fees they would be paid in their capacity as book-runner(s) after they are engaged as book-runner(s). However, as previously stated, the exact timing of that appointment is not known. To the extent DEC and DEP's co-advisor's fees exceed the estimate, DEC and DEP will update this amount through the issuance advice letter procedure.

Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE ACCOUNTING FEES.

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A. Accounting fees (line 8 of Heath Exhibit 1) relate to DEC and DEP's independent auditor or other recognized accounting or consulting firm and include the costs of agreed-upon procedures related to the storm recovery bonds.

Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE SEC REGISTRATION FEE.

19 A. The SEC has specific formulas for calculating registration fees based upon the
20 initial principal amount. The current fee is \$109.10 per million dollars
21 registered. That fee structure, however, changes from time to time. The fees
22 are mandatory for registered offerings, and DEC and DEP have no control over
23 such changes. The estimated amount on line 9 of Heath Exhibit 1 will either

1	increase or decrease proportionately as a result of any increase or decrease in
2	the size of the storm recovery bond financing, and/or as a result of any change
3	in the SEC registration fee structure.

Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE BOTH UP-FRONT AND ON-GOING FINANCING COSTS OF CREDIT ENHANCEMENTS.

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To ensure the storm recovery bonds are issued under the most advantageous terms, it may be necessary to use various forms of credit enhancement or other mechanisms designed to improve the credit quality and marketability of the bonds, including but not limited to overcollateralization accounts or letters of credit. It cannot be known until the bonds are about to be issued whether the use of credit enhancements will reduce customer costs. Such mechanisms will be used only if they are cost justified (i.e., the savings exceed the costs). Because the need for any such credit enhancements or mechanisms, as well as their costs and benefits, will be determined by rating agency discussions and market conditions at the time the bonds are priced, decisions to use them can only be made at or near the time of pricing. On my Heath Exhibit 1, I have assumed no credit enhancements, other than the true-up mechanism and the Capital Subaccount, will be used, because, as witness Atkins discusses in his testimony, additional credit enhancements are not currently anticipated to be necessary to achieve "AAA" or equivalent credit ratings.

1	Q.	HOW WILL DEC AND DEP RECONCILE ACTUAL UP-FRONT
2		FINANCING COSTS WITH THE ESTIMATES PROVIDED BY DEC
3		AND DEP THROUGH THE ISSUANCE ADVICE LETTER
4		PROCEDURE SINCE THE ACTUAL COSTS WILL NOT BE KNOWN
5		UNTIL AFTER THE COMMISSION ISSUES THE FINANCING
6		ORDERS AND THE STORM RECOVERY BONDS HAVE BEEN
7		ISSUED?
8	A.	The proceeds of the storm recovery bond issuance will be used to pay (or
9		reimburse DEC and DEP for) the actual up-front financing costs incurred. The
10		issuance advice letter process, which will discuss the actual up-front financing
11		costs, are addressed in witness Atkins' testimony. If the actual up-front
12		financing costs are below the amount appearing in the issuance advice letter
13		filed with the Commission not later than one day after pricing the storm
14		recovery bonds, then the difference will be credited back to customers in a
15		manner to be determined in the Financing Orders provided, however, that
16		adjustments are not made to the storm recovery charges for any such excess up-
17		front financing costs as prohibited by the Securitization Statute. If the actual
18		up-front financing costs are in excess of the amount appearing in the issuance
19		advice letter, then DEC and DEP will have the right to collect such prudently
20		incurred excess amounts through the establishment of a regulatory asset.

1	Q.	PLEASE DESCRIBE THE ESTIMATED ON-GOING FINANCING
2		COSTS (EXCLUDING DEBT SERVICE) THAT WILL BE
3		RECOVERED FROM THE STORM RECOVERY CHARGE.
4	A.	In addition to debt service on the storm recovery bonds (and any swap or other
5		hedging costs), there will be expenses that will be incurred throughout the life
6		of the storm recovery bonds to support the on-going operations of the SPE.
7		These on-going financing costs are estimated at approximately \$0.44 million
8		and \$0.91 million annually for DEC and DEP, respectively, which
9		approximates the lower end of the range set forth in my Heath Exhibit 1, and
10		include servicing fees; return on invested capital; administration fees;
11		accounting and auditing fees; regulatory fees; legal fees; rating agency
12		surveillance fees; trustee fees; independent director or manager fees; and other
13		miscellaneous fees associated with the servicing of the storm recovery bonds.
14		Certain of these on-going financing costs, such as the administration
15		fees and the amount of the servicing fee for DEC and DEP (as the initial
16		servicers) may be determinable, either by reference to an established dollar
17		amount or a percentage, on or before the issuance of any series of storm
18		recovery bonds. Other on-going financing costs will vary over the term of the
19		storm recovery bonds.
20	Q.	WHAT ARE THE ESTIMATED SERVICING FEES AND HOW WILL
21		THEY BE CALCULATED?
22	A.	In consideration for its servicing responsibilities, the servicers, initially DEC
23		and DEP, will receive the periodic servicing fee (line 1 of Heath Exhibit 1),

which will be recovered through the storm recovery charges. To support the bankruptcy analysis necessary to achieve the highest credit rating, the servicing fees must be on arm's length terms and at market-based rates. Such servicing responsibilities will include, without limitation: (i) billing, monitoring, collecting and remitting securitization charges, (ii) reporting requirements imposed by the servicing agreement, (iii) implementing the true-up mechanism, (iv) procedures required to coordinate required audits related to DEC and DEP's role as servicers, (v) legal and accounting functions related to the servicing obligation, and (vi) communication with rating agencies.

The annual servicing fee to be paid to DEC and DEP is currently estimated to be 0.05 percent of the original principal balance of the securitization bonds, payable on each securitization bond payment date. Alternatively, if DEC and DEP cease to service the storm recovery bonds and a successor servicer is appointed, its servicer fee should be set at a level not to exceed 0.60 percent of such original balance unless a higher rate is approved by the Commission. To date, we are not aware of any utility securitization transactions where a successor servicer has had to be appointed. The servicing fees reflected appear to DEC and DEP to be consistent with the rates in other recent securitizations. Since the servicing fee is based on the estimated original principal balance, the final amount will be known only when the transaction is priced and will be updated through the issuance advice letter process.

1 Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE RETURN ON INVESTED CAPITAL.

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When the storm recovery bonds are issued, DEC and DEP propose that they will each make a capital contribution to their respective SPE, which the SPE will deposit into the Capital Subaccount. The storm recovery bond proceeds will not be used to fund this capital contribution. As previously discussed, the amount of the capital contribution will be at least 0.50 percent of the original principal amount of the storm recovery bonds. The Capital Subaccount will serve as collateral to facilitate timely payment of principal of and interest on the storm recovery bonds. To the extent that the Capital Subaccount must be drawn upon to pay these amounts due to a shortfall in the storm recovery charge collections, it will be replenished to its original level through the true-up process. The funds in the Capital Subaccount will be invested in short-term high-quality investments and, if necessary, such funds (including investment earnings) will be used by the Indenture Trustee to pay the principal of and interest on the storm recovery bonds and the on-going financing costs payable Consistent with prior utility securitizations, including their by the SPE. affiliate's transaction in Florida, DEC and DEP request to earn a rate of return on their invested capital equal to the rate of interest payable on the longest maturing tranche of storm recovery bonds. DEC and DEP request that this return on invested capital be a component of on-going financing costs, and accordingly, recovered through the storm recovery charges.

1	Q.	PLEASE DESCRIBE THE PURPOSE OF THE ADMINISTRATION
2		FEES THAT YOU IDENTIFIED AND EXPLAIN HOW THEY WILL BE
3		CALCULATED.
4	A.	The annual administration fees are set forth on line 3 of Heath Exhibit 1 and are
5		meant to cover expenses associated with administrative functions DEC and
6		DEP will be providing to the relevant SPE. These functions will include, among
7		others, maintaining the general accounting records, preparation of quarterly and
8		annual financial statements, arranging for annual audits of each SPE's financial
9		statements, preparing all required external financial filings, preparing any
10		required income or other tax returns, and related support. None of the SPEs
11		will have any employees, so the administrator will perform these functions for
12		each SPE. These functions are separate from those of the servicer.
13	Q.	PLEASE DESCRIBE THE PURPOSE OF THE OTHER ON-GOING
14		FINANCING COSTS THAT YOU IDENTIFIED IN MORE DETAIL.
15	A.	The accounting and auditing fees (line 4 of Heath Exhibit 1) are meant to
16		represent costs for activities such as providing periodic reports to the trustee
17		and reviewing/certifying SEC filings. These fees will be paid to DEC and
18		DEP's independent auditor or other recognized accounting firm.
19		The regulatory fees are presented on line 5 of Heath Exhibit 1 and cover
20		the amount required to be submitted to the North Carolina Utilities Commission
21		under N.C. Gen. Stat. §62-302. This fee is calculated as 0.13 percent of the
22		storm recovery charge revenues and is required to be paid on a quarterly basis
23		on the 15th day of February, May, August, and November.

1	Each SPE will incur periodic legal fees. The annual estimate for these
2	expenses is shown on line 6 of Heath Exhibit 1.
3	The rating agencies will assess on-going fees associated with
4	monitoring the credit rating of each securitization bond series (line 7 of Heath
5	Exhibit 1).
6	The Indenture Trustee will be responsible for and earn a fee (line 8 of
7	Heath Exhibit1) for, among other things: (i) maintaining a record of investors;
8	(ii) calculating and remitting interest and principal payments to investors; (iii)
9	otherwise fulfilling its obligations under the indenture and other documents;
10	and (iv) reporting as required by the Commission or any other regulatory body.
11	Each SPE will also have an independent director or manager to oversee
12	its operation, and he or she will receive a fee for their services and will be
13	entitled to indemnification. Estimated fees are set forth on line 9 of Heath
14	Exhibit 1.
15	Other miscellaneous costs (line 10 of Heath Exhibit 1) are any costs that
16	may be incurred but that have not been specifically identified at this time. Such
17	types of costs have been identified by other utility companies for similar
18	transactions.
19	Other than the servicing fee and the administrative fee, it is difficult to
20	predict the level of such costs to be incurred by the SPE over the term of the
21	storm recovery bonds. It is virtually certain these fees will increase over the
22	term, not only because service providers periodically increase their fees, but
23	also because of inflation. Therefore, DEC and DEP believe there should be no

1		cap on the on-going financing costs. Moreover, each SPE must recover an or
2		its on-going financing costs in order to preserve bankruptcy remoteness of the
3		SPE and to secure AAA or equivalent credit ratings on the storm recovery
4		bonds.
5	Q.	HOW WILL THE COMPANY RECONCILE ITS ACTUAL ON-GOING
6		FINANCING COSTS OF THE TRANSACTION WITH ITS
7		ESTIMATED COSTS?
8	A.	Because on-going financing costs are recovered through the storm recovery
9		charge, disparities will be resolved periodically through the true-up mechanism.
10		The true-up mechanism is described in more detail in witness Anger's
11		testimony.
12	Q.	HAS THE U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT ISSUED ANY GUIDANCE
13		ON ACCOUNTING FOR STORM RECOVERY FINANCING AND
14		RELATED INCOME TAXES?
15	A.	Yes. Revenue Procedure 2005-62 provides a safe harbor for public utility
16		companies that, pursuant to specified cost recovery legislation, receive an
17		irrevocable financing order permitting the utility to recover certain specified
18		costs through a qualifying securitization. Under the revenue procedure, DEC
19		and DEP will not recognize taxable income upon: 1) the receipt of the
20		Financing Orders; 2) the transfer of DEC and DEP's rights under the Financing
21		Orders to the wholly-owned SPE; or 3) the receipt of cash in exchange for the
22		issuance of the storm recovery bonds.

1	Ų.	DOES THE STORM RECOVERY FINANCING DEC AND DEP IS
2		PROPOSING MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THIS REVENUE
3		PROCEDURE?
4	A.	Yes.
5	Q.	IN DEC'S AND DEP'S AFFILIATE'S TRANSACTION IN FLORIDA,
6		THE FINANCING DOCUMENTS CONTAINED CERTAIN
7		PROVISIONS THAT THE FLORIDA COMMISSION VIEWED AS
8		"CUSTOMER PROTECTIONS." DO THE FINANCING DOCUMENTS
9		THAT YOU ARE SPONSORING CONTAIN SIMILAR "CUSTOMER
10		PROTECTIONS?"
11	A.	Yes, it is my understanding that they do. As noted earlier in my testimony, I
12		am sponsoring proposed forms of the storm recovery property purchase and sale
13		agreement, the indenture, the servicing agreement, the administration
14		agreement, the limited liability company agreement establishing each SPE and
15		the limited liability company agreement/declaration of trust for the Finance
16		Entity. I believe that these documents contain the same substantive "customer
17		protections" which Duke Energy Florida, LLC included in its transaction.
18	Q.	CAN YOU BRIEFLY DESCRIBE WHAT THESE "CUSTOMER
19		PROTECTIONS" ARE?
20	A.	Generally, these "customer protections" include, without limitation:
21		• the satisfaction of a "Commission Condition" (being approval or
22		acquiescence constituting approval by the Commission) prior to any
23		amendment or modification to the financing documents;

1		• a provision authorizing the Commission to institute a proceeding to
2		require either DEC and DEP to make customers whole for any "Losses"
3		suffered (i) as a result of negligence, recklessness, or willful misconduct
4		by either DEC or DEP under the servicing agreement or the
5		administration agreement, or (ii) for any failure or breach by either DEC
6		or DEP of certain material representations, warranties or covenants in
7		the purchase and sale agreement;
8		• provisions making the Commission, on behalf of itself and customers of
9		DEC and DEP, a third-party beneficiary of the purchase and sale
10		agreement and the servicing agreement; and
11		• a provisions allowing the Commission to enforce the provisions of the
12		servicing agreement and to terminate the agreement in the event of a
13		default by DEC or DEP.
14		These provisions and related protections are more fully set forth in the exhibits.
15	Q.	DO ANY OF THE PROPOSED "CUSTOMER PROTECTIONS"
16		OBLIGATE THE COMMISSION BEYOND ITS REQUIREMENTS
17		UNDER THE SECURITIZATION STATUTE?
18	A.	While some of the "customer protections" (such as the requirement that DEC
19		or DEP make customers whole for "losses" as a result of certain events as
20		described in the previous question) are obligations solely of DEC and DEP, the
21		other "customer protections" I describe above create additional obligations for
22		the Commission that are not contemplated by the Securitization Statute. DEC
23		and DEP included these in the forms of transaction documents attached to its

- Joint Petition, but ultimately, it is up to the Commission whether it wishes to
- adopt those "customer protections" that require further Commission
- 3 involvement.
- 4 Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY?
- 5 A. Yes.

BEFORE THE NORTH CAROLINA UTILITIES COMMISSION

DOCKET NO. E-7, SUB 1243 DOCKET NO. E-2, SUB 1262

ENERGY PROGRESS, LLC	\smile	Orders
CAROLINAS, LLC AND DUKE	ıg)	Issuance of Storm Cost Recovery Financing
FOR DUKE ENERGY	$\overline{}$	And Duke Energy Progress, LLC for
THOMAS J. HEATH, JR.	$\overline{}$	Petition of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF	<u> </u>	
	_	In the Matter of:

1		I. <u>INTRODUCTION</u>
2	Q.	PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.
3	A.	My name is Thomas J. Heath Jr. My current business address is 550 South
4		Tryon Street, Charlotte, North Carolina 28202.
5	Q.	BY WHOM ARE YOU EMPLOYED AND IN WHAT CAPACITY?
6	A.	I am employed by Duke Energy Business Services, LLC, a service company
7		affiliate of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC ("DEC") and Duke Energy Progress,
8		LLC ("DEP") (collectively, the "Companies") and a subsidiary of Duke Energy
9		Corporation ("Duke Energy"), as Structured Finance Director.
10	Q.	DID YOU PREVIOUSLY FILE TESTIMONY IN THIS PROCEEDING?
11	A.	Yes. I filed direct testimony and exhibits on October 26, 2020.
12	Q.	WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR REBUTTAL TESTIMONY?
13	A.	The purpose of my rebuttal testimony is to: (1) respond to Saber Partners,
14		LLC's ("Public Staff Consultants" or "Consultants") concept of "best
15		practices" as they relate to the securitization proposals in these dockets; (2)
16		explain the Statutory Cost Objectives ¹ of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 62-172 (the
17		"Securitization Statute") and how DEC and DEP's proposals are consistent with
18		those objectives; (3) explain the Companies' position on post-financing order
19		procedures; (4) respond to the Public Staff's proposals related to return on

invested capital and on-going financing expenses; and (5) respond to certain

¹ See Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC and Duke Energy Progress, LLC's Joint Petition for Financing Orders, at 2, Docket Nos. E-7, Sub 1243 and E-2, Sub 1262 (Oct. 26, 2020).

1		mischaracterizations of the Companies' proposals reflected in the testimony of
2		several Public Staff Consultants' testimony.
3	Q.	ARE YOU SPONSORING ANY EXHIBITS WITH YOUR REBUTTAL
4		TESTIMONY?
5	A.	Yes. The following exhibits are presented in conjunction with my rebuttal
6		testimony for both DEC and DEP:
7		• Heath Rebuttal Exhibit 1 – All discovery produced by the Companies to
8		the Public Staff
9		• Heath Rebuttal Exhibit 2 – All discovery produced by the Public Staff to
10		the Companies ²
11		As this is the first storm securitization transaction proposed by the Companies
12		before the North Carolina Utilities Commission ("Commission"), the
13		Companies believe that the record in these cases may benefit from the
14		additional information conveyed in responses to data requests. Each of these
15		exhibits were prepared under my direction and control, and to the best of my
16		knowledge all factual matters contained therein are true and accurate.

² Note these discovery responses reference attachments provided by the Companies and Public Staff in response to the other parties' discovery requests, but do not contain those actual attachments. The Companies will make these attachments available to the Commission upon request.

1 II. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS REGARDING THE PUBLIC STAFF 2 **CONSULTANTS' TESTIMONY** DO YOU HAVE ANY GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE 3 Q. 4 SCOPE AND SCALE OF THE PUBLIC STAFF CONSULTANTS' 5 TESTIMONY IN THESE DOCKETS YOU WOULD LIKE TO 6 **DISCUSS?** 7 A. Yes. I want to comment on two aspects of the Public Staff Consultants' 8 testimony that I think unduly impacts their recommendations and may be based 9 upon unfounded concerns about the Companies' incentives and behavior. 10 WHAT ARE THESE ASPECTS? Q. The first is how little of the Public Staff Consultants' testimony actually 11 A. 12 addresses issues germane to the Companies' Joint Petition, the content of the 13 proposed Financing Orders, or the numerous exhibits and attachments to them. 14 Instead, the majority of the Public Staff Consultants' testimony is focused on 15 the purported need for post-financing order involvement by the Public Staff and 16 its outside Consultants in the actual bond issuance process. The second is a 17 disagreement with the asserted justifications for such post-financing order 18 participation. 19 Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN YOUR FIRST GENERAL COMMENT. 20 A. It is simply the observation that much of the testimony filed by the Public Staff Consultants is focused on ensuring an active and co-equal role for Public Staff 21

and its Consultants in the actual structuring, marketing, and pricing process for

WHAT IS YOUR SECOND GENERAL OBSERVATION ABOUT THE
Staff and its Consultants on this issue in this proceeding.
with the unprecedented nature of the recommendations proposed by the Public
if the Commission deems such role necessary or helpful, we have serious issues
think there may be a role for the Public Staff in post-financing order activities,
Companies' proposed Financing Order provisions. Notwithstanding, while we
Abernathy, the Public Staff propose relatively few modifications to the
rebuttal testimony of Companies witnesses Charles N. Atkins II and Melissa
and its Consultants, all of which will be addressed by me below and/or in the
of the approximately six main recommendations proposed by the Public Staff
Consultants. Therefore, the Companies have inferred that with the exception
by historic standards unusual, active role for both the Public Staff and its
of content and instead focused almost exclusively on ensuring a continuing and,
Order provisions, but the testimony we received contained very little of that sort
that was more focused on recommended changes to the detailed Financing
storm recovery bonds. ³ Candidly, the Companies were expecting testimony

16 Q. PUBLIC STAFF CONSULTANTS' TESTIMONY? 17

18 While the Public Staff did not propose significant modification to the A. 19 Companies' financing proposal, we believe there is a significant conceptual 20 disconnect between the larger context of the Companies' requests in these

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³ While the Companies do not object to a continuing role of the Commission actively participating in the structuring, marketing, and pricing of bonds in this instance or to an advisory role for the Public Staff, as is explained in more detail later in my testimony, we believe that a continuing and co-equal role for an intervenor such as the Public Staff is problematic and unprecedented in the circumstances, in addition to raising issues around the scope of the Public Staff's statutory authority.

dockets and what the Public Staff proposes regarding the execution of the transaction.

Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN.

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Duke Energy, including DEC and DEP and its other utility operating companies, has many years of experience in issuing long-term debt to both public and private investors, and I believe it has been successful in doing so. Duke Energy currently has more than \$50 billion in outstanding long-term bonds in the public debt markets, an amount equivalent to the cumulative amount of utility securitization bonds issued since their inception in the mid-1990s, and has issued an average of approximately \$6 billion annually in the public debt markets each year since 2016. All of these bonds have been authorized, marketed, and issued by Duke Energy with the assistance of their advisors and underwriters utilizing practices that are standard for the issuance of such instruments in recognized markets for long-term debt. None of these issuances have been subject to the direct and active supervision of a commission, except for the 2016 securitization transaction by Duke Energy Florida ("DEF"), and all transactions related to DEC and DEP in particular have been preliminarily approved by this Commission prior to issuance pursuant to the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. 62-160 et seq. Also, none of the issuances have been subject to the direct and active supervision of intervenors. Further, in every case, the interest and fees associated with these long-term debt issuances have been flowed through to Duke Energy's customers as part of the ratemaking process. To the best of my knowledge, no

state utility commission has ever denied recovery of carrying costs and charges
associated with Duke Energy's long-term debt nor has any party ever even
suggested to a state utility commission that Duke Energy's costs were
imprudent or not otherwise eligible for recovery from customers. In every case,
the fundamental terms applicable to these borrowings were established at the
time of issuance of the securities and, in every case, Duke Energy utilized their
best efforts to minimize the costs inherent in these borrowings, which are
ultimately paid for by its utility customers.

Q. ARE THE STORM RECOVERY BONDS PROPOSED FOR ISSUANCE IN THE PENDING DOCKETS MATERIALLY DIFFERENT FROM OTHER LONG-TERM DEBT ISSUANCES BY THE COMPANIES?

In my opinion, they are not. While I acknowledge that the structures used and the flow of cash are different than a more customary long-term bond issuance, I do not believe those differences necessitate an entirely different process for approval and issuance of those bonds. I particularly reject the notion, which is repeated often in the Public Staff Consultant's testimony, that DEC and DEP would have anything other than their customers' best interests at heart and in mind when structuring, marketing, and pricing these bonds or are presumptively unsuited to manage the bond structuring, marketing, and pricing process in these circumstances because of alleged conflicts of interest. The fundamental purpose of securitization is to lower customer costs. The Companies are quite capable of managing the issuance of storm recovery bonds in this instance competently and fairly and are ready and willing to certify that such bonds will

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1		be issued in a manner consistent with the lowest cost objectives contained in
2		the Securitization Statute as part of that process.
3	Q.	ARE YOU REJECTING THE CONCEPT OF CONTINUING
4		COMMISSION OR PUBLIC STAFF INVOLVEMENT IN THE
5		ISSUANCE OF STORM RECOVERY BONDS AFTER THE ISSUANCE
6		OF A FINANCING ORDER?
7	A.	Not at all. What I am doing is rejecting the fabricated concerns over potential
8		utility carelessness and lack of customer interest expressed in the
9		recommendations of the Public Staff Consultants and noting the fact that the
10		Companies have a long history of accessing debt markets efficiently, at
11		favorable rates, and of recovering the costs of such transactions from our
12		customers with Commission approval. The notion that the Companies would
13		suddenly alter its very well-established business practices and somehow begin
14		applying a less stringent standard while structuring, marketing, and pricing
15		these bonds simply because of the change in cash flows involved in issuing
16		storm recovery bonds is completely unsupported by any evidence.
17	Q.	WHAT ARE YOU ASKING THE COMMISSION TO DO IN THIS
18		INSTANCE?
19	A.	I am asking the Commission to determine whether and to what extent the
20		specific nature of storm recovery bonds requires a completely different process
21		for structuring, marketing, and pricing as proposed by the Public Staff

Consultants in this instance, in light of the history and experience of the

Companies and the Commission regarding the issuance of other long-term debt

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securities for which customers are ultimately liable, and to implement
requirements consistent with their conclusions on this subject. In doing so, I
ask that the Commission consider the long, collective histories of DEC and DEP
in successfully issuing long-term debt and reject the notion that the Companies
will not act in the best interest of their customers if not directly supervised by
the Public Staff Consultants with respect to the issuance of storm recovery
bonds.

I expect the Commission to determine the nature and extent of supervisory authority it feels is necessary and appropriate in these circumstances but do not want that decision to be made on the basis of alleged risks and assumed inappropriate behavior that is completely unsupported by our experience in engaging in similar transactions over a long period of time.

Q. DO YOU BELIEVE THE COMPANIES' JOINT PETITION AND PROPOSED FINANCING ORDERS MEET THE STATUTORY OBJECTIVES OF THE STORM SECURITIZATION STATUTE?

Yes I do. The statute defines two objectives, which the Companies refer to as the "Statutory Cost Objectives": 1) the proposed issuance of storm recovery bonds and imposition and collection of storm recovery charges are expected to provide quantifiable benefits to customers as compared to the costs that would have been incurred [and passed through to customers] absent the issuance of storm recovery bonds and 2) the structuring and pricing of the storm recovery bonds are reasonably expected to result in the lowest storm recovery charge consistent with market conditions at the time the storm recovery bonds are

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priced and the terms of the financing ordering. As demonstrated in Abernathy
DEC Exhibit 5 and DEP Exhibit 5 in the Joint Petition and updated in
Abernathy Rebuttal Exhibits $1-3$, the Companies have structured a financing
that is expected to provide net present value savings of approximately \$57.5
million for DEC customers over the life of the storm recovery bonds and
approximately \$216.2 million for DEP customers over the life of the storm
recovery bonds. Furthermore, as described in the direct and rebuttal testimony
of Companies witness Atkins, the Companies are proposing a structuring and
marketing process that is designed to achieve the lowest storm recovery costs
consistent with market conditions at the time the storm recovery bonds are
priced and the terms of the financing ordering. Finally, to assist the
Commission in evaluating the final terms of the transaction and whether or not
the Statutory Cost Objectives were in fact met, the Companies propose an
issuance advice letter ("IAL") process which would include certifications from
each Company as to the satisfaction of the Statutory Cost Objectives and which
would give the Commission final authority over the issuance of the bonds.
YOU PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED THAT THE PUBLIC STAFF AND
ITS CONSULTANTS' TESTIMONY CONTAINED LIMITED
RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO THE COMPANIES' FINANCING
ORDERS. PLEASE LIST THEM.
The Public Staff and their Consultants recommend that the Commission:
(1) incorporate into its financing order the alleged "best practices" outlined by
the Public Staff Consultants, including (a) creation of a post-financing order

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1	and pre-bond issuance review process, (b) provisions in a financing order
2	that are designed to achieve a lowest cost objective, (c) retention of an
3	independent financial advisor and/or counsel to take part actively in all
4	aspects of the structuring, marketing, and pricing of the bonds;
5	(2) require certifications from the Companies, the bookrunning underwriters,
6	and the Public Staff Consultants that the structuring, marketing, and pricing
7	of storm recovery bonds in fact achieved the lowest storm recovery charges
8	consistent with market conditions at the time of pricing and the terms of the
9	financing order;
10	(3) approve oversight by the Commission, the Public Staff and its Consultant
11	through their participation on a bond team, that has joint decision-making
12	authority with the Companies, on all matters related to the structuring,
13	marketing, and pricing of the storm-recovery bonds;
14	(4) limit the Companies' return on their capital contributions to their respective
15	Special Purpose Entities ("SPEs") to each SPE's actual investment return;
16	(5) make adjustments to the treatment of up-front financing costs, on-going
17	financing costs, servicing and administration fees and tail-end collections,
18	and allow a second "bite at the apple" on auditing certain of the Companies'
19	underlying storm costs; and
20	(6) lengthen the proposed amortization period from a 15 to 20-year period.
21	I will be primarily addressing Public Staff and its Consultants'
22	recommendations (1) through (4) and the adjustments to up-front and on-going
23	financing costs contained in recommendation (5), while Companies witness

1		Abernathy will be primarily addressing the remaining recommendations in (5)
2		and (6). Public Staff Consultants also question certain aspects of the
3		Companies' proposed structure of the transaction and critique some of the
4		Companies' models and calculations used in support of its Joint Petition. While
5		the Public Staff Consultants do not ultimately recommend changes to the
6		Companies' proposed structure at this time, Companies witnesses Atkins,
7		Abernathy, and I address some of their questions and critiques in our respective
8		rebuttal testimony.
9		III. SABER PARTNERS CONCEPT OF "BEST PRACTICES"
10	Q.	PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE STEPS THE PUBLIC STAFF
11		CONSULTANTS RECOMMENDED AS "BEST PRACTICES" FOR
12		DEC AND DEP'S SECURITIZATION.
13	A.	As stated in Public Staff Consultants witness Hyman Schoenblum's testimony,
14		the alleged "best practices" include:
15		(1) Commission participation in the selection of underwriters, legal counsel and
16		other transaction participants and in defining the responsibilities of each
17		party. The Commission acting for itself or through a designee, the Public
18		Staff and their Consultants serving as joint decision-makers with the
19		Companies in all matters relating to the structuring, marketing and pricing
20		of the storm recovery bonds. The Commission should rely on experts who
21		have a duty solely to protect customers;
22		(2) Commission review and negotiation of all transaction documents and
23		contracts that "could affect future ratepayer costs";

1	(3)	Commission should ensure that all statutory limits which benefit customers
2		are strictly enforced;
3	(4)	Commission should establish procedures to ensure all savings are
4		transferred to customers;
5	(5)	Commission should require that storm recovery bonds are offered to the
6		broadest market possible;
7	(6)	Commission should require transparency in the distribution, in the initial
8		pricing and in the secondary market for the storm recovery bonds;
9	(7)	Commission should direct the Commission's staff and the Public Staff and
10		its Consultants to take part fully and in advance in all aspects of structuring,
11		marketing and pricing the storm recovery bonds and direct the financial
12		advisor to disapprove any decision that would not result in the lowest all-in
13		cost of fund and the lowest storm recovery charges;
14	(8)	Commission should require certifications from the underwriters, the
15		Companies and the Public Staff's Consultants as to actions taken to achieve
16		the lowest costs of funds and the lowest storm recovery charges under
17		market conditions at the time of pricing; and
18	(9)	Commission should have authority to enforce the provisions of the financing
19		order and the transaction documents for the benefits of customers. ⁴

⁴ Direct Testimony of Hyman Schoenblum Senior Advisor – Saber Partners, LLC, at 51-56, Docket Nos. E-2, Sub 1262 and E-7, Sub 1243 (Dec. 21, 2020).

1 Q. DO YOU AGREE WITH THE CONSULTANTS' RECOMMENDED

2 **PRACTICES?**

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Many of them. In fact, contrary to statements made by Public Staff Consultants' witnesses⁵, many of these recommended "best practices" have already been incorporated into the Companies' proposed Financing Orders as they were practices utilized in the DEF transaction. I go through them below. However, some additional "best practices" recommended by witness Schoenblum were not present in the DEF transaction and we believe are not appropriate for the Companies' transactions in these dockets, which I will address in more detail below.

Further, some of these "best practices" do not adhere to the statutory framework of the Securitization Statute and deviate from standard North Carolina regulatory practices. Additionally, the Companies do not agree with the Public Staff Consultants that these are standard "best practices" generally agreed upon by the utility industry or the debt capital markets more broadly, but rather are the Public Staff Consultants' "best practices" based upon their evolving personal preferences for these type of transactions. For these reasons, I will refer to them as the Public Staff Consultants' practice recommendations moving forward. Regardless, as I describe further below, the Companies have

⁵ *Id.*; Direct Testimony of Joseph S. Fichera, Chief Executive Officer of Saber Partners, LLC, at 37-38, Docket Nos. E-2, Sub 1262 and E-7, Sub 1243 (Dec. 21, 2020); Direct Testimony of Rebecca Klein, Principal of Klein Energy LLC, at 14, Docket Nos. E-2, Sub 1262 and E-7, Sub 1243 (Dec. 21, 2020); Direct Testimony of William B. Moore, Consultant at Saber Partners, LLC, at 14-15, Docket Nos. E-2, Sub 1262 and E-7, Sub 1243 (Dec. 21, 2020); Direct Testimony of Paul Sutherland, Senior Advisor at Saber Partners, LLC, at 42, Docket Nos. E-2, Sub 1262 and E-7, Sub 1243 (Dec. 21, 2020).

already adopted several of them and are not opposed to others that are not
inconsistent with the Securitization Statute or commonly used in transactions
of this nature. Specifically:

(1) Consultants' Practice Recommendation #1: As discussed later in my rebuttal, the Companies do not object to the formation of a bond team that, consistent with the DEF transactions referenced by the Public Staff Consultants⁶, includes the Companies, their advisors and counsel, the Commission and its independent outside consultants and/or counsel ("Bond Team"). However, the Companies do object to Public Staff Consultants' repeated plea that it too be given a formal position on such a Bond Team and for the Bond Team to have joint decision-making responsibility. The Companies have grave concerns with an arrangement that allows an intervening party to have a formal role in a financial transaction that, by statute, is required to be performed by the Companies, decided by the Companies, and executed by the Companies. In the DEF transaction, which the Public Staff Consultants repeatedly reference⁷ as the model for these transactions, no intervening party was a member of the bond team, and witness Paul Sutherland's testimony concerning "best practices" in that transaction did not recommend any intervenors or their advisors be invited to join the Bond Team as members. 8 Furthermore, I am not aware, and from reviewing the responses to DEC and DEP's discovery requests, it does not

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⁶ Fichera, at 28.

⁷ Supra, at note 5.

⁸ The Public Staff Consultants were the Florida Public Service Commission's advisors in that transaction.

appear that Public Staff Consultants' witnesses are aware, of *any* example where an intervenor was a member of a similarly constructed bond team.

In addition to the creation of the Bond Team, should the Commission desire, the Companies are not opposed, consistent with the DEF transaction, to a member of the Commission staff (or a Commissioner) being a designated joint decision-maker in matters along with a designated representative of the Companies concerning the structuring, marketing, and pricing of the bonds. The Companies have less concerns with this approach given the Commission's role in regulating the Companies, the Commission's responsibilities under the Securitization Statute, and the use of this framework in the DEF transaction and other utility securitizations across the country. Again, however, the Companies are strongly opposed to the recommendation that an intervening party, even the Public Staff or its Consultant be given a joint decision-making role in the transaction.

- (2) <u>Consultants' Practice Recommendation #2</u>: The Companies already included forms of the proposed transaction documents as exhibits to their Joint Petition for review by the Commission.
- 18 (3) Consultants' Practice Recommendation #3: The Companies agree that the
 19 Commission should adhere to and enforce the Securitization Statute.

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⁹ Except those recommendations that in the sole view of the Companies would expose the Companies or the SPEs to securities law and other potential liability (i.e., such as, but not limited to, the making of any untrue statement of a material fact or omission to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary in order to make the statements made not misleading) or contractual law liability (e.g., including but not limited to terms and conditions of the underwriter agreement(s)).

1	(4)	Consultants' Practice Recommendation #4: The Companies proposed a
2		transaction that will provide significant quantifiable benefits to customers
3		in connection with the Companies' recovery of prudently incurred storm
4		recovery costs, and the true-up mechanism is designed to ensure that storm
5		recovery charges are only collected in amounts necessary to pay principal,
6		interest and financing costs. There cannot and will not be an "economic
7		windfall" to the Companies as a result of the proposed transaction.
8	(5)	Consultants' Practice Recommendation #5: As further described in witness
9		Atkins's testimony, the Companies are structuring the transaction to appeal
10		to a wide array of investors and will broadly market the securities. The
11		Companies have requested flexibility from the Commission to have the
12		ability to structure the transaction to achieve the Statutory Cost Objectives.
13	(6)	Consultants' Practice Recommendation #6: The Companies invite the
14		Commission and/or its outside consultant and counsel to fully participate in
15		the pricing process, including participation on any pricing calls so there is
16		full transparency.
17	(7)	Consultants' Practice Recommendation #7: As previously noted in response
18		to the first recommendation, the Companies support the establishment of a
19		Bond Team to participate in the structuring, marketing and pricing of the
20		storm recovery bonds. Furthermore, a member of the Commission staff (or
21		a Commissioner) along with a designated representative of the Companies,
22		will be joint decision-makers. The Companies recommend, in accordance

with Consultants' Practice Recommendation #3 above, that the Commission

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adhere to the statutory standard with respect to obtaining the lowest storm recovery charges consistent with market conditions at the time of pricing and terms of the applicable Financing Order as opposed to adopting a different "lowest all-in cost of funds" standard as suggested by witness Schoenblum¹⁰, or an "unqualified lowest storm recovery charge standard" as suggested by witness Rebecca Klein¹¹. As mentioned above, the Companies also object to the Public Staff Consultants' request to expand upon the "best practices" and processes used in Florida to create a space for the Public Staff and its Consultants on the Bond Team or for the Public Staff or its Consultants to be a joint decision-maker.

- (8) Consultants' Practice Recommendation #8: The Companies have proposed to deliver certifications as described by witness Schoenblum. To the extent other parties offer certifications to the Commission, the Companies do not suggest the Commission ignore them, but these other intervenor certifications should not be conditions to approving the IAL.
- (9) Consultants' Practice Recommendation #9: The proposed transaction documents filed with the Commission are modeled off the DEF transaction documents, which have the enforcement provisions suggested by witness Schoenblum.

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¹⁰ Schoenblum, at 53.

¹¹ Klein, at 14.

IV. NORTH CAROLINA STATUTORY COST OBJECTIVES

2 Q. DOES THE SECURITIZATION STATUTE OUTLINE A LOWEST

3 COST OBJECTIVE FOR THE BOND ISSUANCE?

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A. Yes. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 62-172 requires (1) that the issuance of the storm recovery bonds and the imposition and collection of a storm recovery charge are expected to provide quantifiable benefits to customers as compared to the costs that would have been incurred absent the issuance of the storm recovery bonds and (2) that the structuring and pricing of the storm recovery bonds are reasonably expected to result in the lowest storm recovery charges consistent with market conditions at the time the storm recovery bonds are priced and the terms set forth in such financing order.

Q. HOW DO THE COMPANIES RECOMMEND ADHERING TO THESE

STATUTORY OBJECTIVES?

As proposed in their Joint Petition, the Companies have outlined several steps they will undertake in connection with the structuring, marketing and pricing of the storm recovery bonds. This includes hiring a diverse group of underwriters, conducting broad marketing to attract a wide array of both corporate and more traditional asset backed investors, and crafting disclosure to convey the superior credit quality of the storm recovery bonds. After pricing, each Company intends to provide a certification that the offering of storm recovery bonds provide quantifiable benefits to customers of each Company as compared to the costs that would have been incurred absent the issuance of storm recovery

Q.	PUBLIC STAFF CONSULTANTS SEEM TO RECOMMEND
	that they can deliver the proposed certifications.
	Companies will not price the storm recovery bonds unless they are comfortable
	bonds are priced and the terms set forth in the applicable Financing Order. The
	Company consistent with market conditions at the time such storm recovery
	in the lowest storm recovery charges payable by the customers of such
	bonds and that the structuring 12 and pricing of the storm recovery bonds result

7 8 ESTABLISHING MORE STRINGENT LOWEST COST STANDARDS 9 THAN THE SECURITIZATION STATUTE PROVIDES FOR, IS THIS CONSISTENT WITH YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE INTENT OF 10 11 THE SECURITIZATION STATUTE?

No. Public Staff Consultant Fichera suggests that the Commission create a new standard of the "lowest possible storm-recovery charges and the greatest possible ratepayer protections," while witness Schoenblum suggests, "lowest all-in cost of funds and the lowest storm recovery charges to ratepayers," and witness Klein suggests an "unqualified lowest storm recovery charge standard."¹³ However, the Statutory Cost Objectives in the Securitization Statute are clear. Therefore, to the extent that the Public Staff Consultants'

¹² The Public Staff Consultants argue that the Companies did not include in its proposed process the ability for Commission involvement in the marketing of the bonds. As I generally mentioned earlier, the Companies' proposal was designed to be consistent with the plain language of the Securitization Statute, and Section (b)(3)b.3 excludes, from the Commission's requirement to make findings about whether the Statutory Cost Objectives have been met, the marketing phase of the bonds. While the

Companies' lawyers have advised me that, in North Carolina, legislative intent is derived from the plain language of the statute, the Companies take no issue with and waive any objection to the Commission's active involvement in the marketing of the bonds if that is what the Commission desires.

¹³ Fichera, at 24: Schoenblum, at 53: Klein, at 14.

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REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF THOMAS J. HEATH, JR. DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS, LLC DUKE ENERGY PROGRESS, LLC

testimony recommends that the Commission establish a standard more stringent than the one established by the statute, the Commission should not agree to establish one. As Public Staff witness Klein acknowledges in her testimony, "there are no absolutes in this world."¹⁴

Further, the Public Staff Consultants seem to suggest that a more stringent lowest cost standard can be applied using the "catch-all provision" provided in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 62-172(b)(3)b.12., which states that the Commission may include in its financing order "[a]ny other conditions *not otherwise inconsistent with this section* that the Commission determines are appropriate." Accordingly, the Companies' lawyers have advised me that this provision cannot be used as a "catch all" to expand the scope of the Securitization Statute or create conditions in a financing order that do not adhere to the plain terms and requirements of the Securitization Statute. Based on this guidance and my own review of the Securitization Statute, it is my opinion that the Securitization Statute very clearly establishes the precise cost standard that should be applied, and applying a more stringent standard would be inconsistent with the plain language of the Securitization Statute.

Regardless, the Companies have already proposed to certify to a lowest cost standard after the pricing when the actual terms of the transaction are known to demonstrate the Companies' commitment to get as close as it

¹⁴ Klein, at 17.

1		reasonably can to such a standard. This is evident on Attachment 8 to Appendix
2		C of the Companies' proposed Financing Orders, which states the following:
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20		Based on the statutory criteria and procedures, the record in this proceeding, and other provisions of this Financing Order, [DEC/DEP] certifies the statutory requirements for issuance of a financing order and Storm Recovery Bonds have been met, specifically that the issuance of the SRB Notes and underlying Storm Recovery Bonds on behalf of [DEC/DEP] and the imposition and collecting of storm recovery charges authorized by this Financing Order provide quantifiable benefits to customers of [DEC/DEP] as compared to the costs that would have been incurred absent the issuance of Storm Recovery Bonds and that the structuring ¹⁵ and pricing of the SRB Notes and underlying Storm Recovery Bonds issued on behalf of [DEC/DEP] result in the lowest storm recovery charges payable by the customers of [DEC/DEP] consistent with market conditions at the time such SRB Notes and underlying Storm Recovery Bonds are priced and the terms set forth in the Financing Order. (p. 3)
21	Q.	DO THE COMPANIES HAVE A LEGAL OBLIGATION TO ADHERE
22		TO THE STATUTORY COST OBJECTIVES?
23	A.	Of course we do and, again, on top of that we will certify that they are achieved
24		in the issuance of the bonds.
25	Q.	AS A DUKE ENERGY EMPLOYEE AND PARTICIPANT IN THE
26		BOND ISSUANCES, CAN YOU CERTIFY THAT THE COMPANIES
27		WILL ACHIEVE THE STATUTORY COST OBJECTIVES AND
28		ADHERE TO THE FINANCING ORDERS ONCE ISSUED?
29	A.	Yes. I can certify to that in principle. However, I will have that knowledge and

¹⁵ See supra, at note 12.

1		procedures we customarily use, which are standard in the utility industry and
2		the broader public debt markets.
3		V. POST-FINANCING ORDER COMMISSION INVOLVEMENT
4		A. <u>Statutory Background and North Carolina Regulatory Practice</u>
5	Q.	DOES THE STORM SECURITIZATION STATUTE CONTEMPLATE
6		COMMISSION OR INTERVENOR INVOLVEMENT POST-ISSUANCE
7		OF A FINANCING ORDER?
8	A.	No. I am not a lawyer, but I have read the Securitization Statute and I do not
9		see anything appearing to require that securitization be handled in this totally
10		unique way. To me, under the plain language of the Securitization Statute, the
11		financing order is the primary vehicle through which the Commission is
12		anticipated to supervise the issuance of storm recovery bonds. This approach
13		is also completely consistent with the manner in which the Commission handles
14		other topics of significance to utility customers in North Carolina. And while
15		the Companies acknowledge that the Commission has substantial discretion
16		with regard to how it implements the Securitization Statute in this case, it is my
17		opinion that the process suggested by the Public Staff Consultants is not
18		anticipated by the underlying statutory provisions.

1	Q.	BEYOND THE SECURITIZATION STATUTE, ARE YOU AWARE OF
2		ANY NORTH CAROLINA LAW OR RULE THAT ALLOWS THE
3		PUBLIC STAFF AND OTHER INTERVENORS TO DIRECTLY
4		PARTICIPATE IN A PUBLIC UTILITY'S DAY TO DAY ACTIVITIES,
5		SUCH AS BOND ISSUANCES?
6	A.	No. It is my understanding that the historic relationship between regulated
7		public utilities in North Carolina is that a publicly held utility is allowed to
8		operate as a normal corporation except with regard to where its activities touch
9		upon the public interest inherent in the provision of monopoly utility service to
10		the public. Historically, it is my understanding and experience that this
11		framework has involved preliminary approval, and supervision of, the recovery
12		of long-term debt costs, but has not involved direct transactional supervision of
13		discrete aspects of a particular debt offering, which are aspects generally left to
14		the corporations to manage.
15	Q.	IS IT COMMON NORTH CAROLINA REGULATORY PRACTICE
16		FOR THE COMMISSION TO BE INVOLVED IN THE DAY TO DAY
17		ACTIVITIES OF A PUBLIC UTILITY POST-ISSUANCE OF A FINAL
18		ORDER?
19	A.	No. In my opinion, the normal paradigm involved in the Commission's
20		regulation of utilities in North Carolina is to address individual matters subject
21		to the Commission's jurisdiction through administrative hearing procedures.
22		These typically involve filings by the utilities that initiate a proceeding followed
23		by a pre-filed testimony and evidentiary hearing process that results in a final

1		Commission order. Upon issuance of the final order in such proceedings, the
2		options available to the parties are to comply with the order, to ask for
3		reconsideration of the order, or to appeal the order to the North Carolina
4		Appellate Courts. I am not familiar with any prior proceeding where this
5		Commission has exercised active and ongoing implementation supervision of
6		corporate transactional activities after the issuance of a final order.
7	Q.	IS IT COMMON NORTH CAROLINA REGULATORY PRACTICE
8		FOR INTERVENORS TO BE INVOLVED IN THE DAY TO DAY
9		ACTIVITIES OF A PUBLIC UTILITY POST-ISSUANCE OF A FINAL
10		ORDER?
11	A.	No. In this regard, what has been proposed by the Public Staff Consultants in
12		this proceeding is extraordinary.
13	Q.	WHAT SECURITIES LAW LIABILITY CONCERNS DO YOU HAVE
14		WITH THE PROPOSAL THAT THE PUBLIC STAFF AND ITS
15		CONSULTANTS, OR ANY OTHER INTERVENOR NOW OR IN THE
16		FUTURE FOR THAT MATTER, REMAIN AN ACTIVE PART OF THE
17		BOND ISSUANCE PROCESS AFTER THE FINANCING ORDER IS
18		ISSUED IN THIS CASE?
19	A.	Under federal securities law, DEC and DEP will be the issuers of the underlying
20		bonds in this instance and as such will have all the obligations under the federal
21		securities laws with regard to such issuances. To the extent that the Public Staff
22		and its Consultants and/or other intervenors, now or in the future, remain
23		actively involved in the structuring, marketing, and pricing of bonds, the

1		Companies have concerns about now that impacts their potential liabilities
2		under the securities laws and to what extent such activities could expose the
3		Public Staff and other intervenors, now or in the future, to potential liability.
4		B. The Companies' Initial Proposal
5	Q.	EVEN THOUGH THE SECURITIZATION STATUTE DOES NOT
6		CONTEMPLATE COMMISSION OR INTERVENOR INVOLVEMENT
7		POST-ISSUANCE OF A FINANCING ORDER, AND DESPITE THE
8		CONCERNS IDENTIFIED ABOVE, DID THE COMPANIES
9		CONSIDER THE COMMISSION BEING INVOLVED POST-
10		ISSUANCE OF THE FINANCING ORDERS?
11	A.	Yes.
12	Q.	WHY DID THE COMPANIES PROPOSE THE OPTION TO THE
13		COMMISSION TO BE INVOLVED POST-ISSUANCE OF THE
14		FINANCING ORDERS?
15	A.	Because the actual structure and pricing of the bonds will not be known upon
16		the issuance of the Financing Orders, DEC and DEP believed it was not
17		unreasonable to offer the option of Commission involvement post-issuance of
18		the Financing Orders, if the Commission chose, so that it can be comfortable
19		the transaction satisfies the requirements of the Securitization Statute. The
20		Companies did not want to presume in their Joint Petition what level of post-
21		financing order involvement the Commission might ultimately wish to
22		undertake. Therefore, the Companies' proposal for the IAL process was
23		designed to allow the Commission to determine whether and to what extent it

1		wanted to be involved once the Financing Orders are issued. DEC and DEP's
2		proposal in no way seeks to limit the role of the Commission to oversee the
3		proposed transaction.
4	Q.	PLEASE DETAIL THE COMPANIES' INITIAL PROPOSAL WITH
5		RESPECT TO A DESIGNATED COMMISSIONER OR MEMBER OF
6		COMMISSION STAFF.
7	A.	The Companies proposed an IAL process that provided for a designated
8		Commissioner or member of Commission staff to be involved post-issuance of
9		the Financing Orders. The proposed IAL process additionally included
10		objectively measurable criteria by which the Commission can assess whether
11		the Statutory Cost Objectives of the proposed transactions were achieved.
12		These criteria include whether:
13		1) the issuance of the storm recovery bonds and imposition and
14		collection of storm recovery charges as authorized in the Financing
15		Orders provide quantifiable benefits to customers as compared to
16		the costs that would have been incurred absent the issuance of storm
17		recovery bonds; and
18		2) the structuring and pricing of the storm recovery bonds, including
19		the issuance of SRB Securities, resulted in the lowest storm recovery
20		charges consistent with market conditions at the time the storm
21		recovery bonds are priced and the terms set forth in the Financing
22		Orders.

1		The IAL process proposed by the Companies is similar to the IAL process used
2		in the DEF transaction.
3		C. The Public Staff's Proposed Bond Team
4	Q.	PLEASE DETAIL THE PUBLIC STAFF'S BOND TEAM PROPOSAL.
5	A.	The Public Staff's bond team proposal calls for the Public Staff and its
6		Consultants to be joint decision-makers with the Companies and the
7		Commission in all aspects of the proposed transaction.
8	Q.	WHAT ARGUMENTS DOES THE PUBLIC STAFF MAKE IN
9		SUPPORT OF ITS PROPOSED BOND TEAM?
10	A.	The Public Staff and its Consultants claim that they, and only themselves, are
11		working for the interest of customers with respect to the proposed transaction
12		and therefore they must be a joint decision-maker with respect to the proposed
13		transaction. 16
14	Q.	DOES THE PUBLIC STAFF OR ITS FINANCIAL ADVISOR HAVE
15		ANY EXPLICIT LEGALLY BINDING FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION TO
16		CUSTOMERS?
17	A.	While the Public Staff's financial advisor claims it has an implicit fiduciary
18		obligation, the fact is that neither the Public Staff nor its financial advisor has
19		any explicit legally binding fiduciary obligation to DEC and DEP's customers.
20		For example, in response to the Companies' Data Request No. 2-33, which
21		asked "Does Saber Partners' contract with the Public Staff expressly create a

¹⁶ Direct Testimony of Brian A. Maher, at 17, Docket Nos. E-2, Sub 1262 and E-7, Sub 1243 (Dec. 21, 2020).

1		legally binding fiduciary duty to North Carolina customers or anyone else,"
2		Public Staff Consultant witness Maher objected to the question, and simply
3		referenced the following question and answer in his testimony:
4 5 6		Q. Are you giving an opinion as to whether there is a legal requirement of any party in this transaction to have a fiduciary relationship?
7 8 9 10		A. No. I am discussing the important issues related to whether a fiduciary relationship exists and what the Commission should consider in deciding how to evaluate information it receives from different parties to the proposed transaction.
11		It is unclear to the Companies how the Public Staff's Consultants repeatedly
12		claim a fiduciary duty to North Carolina utility customers with respect to the
13		securitization transaction, but simultaneously fail to testify as a matter of fact
14		that they have an actually established, legally binding fiduciary duty to North
15		Carolina utility customers.
16	Q.	DO YOU BELIEVE THE PUBLIC STAFF HAS THE LEGAL RIGHT
17		TO BE JOINT DECISION-MAKERS IN THE PROPOSED
18		TRANSACTION?
19	A.	No. It would not be appropriate for an intervenor to be a joint decision-maker
20		in any securities offering of a public utility, including this type of securities
21		offering. As noted by Public Staff witness Klein, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 62-15(d)
22		states the Public Staff has a responsibility to "[i]ntervene on behalf of the using
23		and consuming public," but this does not mean it should be making decisions
24		on behalf of a public utility company following finalization and issuance of a
25		Commission order. Such joint decision-making authority is inconsistent with

Public Staff's statutory mission or its traditional role in North Carolina. In addition, the Companies reviewed the record of other utility securitization transactions and could not find any other examples where an intervenor had a comparable joint decision-making role. Notwithstanding the testimony submitted by Public Staff Consultants' witnesses and responses to discovery requests, none of the Public Staff Consultants' witnesses, including witness Klein, can cite an example of an intervenor being a joint decision-maker in a utility securitization bond offering.

The structure that the North Carolina legislature selected in adopting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 62-172 involves the public utility or an assignee of the public utility as the issuer of the storm recovery bonds. As a result, primary securities law liability and contractual liability rests with the public utility and its assignee and not with the State of North Carolina or with any intervenor to the proceeding. Unlike the Companies, the intervenors have no liability and therefore should not be in position of any joint decision-making authority.

Furthermore, while the Commission and the State of North Carolina have ongoing obligations pursuant to the Securitization Statute, including to support the true-up mechanism and to uphold the state pledge, intervenors have no such obligations or authority. Further, by allowing an intervening party – even the Public Staff – to have joint decision-making authority in the transaction, it is unclear to the Companies how the effect of setting that precedent will impact the inclusion or exclusion of other intervening parties who may want to participate in future transactions. A simple example of this

concern is the possibility that in a future securifization the Attorney General –
who is also statutorily charged with representing the using and consuming
public – may seek participation in decision-making but may have different goals
and desires than the Public Staff. The potential for disagreements between the
Public Staff and the Attorney General – both of whom represent the same clients
- is a well-known phenomenon in regulatory proceedings before the
Commission.

Q. DO YOU BELIEVE THE STORM COST SECURITIZATION TRANSACTION IS SIGNIFICANTLY "MORE COMPLEX" THAN OTHER PUBLIC UTILITY TRANSACTIONS UNDERTAKEN BY DEC AND DEP AS THE PUBLIC STAFF CONSULTANTS SUGGEST?

No. As I explained earlier, DEC and DEP recognize and respect the unique aspects of utility securitization bonds in general and more specifically the added features of the proposed SRB Securities transaction. However, the Companies do not accept the Public Staff Consultants' assertion that the proposed transaction is significantly "more complex" than other sophisticated debt transactions undertaken by them. While the proposed transaction does involve certain unique aspects and structural considerations, it is still at its most fundamental level the issuance of publicly issued debt to institutional investors. Moreover, the assertion that the transaction is generally "more complex" is subjective and does not in and of itself evidence a need for the Public Staff Consultants, or other intervenors, to be joint decision-makers in the transaction.

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1 Q. PLEASE DETAIL THE COMPANIES' EXPERIENCE AS ISSUERS IN 2 THE PUBLIC DEBT MARKETS.

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As I briefly referenced earlier, DEC and DEP, their affiliates, and parent company are frequent issuers in the public debt markets. Any implication by the Public Staff Consultants that Duke Energy is not a sophisticated market participant or does not know how to evaluate securities offerings and challenge its underwriting banks is without merit and baseless. Given his 40 years of experience covering the U.S. utilities sector in general and Duke Energy in particular¹⁷, I think Public Staff Consultants witness Barry M. Abramson would agree that Duke Energy's depth of experience with issuing public debt and the related selection of underwriters and other transaction participants has not been questioned in any of its regulated jurisdictions. In addition, through DEC and DEP affiliate DEF's 2016 transaction, Duke Energy's treasury team, which included me, have direct and relevant experience with the issuance of utility securitization bonds. Further, we have already engaged several key participants in DEF's 2016 transaction team, who are participating in DEC and DEP's proposed transaction including Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP as issuer counsel, Guggenheim Securities, LLC as co-advisor (who was recommended by Saber Partners, LLC in the DEF transaction), and Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP as structuring advisor counsel and also eventually underwriter counsel (again by recommendation of Saber Partners, LLC in the DEF

¹⁷ Direct Testimony of Barry M. Abramson, at 3-4, 11, Docket Nos. E-2, Sub 1262 and E-7, Sub 1243 (Dec. 21, 2020).

transaction). Based on these collective factors, DEC and DEP's intention to structure and market their proposed transaction in much the same manner as DEF's 2016 transaction, and the active role permitted to a designated Commissioner or member of Commission staff, if the Commission desires, as outlined in the Joint Petition and further addressed in the remainder of my rebuttal testimony will ensure the proposed transaction meets the Statutory Cost Objectives.

In addition, since the beginning of 2019, DEC and DEP have issued a combined total of \$3.6 billion in the public debt market across seven tranches of debt. Every one of these tranches were allocated to an average of over 65 unique investor accounts, with one of the tranches allocated to 105 unique accounts. By comparison, DEC and DEP affiliate DEF's 2016 securitization issuance allocated \$1.294 billion across five tranches to 56 unique accounts. It is evident that DEC and DEP have a demonstrated track record of broad investors outreach and marketing and have no incentive or intention to operate outside of our customary business practices.

Q. WHAT HAS BEEN THE COMMISSION'S INVOLVEMENT IN THESE TRANSACTIONS?

The Commission, on a preliminary basis, authorized the issuance of the debt and required reporting of the details of the terms of the debt issuances but otherwise played no role in negotiating or issuing the actual instruments.

A.

Q. DID THE COMPANIES CONSIDER CUSTOMERS' INTERESTS DURING THESE TRANSACTIONS?

3 Yes, of course. The Companies are keenly aware that the costs of their debt A. 4 issuances are subject to ultimate recovery from customers and it is not in the 5 Companies' best interests to do anything that unnecessarily adds to the 6 cumulative costs of electric service that their customers must pay. This is as 7 true of their past issuances as it is of the current pending bond transactions. Further, the Companies strongly reject any assertion from the Public Staff 8 9 Consultants that DEC or DEP would enter into any transaction without due 10 consideration of the transaction's impact on their customers or without considering their customers' perspectives. 11

D. Adoption of a Bond Team at Commission Discretion

13 Q. DID THE **PUBLIC STAFF** LOOK TO THE DEF 2016 SECURITIZATION PROCEEDING AS PRECEDENT FOR THIS 14 NORTH CAROLINA PROCEEDING AND THEIR BOND TEAM 15 16 PROPOSAL?

17 A. Yes. Witness Joseph S Fichera references the DEF transaction extensively 18
18 and other Public Staff Consultants reference it as well. That being said, Public
19 Staff Consultants do not describe the bond team or joint decision-making
20 authority from Florida accurately. To start with, witness Fichera incorrectly

¹⁸ See, e.g., Fichera, at 28; Abramson, at 11; Klein, at 11, Exhibit 2, Exhibit 4; Maher, at 12-13, Exhibit 1; Schoenblum, at 11, 27-28, 31, Exhibit 1; Sutherland, at 12-13, Exhibit 7; Direct Testimony of Steven Heller, President of Analytical Aid – Saber Partners, LLC, at 11, 14, Docket Nos. E-2, Sub 1262 and E-7, Sub 1243 (Dec. 21, 2020).

states that DEF did not propose bond team in Florida. To clarify the record,
DEF's proposed financing order attached to its petition stated, "[the]
Commission, as represented by a designated Commissioner, designated
Commission Staff, the Commission's financial advisor, and the Commission's
outside legal counsel (if any), shall be actively involved in the bond
issuanceas part of a Bond Team that also includes DEF, its financial advisor
or underwriter(s), and its outside counsel(s), in the structuring, marketing, and
pricing of each series of nuclear asset-recovery bonds."19

In addition, the bond team did not have joint decision-making authority with DEF. Instead, a designated representative from DEF and a designated representative of the Commission were joint decision-makers. Finally, witness Fichera incorrectly describes the role of the Commission to resolve disputes.²⁰ Witness Fichera testified that a designated commissioner was selected to resolve bond team disputes, but the process was only limited to resolving disputes among the joint decision-makers, not disputes among the entire bond team.²¹

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¹⁹ See Duke Energy Florida, Inc.'s Petition for a Financing Order and Motion to Consolidate, at 28, Docket No. 150171-EI (July 27, 2015).

²⁰ Fichera, at 31.

²¹ See Florida Public Service Commission's Financing Order No. PSC-15-0537-FOF-EI, at 58, Ordering ¶ 67, Docket No. 150171-EI (Nov. 19, 2015) ("Florida Financing Order").

1	Q.	TO CLARIFY, IS THE PUBLIC STAFF CONSULTANTS' PROPOSAL
2		FOR A BOND TEAM ACTUALLY INCONSISTENT WITH THE DEF
3		BOND TEAM PROPOSAL IT RELIES UPON AS PRECEDENT FOR
4		ITS PROPOSAL?
5	A.	Yes. The Public Staff Consultants' proposal for a bond team goes beyond the
6		bond team used in the DEF transaction by recommending an intervening party,
7		the Public Staff, be included as a member of the Bond Team and have joint
8		decision-making authority. Membership on the DEF bond team was limited to
9		DEF and its financial advisor and designees of the Florida Public Service
10		Commission, including their financial advisor (<u>i.e.</u> , Saber Partners, LLC). ²²
11		Bond team membership was not extended to any intervening party to the
12		financing proceeding. Representatives of the customer advocate (Office of
13		Public Counsel) were invited to and joined certain of the bond team calls as a
14		courtesy, however, they were not part of the bond team and did not have a
15		formal role in the post-financing order stage of the DEF transaction. Other
16		transaction participants (legal counsel, underwriters, etc.) were also invited to
17		participate in the bond team calls but none of these parties were members of the
18		bond team. Furthermore, as noted above, there was no joint decision-making

authority among all of the members of the DEF bond team, it was limited to the

designated representative of DEF and designated representative of the Florida

²² Florida Financing Order, at 54, Ordering ¶ 38.

Public Service Commission.

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In the Public Staff Consultants' response to the Companies' Data
Request No. 2-4, the Consultants seemed to intentionally try to make the DEF
bond team broader than it actually was by stating "[i]n the 2016 nuclear asset-
recovery bond transaction for DEF, however, Florida PSC's financing order
established a [b]ond [t]eam consisting of DEF and its designated advisors, the
Florida PSC and its designated advisors, legal counsel, and representatives to
oversee and approve post-financing order decisions concerning the structuring,
marketing and pricing of those securitized bonds." This is simply incorrect.
The DEF financing order actually states "DEF, its structuring advisor, and
designated Commission staff and its financial advisor will serve on the Bond
Team." Regarding decision-making authority, the DEF financing order states
"[o]ne designated representative of DEF and one designated representative of
the Commission shall be joint decision makers for all matters concerning the
structuring, marketing, and pricing of the bonds except for those
recommendations that in the sole view of DEF would expose DEF or the SPE
to securities law and other potential liability (i.e., such as, but not limited to, the
making of any untrue statement of a material fact or omission to state a material
fact required to be stated therein or necessary in order to make the statements
made not misleading) or contractual law liability (e.g., including but not limited
to terms and conditions of the underwriter agreement(s))."

1 Q. WHAT IS THE POINT YOU WANT THE COMMISSION TO DERIVE 2 FROM YOUR EXPLANATION OF THE CONSTRUCT OF THE DEF **BOND TEAM?** 3 4 A. In the event the Commission decides to weigh the applicability of the construct 5 of the DEF bond team model to the Companies' proposed transaction in this 6 case, I want to make clear to the Commission that the Public Staff Consultants 7 did not accurately explain the construct of the DEF bond team, which the Public 8 Staff Consultants heavily rely on in their testimony. My explanation further 9 highlights the point I made earlier that the composition of the bond team the 10 Public Staff Consultants are recommending in these cases has not been adopted 11 in any utility securitization anywhere in the country of which I am aware, 12 including in the referenced DEF transaction. ARE THE COMPANIES WILLING TO ADOPT THE DEF BOND 13 Q. 14 **TEAM MODEL?** 15 Yes. While the Companies believe this is ultimately a decision for the A. 16 Commission, the Companies would support a Bond Team comprised of the 17 Companies, their advisor(s) and counsel, and a designated Commissioner or 18 member of Commission staff, including any independent consultants or counsel hired by the Commission to ensure that the structuring, marketing²³, and pricing 19

of the storm recovery bonds will achieve the Statutory Cost Objectives. As I

²³ See supra, at note 12.

1		stated above, this is consistent with the bond team approach used in DEF's
2		transaction.
3	Q.	UNDER THIS MODEL, WHO WOULD HAVE DECISION-MAKING
4		AUTHORITY?
5	A.	Similar to the DEF transaction, a designated representative of the Companies
6		and a member of the Commission or Commission staff, as a designated
7		representative of the Commission, would be joint decision-makers in all aspects
8		of the structuring, marketing, and pricing of the storm recovery bonds except
9		for those recommendations that in the sole view of the Companies would
10		expose either Company or any SPE to liability. Pursuant to federal securities
11		laws, the Companies, in their role as "sponsors" and "depositors", have strict
12		liability for the accuracy of disclosure documents including the prospectus for
13		the storm recovery bonds and any other materials and information delivered to
14		investors. No other parties to the proposed transaction have this liability.
15		Therefore, the Companies must have final say over these items.
16		Like in Florida, the Companies and a member of the Commission or
17		Commission staff, as a designated representative of the Commission and its
18		outside consultant or counsel, as bond team members, excluding the
19		Companies' structuring advisor, would also have equal rights on the hiring
20		decisions for the underwriters. However, the Companies would like to retain
21		their right to select and engage any counsel for the Companies, the SPEs and
22		the underwriters.

Q. PUBLIC STAFF CONSULTANTS RECOMMEND THE COMMISSION ENGAGE A FINANCIAL ADVISOR; DO YOU AGREE?

A.

A. Ultimately this is a question for the Commission. If the Commission feels that it will be beneficial to engage an outside consultant to assist the Commission in connection with making determinations under the Securitization Statute, there are several firms that have experience advising utility commissions in offerings of utility securitization bonds. The Companies understand, from reviewing prior utility securitization financing orders and transactions, that firms such as Drexel Hamilton, Ducera Partners, Hilltop Securities (formerly First Southwest), Oxford Advisors, and Public Financial Management Company have advised other commissions on current or previous utility securitization transactions. The Companies also believe that larger financial institutions such as, but not limited to, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and JP Morgan may have advisory capabilities.

Q. CAN OTHER PARTIES, INCLUDING THE PUBLIC STAFF AND ITS

CONSULTANTS, PARTICIPATE IN THE STRUCTURING,

MARKETING, AND PRICING OF THE BONDS UNDER THIS

MODEL?

While they would not be formal members of the Bond Team, the Companies are not opposed to the underwriters or the Public Staff and its Consultants being invited to join all Bond Team meetings. Discussion among the Bond Team, the underwriters and Public Staff will allow for multiple voices and suggestions about the best way to structure, market, and price the storm recovery bonds.

1 Companies witness Atkins further elaborates on this concept.

)	T	Certification
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- 3 Q. PUBLIC STAFF CONSULTANTS ARE PREPARED TO OFFER AN
- 4 "INDEPENDENT" CERTIFICATION THAT THE TRANSACTION
- 5 MEETS THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS IF THE COMMISSION
- 6 DESIRES. IS THIS CONSISTENT WITH THE DEF MODEL?
- 7 A. No, it is not. Certifications for the DEF transaction were provided by DEF, the
- 8 Florida Public Service Commission's advisor, and the lead underwriters.
- 9 Q. DO YOU BELIEVE ANY CERTIFICATION BY A PARTY OTHER
- 10 THAN THE COMPANIES IS NECESSARY?

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A. No. Unlike the Florida transaction referenced by the Public Staff Consultants witnesses, where DEF was only obligated to certify that "the structuring, pricing and financing costs of the [securitization] bonds and the imposition of the proposed [securitization] charges have a *significant likelihood of resulting in lower overall costs or significantly mitigate rate impacts to customers* as compared with the traditional method of financing and recovering [securitization] costs," the Companies are proposing in connection with the IAL to certify to a higher standard that, based on the actual results after pricing, the structuring and pricing²⁴ of the SRB Securities and underlying storm recovery bonds issued on behalf of DEC and DEP result in the *lowest storm recovery charges* payable by the customers of DEC and DEP consistent with market

²⁴ For the reasons explained above, the Companies do not object to certifying that the marketing phase of the bond issuance met the Statutory Cost Objectives as well.

conditions at the time such SRB Securities and underlying storm recovery
bonds are priced and the terms set forth in the Financing Orders. As such, it is
unclear what value an additional certification could provide that is not already
covered by the Companies' proposed certification. To the extent, however, the
Commission wishes to obtain a certificate from an independent outside
consultant, like the DEF transaction, acceptance of the IAL should not be
conditioned on the delivery of certifications from parties other than the
Companies.

VI. PUBLIC STAFF ACCOUNTING ADJUSTMENTS

Q. ARE THERE ANY ACCOUNTING RECOMMENDATIONS MADE BY

THE PUBLIC STAFF THAT YOU WANT TO ADDRESS?

Yes. Public Staff witnesses Michael C. Maness and Michelle M. Boswell jointly propose that the Companies' capital contributions to each respective SPE should be limited to the actual investment return earned by the SPEs on that contribution. Public Staff witnesses Maness and Boswell also recommend that adjustments to on-going financing costs be subject to future prudency reviews by creating a corresponding regulatory liability for the purposes of providing a credit to customers for adjustments the Public Staff deems to be imprudently incurred. I explain why such a proposal is unprecedented, not contemplated by the structure of, and inconsistent with, the Securitization Statute.

Finally, Public Staff witnesses Maness and Boswell propose that overrecoveries of up-front financing costs should be credited back to customers

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1		through use of a deferred regulatory liability and subsequent credit to the
2		Companies' cost of service, in each of the Companies' next general rate cases.
3		Companies witness Abernathy provides a detailed summary of the Public
4		Staff's testimony on this issue, which I will not recite here, and briefly explains
5		why the Public Staff's proposal makes little sense from a ratemaking
6		perspective given the separation between the Companies and each SPE. I
7		further expand on the need for and nature of that separation below.
8		A. Return on Capital Contribution
9	Q.	DO YOU AGREE WITH PUBLC STAFF WITNESSES MANESS AND
10		BOSWELL THAT THE COMPANIES' RETURN ON ITS CAPITAL
11		CONTRIBUTIONS SHOULD BE LIMITED TO THE ACTUAL
12		RETURN ON FUNDS IN THE COLLECTION ACCOUNTS?
13	A.	No. The Companies are entitled to earn a return on their equity capital
14		contributions to these proposed transactions commensurate with the level of
15		return a regulated utility is otherwise entitled to earn on its equity capital
16		investments. For this reason, the Companies believe that their proposed level
17		of return, equal to the interest rate of the longest maturity bond, is reasonable,
18		justified, and consistent with the recommendation of Saber Partners, LLC in the
19		DEF transaction.
20		The Companies' cash investment deposited into the capital account is
21		not released to the Companies until after the last payment of the longest tranche
22		of bonds is paid in full, which will be at least 15 years from now and perhaps
23		longer if the Commission decides to extend the maturity of the bond to 20 years

as the Public Staff has proposed. If the Companies were investing this capital
in assets that would be added to their respective rate base and amortized over a
similar period, it would be entitled to a return at its weighted average cost of
capital ("WACC"). However, here, the Companies are actually asking for a
level of return that is less than its WACC. In fact, the market interest rate on
the longest tranche is based upon the weighted average of that tranche, not the
market rate for a "bullet" payment that matches the final payment of the longest
tranche. As a result, the return proposed to be earned by the Companies is less
than a market rate for the date the equity contribution is expected to be returned
to the Companies. The plain fact is that the Companies are investing millions
of dollars into entities, for the quantifiable benefits for its customers, that will
not be returned for potentially two decades. To compensate the Companies for
the lost opportunity to invest that capital in assets that would yield a higher
return, the Companies are seeking a return that is less than its WACC but higher
than what the Public Staff has proposed. Moreover, the Companies are aware
that the DEF transaction allowed and utilized the same return proposed by the
Companies here. For these reasons, the Companies ask that the Commission
allow the Companies to earn its requested return on its capital contributions.

B. On-going Financing Costs

2 Q. PLEASE REMIND THE COMMISSION WHAT ON-GOING

3 FINANCING COSTS ARE AND HOW THE COMPANIES PROPOSE

4 TO ACCOUNT FOR THEM.

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As I explain in my direct testimony, there will be on-going expenses that will be incurred by each SPE throughout the life of the storm recovery bonds to support its ongoing operations. These on-going financing costs include servicing fees; administration fees; accounting and auditing fees; regulatory fees; legal fees; rating agency surveillance fees; trustee fees; independent director or manager fees; and other miscellaneous fees associated with the servicing of the storm recovery bonds. Of these on-going financing fees, the largest is the servicing fee, which is approved in the Financing Orders at 0.05% of the initial aggregate principal amount of the storm recovery bonds so long as DEC or DEP, as applicable, or a successor utility is the servicer. Additionally, the administration fee is approved by the Commission in the Financing Orders. The remaining fees are *de minimis* amounts owed to third parties to maintain the structure of the bonds. The SPE's sole source of funds are the storm recovery charges collected from customers. To ensure the amount of storm recovery charges collected for each payment period is sufficient to pay the principal and interest on the storm recovery bonds and the on-going financing costs, they are factored into each true-up adjustment.

- 1 Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE PUBLIC STAFF'S PROPOSAL
 2 REGARDING ON-GOING FINANCING COSTS.
- A. In contrast to the Companies' recommendation, the Public Staff recommends
 that adjustments to on-going financing costs that are paid from the storm
 recovery charges be matched with an offsetting regulatory asset or liability in
 the Companies' traditional ratemaking cost of service to create a link to adjust
 the Companies' cost of service in a future general rate case proceeding upon
 subsequent audit for prudency review of such adjustments.
- 9 Q. SHOULD THE COMMISSION REJECT THE ACCOUNTING
 10 TREATMENT FOR ON-GOING FINANCING COSTS PROPOSED BY
 11 THE PUBLIC STAFF?
 - Yes. The structure of securitization is simply not designed to work this way and the proposed audit and prudency review is inconsistent with the Securitization Statute. Other than the servicing fee and administration fee payable to DEC or DEP, as applicable, which are approved upfront in the Financing Orders, the remaining costs are third party costs incurred to support the structure. These types of costs are approved in the Financing Orders and IAL, and future adjustments are generally not subject a prudency review over the life of the transaction. The Companies are concerned with the Public Staff's proposed treatment because it is a negative factor in the separateness analysis between the SPE and the Company, which owns the member interest in the SPE. The on-going financing costs are the costs of the SPE, not costs of the applicable utility. Furthermore, witnesses Maness and Boswell improperly

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1		suggest that the Commission should authorize a new audit process that expands
2		both the time and scope of the review permitted by the Securitization Statute.
3		The statute states that any review of an adjustment filing be limited to
4		mathematical and clerical errors and the Commission must inform the
5		Companies of such errors within 30 days of the filing, so their proposal is
6		inconsistent with the plain meaning of the statute.
7		While the Companies are more than willing to provide the details of on-
8		going financing costs to the Public Staff to be able to check for mathematical
9		or clerical errors in connection with each true-up adjustment, as the statute
10		specifically contemplates, the on-going financing costs should not themselves
11		be subject to the type of prudency review and cost of service impacts
12		contemplated by the Public Staff.
13		C. Over-Recovery of Up-front Financing Costs
14	Q.	DO YOU AGREE WITH COMPANIES WITNESS ABERNATHY THAT
15		THE PUBLIC STAFF'S PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH A
16		REGULATORY LIABILITY TO POTENTIALLY ADJUST THE
17		COMPANIES' COST OF SERVICE IN THEIR NEXT GENERAL RATE
18		CASES FOR ANY OVER-RECOVERY OF UP-FRONT FINANCING
19		COSTS DOES NOT MAKE SENSE FROM A REGULATORY
20		PERSPECTIVE?
21	A.	Yes. My discussion above regarding the separateness of the Companies and the
22		SPEs in the context of ongoing financing costs applies here too. If there is an
23		over-collection of up-front financing costs, then it is the SPE - not the

6	VII. CONCLUSION
5	contemplates.
4	collection in connection with the next true-up as the Securitization Statute
3	storm recovery charge being collected from customers, as a result of the over-
2	that were actually incurred. As such, it is appropriate for the SPE to lower the
1	Companies – that will have received an excess of bond proceeds above costs

- 7 Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY?
- 8 A. Yes.

1 BY MR. JEFFRIES:

- Q Mr. Heath, have you prepared a summary of your prefiled direct and rebuttal testimonies?
 - A Yes, I have.
- Q Could you please provide that for the Commission, please?
 - A Sure. Good morning, Commissioners. My name is
 Thomas Heath and I am a Structured Finance
 Director from Duke Energy Corp. I'm pleased to
 appear before you today to discuss the Petition
 for storm recovery financing orders for Duke
 Energy Carolinas and Duke Energy Progress, which
 I will refer to collectively as "the Companies".

In my direct testimony, I present the Companies' proposal to use storm recovery bonds to finance storm recovery costs as permitted by the Securitization Statute and to provide an estimate of upfront and ongoing financing costs. The Companies request that the Commission approve the issuance of storm recovery bonds to finance the full amount of the Companies storm recovery costs related to Hurricanes

Florence, Michael, and Diego and winter -- or

Florence, Michael, and Dorian and Winter Storm

Diego.

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The Statutory Cost Objectives of the Securitization Statute of providing quantifiable benefits to customers and structuring and pricing the bonds to result in the lowest storm recovery charges consistent with market conditions at the time the bonds are issued are clear, and the Companies have proposed a financing structure that meets these objectives and provides significant savings for DEC and DEP customers compared to traditional base-rate The Companies have proposed options to recovery. either issue bonds separately for DEC and DEP or in a combined structure, which the Companies believe are expected to attract greater investor attention and provide consistent bond terms and pricing for both DEC and DEP customers. options are intended to permit flexibility for the offerings to achieve the Statutory Cost Objectives; and it is important to note that no decision has been made to date as to exactly what structure will be utilized in the proposed transaction.

My rebuttal testimony responds to

recommendations proposed by the Public Staff consultants, clarifies the requirements of the Securitization Statute, explains how the Companies' proposals are consistent with the Statutory Cost Objectives, and provides alternative recommendations regarding post-financing order procedures.

The Companies' -- or rather the Public Staff's testimony was primarily focused on ensuring a continuing and, by historic standards, an unprecedented and extraordinarily active role for the Public Staff in the post-financing order structuring, marketing, and pricing process for the storm recovery bonds. The Companies have significant concerns with an arrangement that allows an intervening party, even the Public Staff, to have a decision-making role in a financial transaction that, by statute, is required to be performed by the Companies, decided by the Companies, and executed by the Companies.

In the event the Commission decides to weigh the applicability of the construct of the Duke Energy Florida, or DEF,

bond team model to the Companies' proposed transaction in this case, I make it clear to the Commission that the Public Staff consultants did not accurately explain the construct of the DEF bond team which they heavily rely upon in their testimony. While the Companies believe this is ultimately a decision for this Commission, the Companies would support a bond team consistent with the DEF bond team which would be comprised of the Companies, their advisors and counsel, and a designated Commissioner or member of Commission staff including an independent, any independent consultants or counsel hired by the Commission itself to ensure that the structuring, marketing, and pricing of the storm recovery bonds will achieve the Statutory Cost Objectives.

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Commissioners, I want to make clear that the Companies particularly reject the notions, which are often repeated in the Public Staff consultant's testimony, that DEC and DEP are presumptively unsuited or would have anything other than their customers' best interests at heart and mind during this process. The Companies are keenly aware that the cost of all

of their debt issuances are subject to ultimate recovery from their customers and it is not in the Companies' best interest to do anything that would unnecessarily add to the cumulative cost of electric service that their customers must pay. This is as true of their past issuances as it is of the proposed transactions, and our record -our track record of prior bond issuances speak for themselves. After all, the fundamental purpose of securitization is to lower customer costs. And, with this in mind, the Companies have put together an indicative structure that, based on market conditions as of early October 2020, would save DEC customers two hundred and fifty -- sorry -- DEC customers \$57.5 million and DEP customers \$216.2 million over a 15-year period, that's over a 30 percent savings when compared to the traditional method of recovering storm costs through base electric rates. Further, the Companies have proposed to certify to this Commission through the Issuance Advice Letter or otherwise, that the bonds meet the Statutory Cost Objectives, and we take that willingness to certify very seriously.

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Lastly, the Public Staff consultants have proposed so-called "best practices" related to utility securitization transactions and implied that the Companies' proposed transaction is deficient because it does not include these so-called "best practices". The facts, however, are that many of these recommended practices have already been incorporated into the Companies' proposed financing orders and transaction documents. Companies believe that the additional recommended best practices of the Public Staff consultants are not appropriate for the proposed transactions in these dockets as they do not adhere to the Securitization Statute and deviate from established North Carolina regulatory practices.

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Since the filing of my rebuttal testimony, it is my understanding that the Companies and the Public Staff have reached a settlement regarding ongoing financing costs and capital contributions among other things. I'm happy to address any questions the Commission may have regarding the Settlement Agreement and these agreed-upon issues.

1	This concludes my testimony
2	summary.
3	Q Thank you, Mr. Heath.
4	MR. JEFFRIES: Mr. Heath is available for
5	cross examination and questions by the Commission.
6	CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. Mr. Grantmyre,
7	Mr. Creech, you may proceed.
8	MR. CREECH: Good morning, again, Madam
9	Chair. Thank you, Mr. Jeffries.
10	CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. CREECH:
11	Q And good morning, Mr. Heath. How are you? Can
12	you hear me?
13	A I'm doing well today. Yes, I'm doing well today.
14	Thank you.
15	Q Good, good. Well, we're doing combined
16	cross on your direct and your rebuttal testimony
17	today, and so we'll start with your direct, but
18	we may move around a little bit. But let's start
19	with your direct.
20	One of the purposes that you state
21	in your direct on pages 3 and 4 is to support the
22	Joint Petition of the Companies. And I was
23	hoping we could briefly turn to the Petition just
24	for a moment as a preliminary matter.

1 Α Sure. No problem. I've got it before me, so I'm 2 ready whenever you are. 3 Great. On the first page of the Petition, it 4 indicates a rationale for the Petition and ends 5 with "The Companies estimate that securitization of the respective storm recovery costs will 6 7 result in expected customer savings of 32 percent for DEC customers and 33 percent for DEP 8 9 customers"; is that correct? 10 I believe that is correct. Α 11 Q Page 1. 12 I was looking at my testimony, sorry, not the 13 Petition. I believe that is correct though. 14 Yes. 15 And to be clear, there's not just a customer Q 16 benefit here, however, the Companies benefit too, 17 including the Companies get paid back sooner and 18 in full instead of having to await the Companies' 19 next rate cases and this debt cannot be 20 considered corporate debt of the Utilities by the 21 Commission except for federal income tax 22 purposes, correct? 23 That is correct. Α 24 And, of course, it's the ratepayers who pay back

these bonds, which is why you've heard them 1 2 referred to as ratepayer-backed bonds, correct? 3 That is correct, but I would also clarify that, 4 as I mentioned in my testimony summary, that 5 customers are ultimately responsible for paying back principal and interest on all of our debt, 6 7 whether it's securitization debt or our first mortgage bonds. 8 9 And the Joint Petition, the Companies, I think Q 10 you mentioned, are proposing \$1 billion in bonds 11 and that's approximately -- that's to reimburse 12 -- a quarter reimbursement back to DEC and 13 three-fourths back to DEP; is that right, 14 approximately? 15 Α Approximately, yes. 16 All right. Now, let's turn to page 10 of the 17 Joint Petition if we can, please, and Section 13 18 on page 10. 19 Α Yeah. 20 Okay. We're not going to do a lot of reading 21 today, because I know that's not preferred, but I 22 would ask, because I think it's important and for 23 our discussion today, that you please read the first sentences there, the first eight lines 24

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finishing in "base rates", if you will.
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         Okay. I'm on the Joint Petition, but Number 13,
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          is that right, under the offering of and sale of
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         bonds?
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          It's on page 10, Section 13, paragraph 13.
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         All right.
    Α
                    Hang on.
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                         (Witness peruses documents).
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                         I have -- hang on just a second.
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         Okay. I'm there finally. Sorry about that.
10
                  Thank you. Would you mind reading the
    Q
         No, no.
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          first eight lines there down to ending the
          sentence "base rates"?
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          Sure. On November 6, 2019, SB 559 was signed
          into law, establishing N.C. General Statutes
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          § 62-172 to create a new financing tool to allow
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          utilities the ability to securitize certain storm
          recovery costs. Securitization is a process by
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          which the storm recovery costs, which the
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          Companies are entitled to recover, are not
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          financed directly by the Companies at their
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          overall cost of capital. Instead, securitization
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         makes use of relatively low-cost bonds, which are
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          secured by an irrevocable right to bill,
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          collect -- bill and collect storm recovery
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charges and certain periodic adjustments to such 1 The storm recovery charges are separate 2 charges. and distinct from the Companies' base rates. 3 4 Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Heath. And then the Q 5 next sentence, I won't have you read it, but the next sentence indicates that the issuer of the 6 7 bonds will be a bankruptcy-remote special purpose entity, which we refer to as an SPE; is that 8 9 correct? 10 That is correct. Α 11 And so DEC and DEP themselves will not 12 technically be the issuers of the bonds, but 13 rather a bankruptcy-remote SPE or SPEs, correct? 14 The SPEs are the issuer, but Duke Energy 15 Carolinas and Duke Energy Progress will be 16 co-registrants on the registration statement. 17 And let's do just finish reading the very -- the 18 remainder of that section if you will and I think we'll be done, starting "because". 19 Because of the nature of the storm 20 Α Sure. 21 recovery property pledged to support the storm 22 recovery bonds, the securitization process 23 results in the issuance of highly-rated bonds, 24 usually AAA or equivalent rated, to raise the

capital necessary to reimburse an electric 1 utility for its previously incurred storm 2 recovery costs and to pay the associated 3 4 financing costs related to issuing the bonds and 5 maintaining the structure to ensure timely payment of debt service on the bonds. 6 7 approach makes it possible to reduce each 8 Companies' overall revenue requirement associated with storm recovery costs thereby reducing costs 9 10 to customers. The revenue requirement is lower because the securitization results in a lower 11 cost method of financing storm recovery costs in 12 13 comparison to traditional cost recovery and ratemaking methods. 14 15 Thank you. And then let's move onto -- in the Q 16 Petition to page 25 if we can. And there's a 17 heading there that says "Securitization Benefits." 18 19 I'm there. Α 20 Okay. And actually let's turn onto the next 21 page, page 26 and Section 46, and you see the 22 sentence --23 I'm there. Α Do you see the sentence there that indicates that 24

the Storm Securitization Statute "requires the 1 2 Commission to find that the proposed structure 3 and pricing of the storm recovery bonds are 4 reasonably expected to result in the lowest storm 5 recovery charges consistent with market 6 conditions at the time the storm recovery bonds 7 are priced and the terms of the Financing 8 Orders"? Do you see that? 9 Yes, I see that. I do see that. Α 10 Will you read the sentence right after that 11 starting with "the final structure"? 12 "The final structure and terms of the storm 13 recovery bonds will be determined shortly before 14 their issuance, in accordance with the Financing 15 Orders. As described in the" --16 That's good. Q 17 Α Okay. 18 Okay. Sorry about that. But I guess -- so we 19 will not know the final structure and terms in 20 pricing of the bonds at the time of any financing 21 order; isn't that correct? Is that correct? 22 That is correct. 23 Okay. Now, let's turn to page 27 of the Joint Q 24 Petition if we can. It's the next page and

Section 48. 1 2 I'm there. Α 3 And the first sentence there says "To maximize 4 the benefits from securitization for customers, 5 it is necessary to obtain AAA-equivalent credit ratings of the storm recovery bonds and, if 6 7 applicable, the SRB Securities"; isn't that 8 correct? 9 That is correct. Α 10 And you'd agree that there are some very specific Q 11 requirements that must be met for these bonds to 12 achieve AAA rating and among them are some of the 13 items listed right in that next sentence which 14 are not, you know, number one, nonbypassability; 15 number three, a mandatory true-up mechanism; 16 four, the requirement that the Commission not 17 amend or terminate the Financing Orders; six, a 18 statutory pledge that neither the State nor the 19 Commission will impair the rights of the storm 20 recover bond holders. Is that correct? 21 That is correct. Yes. Α 22 Okay. And then finally we'll move on from the 23 Petition here momentarily. Let's just turn to

There's a chart

page 20 -- back to page 20.

there, kind of a flow chart, that says Structure 1 2 of Issuance. 3 Yes, I'm there. 4 All right. And on the left-hand side there we Q 5 see DEC, the Duke Energy Carolinas, on the right-hand side Duke Energy Progress. And really 6 7 the point there is that DEC can create a SPE of 8 its own and DEP can create a SPE of its own and 9 potentially come together, there at the bottom 10 that fourth box down I suppose, to issue them 11 jointly and that's what the Companies are asking 12 for flexibility for in this Petition; is that 13 correct? Yes, flexibility, but the flexibility is not just 14 15 for that structure. It could be for the SRB 16 structure. It could be for separate issuances 17 for DEC and DEP either at the same time or 18 separated in time. Yeah. But it's about 19 flexibility for the best option to achieve the 20 Statutory Cost Objective. 21 All right. And let's move to your rebuttal, if Q 22 we may, your rebuttal testimony. 23 Α Sorry. 24 It's okay. And I want to -- you mentioned on

page 20 about the testimony of Public Staff 1 2 witness Fichera, and I was going to bring up now 3 our premarked Exhibit 5 to talk to you about 4 witness Fichera's figures, but it looks like the 5 functionality of that particular -- some of those figures did not come through. They were all 6 7 black. And so I would ask actually if you could 8 potentially pull up -- if you would please pull 9 up the Fichera testimony, if you would, please, 10 witness Fichera's testimony. 11 All right. I'm there. Can you hear me? 12 Mr. Fichera's testimony. 13 Perfect. Perfect. All right. Thank you. Q And 14 if you could just turn to page 13 of 15 Mr. Fichera's testimony. There's a figure 2 16 there. Very reminiscent to the premarked 5. 17 Uh-huh. Α 18 And hopefully can see that. And witness Fichera 19 breaks this whole process into three phases. And 20 do you see what I'm looking at there, Phase 1, 21 Phase 2, and Phase 3? 22 Yes, I do. 23 And -- give me one second. And so under Phase 1 Q a petition would be filed, testimony would be 24

filed, discovery occurs, and following the 1 2 hearing, possibly a financing order issued by the 3 Commission under this kind of framework; is that 4 correct? 5 That is correct. Α 6 And that would be followed by Phase 2 that would 7 add the implementation of the Financing Order and 8 that's I think what you refer to as kind of the 9 marketing phase in your testimony; is that 10 correct? 11 I would say it's the structuring and marketing 12 process. 13 Okay. Right. And then finally it's really the Q final period there when pricing occurs and the 14 15 issuance of bonds; is that correct, in the Phase 16 3? 17 That's right. Α 18 Okay. So I just lay that out, because I think 19 we'll see that here coming up. Thank you for 20 that very much. 21 So I would like to continue on 22 with your rebuttal if I could on a couple of 23 major themes that you touch on in your rebuttal. 24 The first relating to whether or not this is your

traditional bond issuance, and the second related 1 2 to some of your references to a plain meaning 3 reading of statutes. But before I do that, I 4 would like to talk with you about your initial observations about the Public Staff's testimony 5 6 in this case, which you indicated also in your 7 summary today. If you go to page 4, lines 12 and 13 of your rebuttal. 8 9 Okay. I'm there. Α 10 Yeah. You indicate that you thought that the 11 Public Staff's testimony should've focused more 12 on the Financing Orders though you are aware of 13 various observations the Public Staff witnesses 14 made as to Financing Orders including extensively 15 in the testimony of former Texas Commissioner 16 Klein in her Exhibit 2; is that correct? 17 Yes. Α 18 And that the Commission's Procedural Order in 19 this proceeding indicated that suggested 20 provisions to the proposed Financing Orders be 21 filed on or before February 8th, which is, of

Yes, it is, but I do believe that it would've

course, after this evidentiary hearing today; is

22

23

24

that correct?

1		been helpful at this stage to see a markup of
2		exactly what was being asked for here.
3	Q	All right. Now, I do want to move onto the
4		themes I mentioned before. Let's turn to page 7
5		of your rebuttal. And in lines 9 to 11 you ask
6		"Are the storm recovery bonds proposed for
7		issuance in the pending documents" documents
8		"dockets materially different from other
9		long-term debt issuances by the Companies." And
10		can you please read the first sentence of your
11		response there?
12	A	In my opinion, they are not. While I acknowledge
13		the structures used and the flow of cash are
14		different than a more customary long-term bond
15		issuance, I do not believe those differences
16		necessitate an entirely different process for
17		approval and issuance of the bonds.
18	Q	Okay. But as the Companies seem to actually
19		acknowledge in their Joint Petition, there are
20		various aspects of these ratepayer-backed bonds
21		that are not normal. This process now, of
22		course, has its own statue, does it not?
23	А	Yes, it does.
24	Q	And the statute authorizes the Commission to

issue one or more Financing Orders which impose a 1 2 specific charge on all customers' electricity in 3 a Public Utility's historic service area, 4 correct? 5 That's correct. 6 And a Financing Order that declares that the 7 right to impose, adjust, bill, and collect that 8 charge to be a present interest in property which 9 can be transferred to a bankruptcy-remote SPE, 10 correct? 11 Correct. 12 And pledges that the State Legislature and the Q 13 Commission cannot revoke or amend the state 14 statute or the Financing Order in a way that will adversely affect holders of the bonds, correct? 15 16 Yes, all that is correct. Α And that the storm recovery charges will remain 17 18 in place "even if a customer elects to purchase 19 electricity from an alternative electric supplier 20 following a fundamental change in regulation of 21 Public Utilities"; is that correct? 22 Yes, it is. 23 Now, and as a result of these features, Q 24 ratepayer-backed bonds are typically assigned the

highest possible credit ratings, correct? 1 2 Α Yes. 3 And they're not treated as debt of the Utility 4 for purposes of the credit rating agencies 5 assigning ratings to the Utilities' other securities, correct? 6 7 No, that's incorrect. S&P, Standard & Poor's Α 8 does unconsolidated, but Moody's does include it 9 as on credit, and this debt is -- even though the 10 Statute and the Financing Order will say that this is not debt of the Utility for any purpose 11 12 other than federal income tax purposes, the fact 13 is this debt is consolidated onto the balance 14 sheets of DEC and DEP for SEC filing purposes, 15 and that is generally what the rating agencies 16 look to. 17 So Moody's sees it as 18 consolidated, leaves it as consolidated, does 19 make some qualitative adjustments for it. 20 would strip it out. 21 Are you suggesting that the Financing Order would Q 22 be incorrect? 23 The Financing Order I believe and the --Α 24 this comment about this being debt, not treated

as debt of the Utility is for ratemaking purposes 1 2 and for income tax purposes only. 3 But to be clear, it's not debt of the parent. 4 is only debt in the consolidated balance sheet; 5 isn't that correct? 6 It's not debt of DEC and DEP for ratemaking Α 7 It is debt of DEC and DEP and Duke 8 Energy Corp for consolidated financial statement 9 purposes. 10 For consolidated purposes; is that correct? Q 11 Yes. Yes. Α 12 All right. Now for DEC -- let's see here. Q 13 we were talking about traditional utility bonds 14 and, again, with respect to traditional utility 15 bonds, the State Legislature and the Commission 16 could conceivably revoke or amend the State 17 Statute or the State Commission's order --18 Utility Commission's order which authorized 19 issuance of the traditional utility bonds in ways 20 that adversely affect holders of the bonds; is 21 that correct? 22 Could you clarify that question or repeat that, 23 please? 24 I guess I'm going back to the point about the

State pledge, and so -- and the Commission. 1 2 for these bonds, there's got to be a pledge that 3 the State Legislature and the Commission cannot 4 revoke or amend the State Statute or the 5 Financing Order in a way that will adversely affect holders of the bonds; that's correct, is 6 7 it not? That is correct, yes. 8 Α We'll move on. Now for DEC -- for 9 Q All right. 10 DEC, how many of these ratepayer-backed bond 11 storm securitization issuances has the Company 12 completed? 13 Α None. And for DEP, how many ratepayer-backed bond storm 14 15 securitization issuances has the Company 16 completed? 17 None. Α 18 And as for their parent, how many such issuances 19 has the parent completed? 20 Α Their parent company none, but their affiliate, 21 Duke Energy Florida, did a transaction for almost 22 \$1.3 billion in 2016. 23 So they have an affiliate who's done one? Q 24 Α Correct.

Okay. All right. Let's move on to another theme 1 Q 2 in your rebuttal if we can, the so-called plain 3 meaning or plain reading of the Statute which is mentioned on my count about five times in your 4 rebuttal. So I'd like to first, if I may, talk 5 to you about the Statutes if we could and 6 7 specifically I would like to --8 MR. CREECH: Madam Chair, I would like to pull premarked Exhibit 1, the Public Staff premarked 9 10 Exhibit 1, which is pages 1 to 21. 11 CHAIR MITCHELL: Mr. Creech, identify the 12 document that you're looking at, please. 13 MR. CREECH: Yes. At the very top it says "62-2, Declaration of Policy". 14 15 CHAIR MITCHELL: Okay. 16 MR. CREECH: And I would like to mark this 17 as Public Staff -- I have to get our naming convention 18 here today, so I'd like to do it exactly how the 19 Commission would like, Public Staff Cross Examination -- Public Staff Heath Cross Examination 20 21 Exhibit 1. How would you --22 CHAIR MITCHELL: Let's identify the document 23 as Public Staff Heath Cross Examination Number 1. 24 Public Staff Heath Cross Examination Number 1.

(WHEREUPON, Public Staff Heath 1 2 Cross Examination Exhibit 1 is marked for identification.) 3 4 MR. CREECH: Thank you. 5 BY MR. CREECH: Mr. Heath, you'll be pleased to know we're not 6 7 going to read a ton of this statute, but we will briefly touch on it. So this premarked --8 this -- the Public Staff Heath Cross Examination 9 10 Exhibit 1 is actually comprised of three 11 statutes. One underlying the Commission. 12 other underlying the Public Staff. And the third 13 being the Storm Securitization Statute. see subsection -- if you turn to page 2, the 14 15 second page of the document, to Subsection (b). 16 Yes. Α 17 And it reads that "Authority shall be vested in the North Carolina Utilities Commission to 18 19 regulate public utilities generally, their rates, 20 services, and operations"; correct? Do you see 21 that? 22 What paragraph do you see that in? 23 I'm sorry. It's under (b), it's really the first Q 24 three -- the first two lines there.

1 Α Okay. 2 To these ends, therefore, authority shall be Q 3 vested. 4 Yes. Α 5 Q Right. 6 Yeah, I see that. Α 7 All right. Now, let's turn over a couple more Q 8 pages if we can, and at the top of the page it says 62-15, and this is a Public Staff --9 10 Α Yeah. 11 All right. And do you see under Subsection (b) 12 there it says There is established in the 13 Commission a Public Staff.? 14 Α Yeah. 15 Okay. And let's scroll down just a moment more Q 16 down to (d), and do you see the word "shall" 17 there, the second word? 18 Such -- oh, "shall be fixed"? 19 No. I'm sorry. Under (d) there, It shall be the Q duty and responsibility --20 21 Oh, (d). Α 22 -- of the Public Staff to. D as in David. 23 Α Yes. Yeah. Sorry. 24 Okay. And in the listing that follows there, you

see that it includes reviewing and investigating 1 2 certain matters there in items one and two, 3 numbers one and two, reviewing -- review, 4 investigate, et cetera. 5 Α Correct. 6 And in item three it indicates Shall intervene on 7 behalf of the Using and Consuming Public, in all Commission proceedings affecting the rates or 8 service of any public utility, end quote; is that 9 10 correct? Do you see that? 11 I see that, yes. 12 And then finally, and I think this is Q 13 important, let's go all the way down to 12. 14 could you read number 12, please? 15 When deemed necessary by the executive Α Sure. 16 director, in the interest of the Using and Consuming Public, advise the Commission with 17 respect to securities, regulations, and 18 19 transactions, pursuant to the provisions of 20 Article 8 of this Chapter. 21 Okay. And as you probably realize, the 22 Legislature placed the Storm Securitization 23 Statute that involves securities in Article 8 24 which is entitled "Securities Regulation of

Chapter 62"; is that correct? 1 2 I believe so, yes. Α 3 Okay. Now, speaking of securities, let's turn to 4 that issue for a moment if we can, because you've 5 raised that issue in your testimony if we can, so let's go back to your rebuttal. And on pages 25 6 7 and 26 of your rebuttal, it's the bottom of 25, 8 top of 26. 9 Α Okay. I'm --10 Okay. You state -- quote -- well, it's starting Q 11 at the answer there on page 25, line 19, you say "Under federal securities law, DEC and DEP will 12 13 be the issuers of the underlying bonds in this instance and as such will have all the 14 15 obligations under the federal securities laws 16 with regard to such issuances." Do you stand by 17 that statement? 18 I quess I would probably clarify that. DEC and 19 DEP would be co-registrants along with their SPEs 20 who are the issuers. Those SPEs are wholly owned 21 by Duke Energy Carolinas or will be wholly owned 22 by Duke Energy Carolinas, Duke Energy Progress. 23 Okay. And thank you. And that's -- those -- and Q 24 that was borne out in your response to a Data

1		Request 16 as I recall. Does that sound familiar
2		to you? Public Staff Data Request 16.
3	A	It's very possible. I mean, there were many data
4		requests and it's hard to remember exactly what
5		every one of them covered, but that's probably
6		likely.
7	Q	Let's there's just two other aspects on this.
8		You have attached to your testimony forms of
9		transaction documents proposed by the Companies,
10		but they do not require the Companies to
11		indemnify these SPEs for money damages imposed by
12		reason of securities law violations; is that
13		correct?
14	А	I believe there is a condition that we make the
15		customers hold for any losses that are sustained.
16	Q	And any unindemnified money damages imposed by
17		reasons of any securities law violation in
18		connection with the issuance of storm recovery
19		bonds would be a financing cost which the SPEs
20		are entitled to recover from storm recovery
21		charges; is that correct?
22	А	I believe that would require a legal opinion.
23		I'm not really an attorney, but
24	Q	Understood. I'm not asking for

legal opinions here today. But we'll move on 1 2 then. You were involved in the DEF storm 3 4 securitization transaction in Florida; is that 5 correct, Duke Energy Florida? 6 That is correct, yes. Α 7 Okay. And was there any securities law violation Q 8 alleged or did one actually occur as it relates 9 to Duke Energy Florida? 10 There were not, no. Α 11 The Florida Commission? 0 Not that I'm aware of. 12 13 Its advisor that is also serving as the Public Q Staff's advisor in this case? 14 15 No, there were not that I'm aware of, but, you Α 16 know, I don't think we managed risk on whether or 17 not something, you know, whether there was a 18 We look at the potential for there to be 19 a claim. 20 Okay. Let's move on if we can. In your -- so we 21 move on kind to the next topic here and maybe a 22 little harmony for a moment. You asked the 23 Commission at various -- to look at various 24 items -- let's see here -- we're on pages 10 and

11 of your rebuttal. 1 2 Α Yes. 3 And it's at the bottom of 10 going into 11 you 4 mention various of the Public Staff's proposals, 5 our proposals, and I just wanted to -- and the first three relate to best practices, 6 7 certifications, and in a bond team and/or Public 8 Staff involvement. And at least on those three 9 levels, in terms of a matter of degree, best practices, certifications, and Public Staff 10 11 involvement, there is some level of agreement in 12 this case and perhaps some level of disagreement. 13 Would that be a fair characterization? Yes. But I think on the specific topic there's, 14 15 you know, some that would be more common, 16 understanding there may be wider, new wider 17 differences of opinion on others. 18 Okay. Now, let's turn to page 19 of your 19 rebuttal if we can. 20 Α Okay. 21 And this goes to your -- where you speak of the Q 22 Companies' view on the lowest cost objective or 23 standard for issuance of the bonds. 24 Yes. But I think it's really -- I think it's Α

really looking at what the statutory objective 1 2 is, yes. 3 Okay. Very good. And this relates back to our 4 discussion of your calling for a plain reading of 5 the Statute, so that's good, and as well as our prior kind of original characterization or 6 7 discussion in characterizing these -- this process in phases. Phase 1 that we're now in. 8 9 Phase 2 being the marketing, structuring, and 10 pricing of the bonds. And then Phase 3 being the 11 final period where certifications occur and we 12 press go and bonds are issued. If you can --13 MR. JEFFRIES: Mr. Creech. 14 MR. CREECH: Yes. 15 MR. JEFFRIES: I'm sorry to interrupt. 16 MR. CREECH: Please. 17 MR. JEFFRIES: I don't think -- your 18 characterization of the phases I don't think was 19 consistent with Mr. Heath's characterization of the 20 phases, so we might want to clarify that. I think 21 it's -- the record may be confused on at this point. 22 MR. CREECH: Thank you. 23 Mr. Heath -- and my apologies. Mr. Heath, did Q 24 you want to clarify any point on that?

I mean, there are certainly stages to this, 1 Α 2 right? There's a financing order. There's a 3 post-financing order. I think we, you know, when 4 we talked about Mr. Fichera's testimony earlier, he had that broken into three phases. I think I 5 look at it as there's the petition and there's a 6 7 post-financing order process. 8 Okay. Okay. All right. Thank you. 0 9 MR. CREECH: Thank you, Mr. Jeffries as 10 well. 11 Now, as -- we're on page 19 of your rebuttal and 12 can you read your question and answer at the top 13 of page 19 if you will there, Does the Securitization Statute outline a lowest cost 14 15 objective. Could you, I suppose, read your 16 answer there? 17 Sure. Α 18 And you can feel free to skip down to number two 19 after you start, but -- or you can read the whole 20 thing; either way. The North Carolina General Statute § 62-172 21 Α 22 requires (1) that the issuance of the storm recovery bonds and the imposition and collection 23 of a storm recovery charge are expected to 24

provide quantifiable benefits to customers as 1 2 compared to the costs that would have been incurred absent the issuance of the storm 3 4 recovery bonds, and (2) the structuring and 5 pricing of the storm recover bonds are necessarily expected to result in the lowest 6 7 storm recovery charges consistent with market 8 conditions at the time the storm recovery bonds are priced and the terms set forth in such 9 10 financing order. 11 Thank you. Let's turn to the Securitization 12 Statute if we can, which you may recall we marked 13 that as Public Staff Heath Cross Examination 14 Exhibit Number 1, and you can go over to page 7, 15 which is Session Law 2019-255 (sic). Page 7 of 16 that document, the Securitization Statute. 17 Yeah, I believe I'm there. Α 18 Okay. I believe Section (a) there is 19 definitions. And let's scroll down to Section 20 (b) if we can, which is actually on page 9 of the 21 overall document, page -- of the overall 22 document, page 3 of the Statute.

No, I'm not following your page references there.

Financing Orders.

23

24

- I'm sorry. Just the third page of that 1 Q 2 particular statute. At the bottom of the page 3 says Financing Orders (b). 4 Yes, okay. I'm there. Α 5 I'm just trying to get us momentarily and then 6 we're actually going to -- we're actually going 7 to go over -- and then we're actually going to kind of continue flipping over if we can one more 8 page, three -- to number 3 there at the next page 9
- 11 A Yes, I see that.
- All right. And thanks for your patience on that.

 And then finally under that section we go to (b)

 which is on the next page which is page 11 of the

 overall document, page 5 of the Securitization

 Statute. It says a --

where it says Petition and order.

17 | A Okay.

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- Q It says A financing order issued by the

 Commission to a Public Utility shall include all

 the following elements, does it not?
- 21 A Yes, it does.
- 22 Q All right. And you see there that -- and you
 23 just read from your rebuttal items one and two,
 24 you see that those correspond really with items

(b)(2) and (b)(3) just below there, do you not, A 1 2 finding that the proposed issuance and then A finding that the structuring and pricing. Do you 3 4 see that? 5 Α Yes, findings that the Commission has to make. 6 Yes. 7 Now, going back to page 19 of your Q Okay. 8 rebuttal testimony that we had you just read, at 9 the top on your answer it says Yes. N.C. Gen. 10 Stat. § 62-172 requires. But should it be 11 revised to add reference to the Financing Order 12 as the Statute requires that it's the Financing 13 Order include those two items such that your 14 answer on page 19 of your rebuttal should instead read "Yes. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 62-172 requires 15 16 that the Commission's Financing Order include 17 those two things"? 18 MR. JEFFRIES: Chair Mitchell, we'd object. 19 I mean, Mr. Creech is free to ask Mr. Heath a question 20 about his testimony, but I don't think having him try 21 to attempt to correct it on record is appropriate. 22 MR. CREECH: I'm pleased to move -- I'm pleased to move on. I was just trying to make a 23 24 particular point about the plain reading of the

Statute. 2 CHAIR MITCHELL: I'll sustain the objection. 3 Please move on, Mr. Creech. 4 MR. CREECH: Okay. 5 Continuing on with this line of questioning, Q however, in a different way, let's go to the 6 7 final provision of Item 12 of the Statute. Again, in the very -- the next page, so again 8 9 we're now to -- down to (b) (12) on the very next 10 page of the Statute. And thanks for your 11 patience. And do you see there, Mr. Heath, where 12 it says "Any other conditions not otherwise 13 inconsistent with this section that the Commission determines are appropriate"? 14 15 Yes, I see that. Α 16 Now, let's briefly talk about the pricing of the 17 bonds if we can. All right? 18 Okay. 19 And it may be that witness Atkins to whom you Q 20 regularly refer in your rebuttal can also speak 21 to this and, of course, he'll be on later today. 22 This relates to the Companies' contention that 23 all the bonds need to have actual buyers -- well, 24 actual orders from buyers for a hundred percent

of the bonds at the time the bonds are to be 1 2 sold, selling the bonds at a so-called 3 market-clearing price; is that correct? 4 Yes. Α 5 Now, do you think it's advisable, whether 6 you're selling a thousand bonds or a thousand of 7 anything or renting a thousand of anything, if you could get a great price for 95 percent of 8 9 something, the bonds, wouldn't you rather do that 10 than to go about getting a lower price overall 11 and getting lower gross receipts overall by 12 having to sell them all at once? 13 I don't think I follow that question. I mean, I 14 think if you're asking about do we want to have 15 the bonds fully subscribed, yes, I do. 16 think that anything other than having orders for 17 the bonds is a market-clearing price. 18 forcing to -- you know, trying to get an 19 underwriter to buy them at some other price to 20 drive down a rate or something like that I don't 21 think is appropriate. I mean, this is -- these 22 are -- should be fully marketed bonds and this 23 should bear the rate that is going to be 24 available in the market.

1	Q	I guess my point is would it be a fair analogy to
2		say if you could, you know, if you can get an
3		optimum price for 95 percent of these bonds that
4		you're saying that no, we've actually got to sell
5		it at a potentially at a lower price so that
6		we get them all sold at once, we cannot have the
7		underwriting the underwriter hold onto the
8		final, you know, 5 percent there and take some
9		level of risk. Is that what you're saying?
10	А	Yeah. For it to be a market-clearing price, they
11		need to be fully subscribed and sold.
12	Q	Notwithstanding the fact that that could mean
13		lower gross receipts or excuse me in that
14		type of setting a less than optimum result.
15	A	I wouldn't describe that as less than optimum. I
16		mean, the market-clearing is how bonds are the
17		market-clearing rate is how bonds are priced in
18		the public markets.
19	Q	I hope we can move on to two final things if we
20		can. One is from your rebuttal and the other is
21		your direct testimony.
22	A	Sure.
23	Q	All right. The first relates to Public Staff
24		witness Abramson in your rebuttal, and then in

your direct testimony relating to transaction 1 2 documents. So let's first look at your rebuttal 3 on page 32 starting on line 7. 4 Okay. Α 5 You state that given his 40 years of experience 6 covering the U.S. utilities sector in general and 7 Duke Energy in particular, and so you continue --8 you reference Public Staff witness' Abramson's 9 experience covering utility bonds, do you not? 10 Yeah, I do. Α 11 And do you happen to have -- I'd like for us 12 briefly to turn to witness Abramson's testimony 13 if we could. 14 Okay. Give me a minute. 15 Q Let me get there if I can also. Thank you. 16 let's turn to pages 6 and 7 of witness Abramson's 17 testimony. 18 Okay. And line 17 in particular. Do you see the 19 Q 20 heading that reads "Achieving the Best Possible 21 Outcome For Ratepayers Is Also Good For Relations 22 Between the Utility and its Regulators, A Key 23 Factor For Investors"? Is that correct? 24 Α I do see that, yeah.

And do you see where it goes on to say "In 1 Q 2 addition, a securitization bond offering that 3 provides ratepayers the best possible outcome -4 namely the greatest savings - would be viewed 5 favorably by state regulators, in my opinion. Knowledgeable, long-term investors in utility 6 7 stocks and bonds understand that a good 8 regulatory environment is important to the 9 long-term success of their investments in 10 regulated monopolies"? Is that correct? 11 Yes. Α The final aspect of your testimony I'd 12 Q 13 like to touch on are the transaction documents if I can, and that's Exhibit -- kind of the various 14 15 Exhibits 2 to your direct testimony. 16 Okay. Α 17 Now, with respect to these All right. 18 transaction documents, in most of these there are 19 two parties to these agreements; one being the 20 Utility and the other being its wholly-owned 21 subsidiary SPE; is that correct? 22 Yes, for some of them. 23 And so essentially it's the Utility contracting Q 24 with its own SPE; is that correct?

Or I would say it's the other way around, 1 Α 2 the SPE contracting with the Utility. 3 Utility is going to service bond. It's going to 4 be the administrator. It's going to sell the 5 property right to the SPE and those sorts of 6 things. 7 Certainly. Certainly. Thank you. Q Thank you for 8 that clarification. And in light of that, let's 9 turn to customer protections in those agreements 10 and on page 35 of your direct testimony. On page 11 35 of your direct testimony you ask the following question: In DEC and DEP's affiliate's 12 13 transaction in Florida, the financing documents contain certain provisions that the Florida 14 Commission viewed as "customer protections". 15 16 then you say Do the financing documents that you are sponsoring contain similar "customer 17 protections"? Do you see that? 18 19 Yes, I do. Α 20 And you replied, Yes, it's my understanding that 21 they do. Is that correct? 22 That is what I said, yeah.

through several of these transaction documents,

All right. All right. I think we could go

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Q

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but we won't go through them all. I'd like to
 1
 2
         primarily just look at this Servicing Agreement
 3
         if we could, please. All right. Now, and in
 4
         doing so I would like to --
 5
              MR. CREECH: Madam Chair, if I could, bring
 6
    up Public Staff premarked 13, which is the Duke Energy
 7
    Florida, the Servicing Agreement.
 8
              CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. Mr. Creech,
 9
    give us the page numbers for that exhibit.
10
              MR. CREECH: Shall do. Just one second,
11
             And thank you. I thought had it. Just one
    please.
12
    second.
             I'm sorry.
13
              CHAIR MITCHELL: I've got it, Mr. Creech.
                                                          Ι
14
    believe it's 529.
15
              MR. CREECH: 529.
                                  I'm sorry.
16
              CHAIR MITCHELL: Is that consistent with
17
    your records?
18
              MR. CREECH: Let's see here.
19
              CHAIR MITCHELL: Mr. Creech, we're looking
20
    at the Nuclear Asset Recovery Property Servicing
21
    Agreement; is that right?
22
              MR. CREECH:
                            The Duke Energy Florida, DEF,
23
    Servicing Agreement, correct.
24
              CHAIR MITCHELL: Okay.
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```
MR. CREECH: I'm having a technology issue
 1
 2
    here. Excuse me one second.
 3
               CHAIR MITCHELL: Okay.
 4
              MR. CREECH: And thank you. That's correct.
 5
    Thank you. Thank you so much. Page 529.
 6
               CHAIR MITCHELL: Okay. Let's give everybody
 7
    a minute to find the document. That is the Nuclear
    Asset Recovery Property Servicing Agreement. That
 8
 9
    page number down at the bottom is 529. Mr. Creech,
10
    would you like to mark this exhibit?
11
                            I would, please. I would like
              MR. CREECH:
12
    to mark this exhibit as Public Staff Heath Cross
13
    Examination Exhibit 2.
               CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. The document
14
15
    will be marked Public Staff Heath Cross Examination
16
    Exhibit 2 -- Exhibit Number 2.
                         (WHEREUPON, Public Staff Heath
17
                         Cross Examination Exhibit 2 is
18
19
                         marked for identification.)
20
              CHAIR MITCHELL: You may proceed.
21
              MR. CREECH: All right.
22
    BY MR. CREECH:
23
         Mr. Heath, this is a Service Agreement executed
24
         by DEF in connection with the 2016 Florida
```

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ratepayer-backed bond transaction, and Section
 1
 2
          5.04 describes the circumstances under which DEF
 3
         may resign as servicer. If we can let's go down
 4
         to that.
 5
          I see Section 5.04 to be Effective Date and
          Termination.
 6
 7
         Right. And will you read -- will you read the
    Q
 8
          last sentence of that section, please?
          Duke Energy Florida shall not resign as Servicer
 9
    Α
10
          if such resignation does not satisfy the Rating
11
          Agency Condition or without consent of the
          Commission.
12
13
         Okay. So and let's go -- let's go to your -- the
14
          form Service Agreement attached to your direct
15
         testimony.
16
                 I'm not sure I have that in my binder
         Okay.
17
                 Yeah, I think I only have my Exhibit 1.
          don't believe I have the formal documents here
18
         unless someone can direct me to them.
19
20
         That is Exhibit 2b which is the form -- it's the
21
          Storm Recovery Property Servicing Agreement.
22
          Yeah, I know that's -- I know it's an exhibit,
         but I don't think it's in my materials here.
23
24
         All right.
                      Let's see here.
```

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Yeah, I'm just not seeing it here with my
 1
    Α
 2
         testimony in our -- in my binder.
 3
               MR. ROBINSON: Chair Mitchell, this is Camal
 4
    Robinson. For whatever reason, I'm not sure why, we
 5
    didn't get him that, but I can get that to him in
    about two minutes if you'd give us a second to get him
 6
 7
    that document.
 8
               CHAIR MITCHELL: We'll take a brief hold
 9
    while Mr. Robinson gets the document to the witness.
10
    Thank you.
11
               MR. ROBINSON:
                             Thank you, Chair Mitchell..
12
               (Pause).
13
               Chair Mitchell, he should have it any second
14
          Mr. Heath, if you would just check your email,
15
    please.
16
               CHAIR MITCHELL: Thank you, Mr. Robinson.
17
    Mr. Heath, let us know when you have the document.
18
               THE WITNESS: I have it opening up now.
19
    should just be a second. I have it open and I'm in
20
    Section 5.04.
21
    BY MR. CREECH:
22
         Perfect. Thank you. And then -- and again,
23
          that's -- right -- page 13 of that document, but
24
         page 542 of the overall combined exhibits.
```

1 Α Okay. 2 All right. Can you read -- can you please read Q 3 the final sentence of that 5.04? 4 Α It says Duke Energy Carolinas/Progress Sure. 5 shall not resign as Servicer if such resignation does not satisfy the Rating Agency Condition. 6 7 And that's different from the DEF final sentence; Q 8 is it not? 9 Let me get back to it. I think there is 10 something different there. Yes, the DEF 11 Agreement also has the words at the end "or without consent of the Commission". 12 13 All right. Now, I guess the point is you've 14 indicated in your testimony that it's your 15 understanding that the financing documents 16 attached to your testimony -- let's use your words here -- "contain similar customer 17 18 protections as the DEF transaction documents"; is 19 that correct? 20 That is correct. 21 But in this instance there could be a servicer, Q 22 that the Utility could resign as servicer and 23 inform the rating agency but not the Commission; 24 is that correct, under the forms you submitted --

or not you submitted, but attached to your 1 2 testimony? 3 It says without the -- the Florida Agreement has 4 the words "without consent of the Commission", so 5 I'm not sure that we would not notify the Commission at least. I do think that we -- I 6 7 thought we did have that provision in there. know we're not trying to limit the Commission's 8 9 ability on anything here, so if that was an 10 oversight, we certainly apologize for that. Ι 11 know we are trying to -- we weren't -- also there 12 in some aspects we weren't trying to presume that 13 the Commission wanted to have the ongoing 14 responsibilities and obligations that the Florida 15 Commission accepted in the Florida transaction, 16 so -- and that was part of our consideration as 17 well. 18 All right. And this is just merely one of 19 several transaction documents; isn't that 20 correct, Mr. Heath; this Service Agreement? 21 Yes, there are many. Yes. Α 22 All right. Well, we could continue to go through 23 some of these documents, but I think -- I think 24 that will be it for now, Mr. Heath. I really

1 appreciate your time and thank you. 2 MR. CREECH: Thank you, Commissioner. 3 THE WITNESS: You're welcome. 4 CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. Mr. Jeffries, 5 any redirect for the witness? MR. JEFFRIES: Thank you, Chair Mitchell. 6 7 have just a couple of questions for Mr. Heath. 8 REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. JEFFRIES: 9 Mr. Heath, do you have Public Staff Heath Cross 10 Examination Exhibit Number 1 handy? That's the 11 package of statutes that Mr. Creech was --12 Yeah. Yes, I'll get to them. Yes, I'll get to 13 it in just a second. Okay. I have them. 14 All right. So starting with the second statute 15 in that packet which is 62-15, which begins on 16 page 4 of that package. 17 Yes. Α 18 Mr. Creech was asking you -- and to be clear, and 19 I think everyone understands this, but 62-15 is 20 the portion of Chapter 62 that talks about the 21 Public Staff's duties and responsibilities, and 22 you recall he asked you -- down under (d) I think 23 he asked you to look at a couple of those 24 provisions. And then ultimately pointed you

toward paragraph 12. 1 2 Yes. Α 3 And this is a description of what the Public 4 Staff's -- the lead-in language to that laundry 5 list of duties and responsibilities is it shall be the duty and responsibility of the Public 6 7 Staff to, and then it's one, two, three, four, five, six all the way down to 12 and --8 9 Α Correct. 10 And 12 says When deemed necessary by the executive director, in the interest of the Using 11 and Consuming Public, advise the Commission with 12 13 respect to securities, regulations, and transactions, pursuant to the provisions of 14 Article 8, correct? 15 16 That's correct. Α 17 And I think we all agree that 62-172 falls within Q 18 Article 8. My question to you is the word 19 "advise" there, does that -- in your opinion is 20 that -- is that equivalent with the proposal to 21 make the Public Staff a coequal decision maker in 22 the issuance of these bonds in your opinion? 23 In my opinion, no, it's not. Advising the Α 24 Commission is -- it's not what the Public Staff

proposed in their creation of a bond team in 1 2 which they would have joint decision-making 3 authority with the Company. 4 Do you have -- does Duke -- does DEC and DEP have Q 5 any issue with the Public Staff advising, at least as you understand that term, the Commission 6 7 on your Phase 2 of the process of the 8 structuring, marketing, pricing process? 9 Α As I understand advising it, and I would really 10 say that in terms of I believe they have a role 11 to advise a bond team should the Commission 12 decide to implement one and that bond team would 13 consist of the Companies, their advisor and 14 counsel, as well as the Commission -- or a 15 designated Commissioner or member of Commission 16 staff along with their advisor and counsel as 17 joint decision makers on this transaction in all 18 aspects of the structuring, marketing, and 19 pricing of the bonds. And I would see 20 underwriters, other parties including the Public 21 Staff as advising that bond team, advising those 22 two joint decision makers, but those joint 23 decision makers, again, the Company and the 24 Commission would be the ones to make final

1 decisions and as to how we structure, market, and 2 price these bonds, not the -- I don't believe 3 it's appropriate based on this statute or the 4 Securitization Statute for the Public Staff to 5 have a role that it has proposed. 6 Thank you, Mr. Heath. Mr. Creech also raised the Q 7 prospect of a -- asked you a couple of questions 8 about a market-clearing price and the prospects 9 that you could sell 95 percent of the bonds but 10 not -- apparently not sell the other 5 percent. 11 Could you provide at a 50,000-foot level for 12 those of us that aren't experts on issuances of 13 corporate bonds what -- how does this -- how does 14 this pricing process work? How does the 15 marketing/pricing process work for these kind of 16 securities? 17 Sure. Sure, I'd be happy to. Typically, in most 18 corporate bond issuance, there is an evaluation 19 by the issuer and its advisors and underwriters 20 that where we would look at comparable securities 21 of equivalent duration or tenor. And so we're 22 looking here to maybe a 15-to-18, 20-year bonds. 23 We would look at comparable securities at those 24 levels and we would come up with some expectation of pricing levels for those bonds.

Based on that collaborative effort as well, we would come out with an idea of a initial price talk, which would typically be something -- probably a little wider than where we would expect the deal to clear so that when we go out and talk to investors and that we're giving them something that kind of incentivizes them to start getting attracted to the offering or having interest in the offering.

And through different rounds of price discovery, we would build an order book along with the underwriters, and so these different investors would come into the book with a indication of interest at some pricing level or really at that IPT level. And as we built that book, we would look and see how many orders are in there, at what level, and what sort of pricing sensitivity those investors might have, and based on that understanding, we would look and say okay, well, now we can lower that spread a little bit.

So just give me an example or give you an example, we go out with an initial price

talk of 100 base points or 1 percent on top of the underlying treasury rate, so we get a lot of interest at that level. And say we're trying to sell \$500 million worth of bonds, we get orders for 6, 7, \$800 million, maybe more, we know that there's more interest than we need from that book, so we might go back out to investors and say that 100 basis points is now 90 basis points. Some of those orders might fall out of the book, but we still end up with more demand than we — more orders than we need to fill that book, so now instead of \$800 million, maybe that's \$700 million or something.

And then based -- again, based on what we understand to be the pricing sensitivity there, you know, are there big orders in that book that they're going to fall out legally if we lower this spread another five basis points or another 10 basis points. And so again, based on that understanding and talk with our underwriters and what we know of investors from our marketing effort, we then make a decision as to whether further compress that pricing. We may go back out and that 90 is 85 and we'll see where that --

how that looks again. It may be multiple levels of kind of cutting that spread level until you get to a point where okay, we've got 500 -- maybe we're down now to \$600 million worth of orders, but I know there's someone in here with \$100 million or maybe two people with \$75 million orders and if I push anymore we -- those orders may go away completely. And if that happens, then I haven't sold \$500 million worth of bonds.

And so that discovery process is not a -- I would not call it a science. I would call it an art as to know how far to push, and you really have to understand the quality of your book and what the pricing sensitivities of those investors are.

- Q Thank you. Could you explain -- I mean, why is it important with respect to storm recovery bonds to sell a hundred percent of the amount that's authorized?
- A I don't think it's just with respect to storm recovery bonds, I think that's applicable to every public issuance or every issuance of debt in the public markets. We take that same approach for our holding company issuances. We

take that same approach for all of our first 1 2 mortgage bond issuances of DEC and DEP. 3 something to be -- to really get to a 4 market-clearing level, what the market is going 5 to bear, those bonds should be fully subscribed and sold. 6 7 What -- could you help me understand, again, I'm Q 8 a layman, I'm not an expert on this stuff, but 9 what are the practical consequences if you sold 10 less than a hundred percent of the storm recovery 11 bonds in this particular context? What does that 12 mean for the Company? 13 Well, it could mean that the bonds -- that we 14 don't have a successful deal, right? So it could 15 be that if we don't have enough orders to fill 16 and the underwriters are not willing to buy those 17 at a discounted price, then we don't have a 18 completed transaction. 19 One last question. Mr. Heath, you were -- Mr. Q 20 Creech asked you some questions about your rebuttal testimony. I believe it was page 35. 21 22 I'm getting back to that. Give me a second. 23 Yeah. Actually, looking at this I think Q 24 maybe now I have the wrong page reference. Ιt

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was the discussion about customer protections.
 1
 2
          Yes.
    Α
 3
          Do you recall that?
 4
               That's in my direct testimony.
    Α
 5
          Oh, okay. That would explain why I can't find it
 6
          in your rebuttal. So you made some statements in
 7
          there about the documents and this deal having
 8
          some of the similar protections that were
 9
          included in the Florida transaction. Do you
10
          recall?
11
          I do.
    Α
          And then Mr. Creech went from there and flipped
12
    Q
13
          over to the transactional documents and started
14
          asking you some questions, but is it -- you
15
          explain what protections you're talking about in
16
          the following Q and A, don't you, in your direct
17
          testimony?
18
          Yes, I do.
19
          Okay. I mean, that's the purpose of the
    Q
20
          discussion after the -- your statement that these
21
          transactional documents contain some of the same
22
          protections, right?
23
          Correct.
    Α
24
          Okay. Thank you.
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That's all the redirect I 1 MR. JEFFRIES: 2 have for Mr. Heath. 3 CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. Thank you, Mr. Jeffries. We will now take questions from 4 5 Commissioners. I will start with Commissioner Brown-Bland. 6 7 EXAMINATION BY COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND: Mr. Heath, just a moment ago Mr. Jeffries asked 8 9 you to speak in lay terms about what certain 10 things would mean and you ended that series of 11 questions indicating if the underwriters didn't 12 buy all the bonds that it would mean you didn't 13 have a completed transaction. If you just carry 14 that out to its logical conclusion, what does 15 that, in effect, mean for the Companies? 16 I guess as a couple implications, one is we 17 could -- we could come back to the market at a 18 later date. Kind of, you know, pull the deal, 19 come back, approach the market a couple of months 20 later. The result would probably be maybe even 21 wider pricing than where we thought we would land 22 initially, because, you know, because of that 23 first unsuccessful transaction. 24 I guess it could also mean that we

Τ.	just decide to not go forth with securitization
2	at all and seek to recover storm recovery costs
3	through the Storm Recovery Rider that we've
4	proposed in the pending rate cases.
5	Q So the bottom line is it means you couldn't issue
6	the bond; is that right?
7	A It could mean that you can't issue the bonds or
8	it could mean that you maybe go to the market
9	later and you have a and you may not be as
10	you may not end at the pricing where you thought
11	you would initially.
12	Q All right. Thank you.
13	COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND: That's all my
14	questions at this time.
15	CHAIR MITCHELL: Okay. Commissioner Gray?
16	COMMISSIONER GRAY: Thank you.
17	EXAMINATION BY COMMISSIONER GRAY:
18	Q Mr. Heath, has DEF ever tried to issue the Storm
19	Securitization Bonds?
20	A No, Commissioner, we have not. There's only
21	there's been two securitization issuances in the
22	State of Florida in all. One of those was the
23	DEF Nuclear Recovery Securitization that was done
24	in 2016. There has been a Storm Recovery

Issuance that was done by FP&L prior to that.

- Q As a follow-up, were both subscribed at a 100 percent or was there -- following up on Commissioner Brown-Bland's thought, were any of them not issued because they were not fully subscribed?
- So in the DEF transaction, it was a negotiated transaction like we're proposing here where we go to the market in this process that I talked about. That transaction was fully subscribed and with some slight over subscription. Right. So if we're selling \$1.3 billion worth of bonds, there were orders for probably 1.5 billion or something like that. So it was fully subscribed; actually a little bit over subscribed.

But the Florida transaction was actually done in a completely different process and it's the only securitization bond that I'm aware of that was done in that manner where it was really an auction process conducted with several banks where FP&L got banks to just bid on the transaction. They came up with -- you know, they picked one to go forth with. Those -- they sold all of those bonds to that bank, and then I

don't know if that bank held those bonds or if 1 2 they would have turned around and then kind of 3 sold them in a secondary-type market. 4 But the DEF transaction was fully 5 subscribed. 6 In the FP -- Florida Power & Light program is 7 it -- did the banks step in when FP&L was unable 8 to conclude their own effort? And is that an 9 option in this jurisdiction? 10 Α The banks bought the entire deal through a 11 competitive bid process. That would be an 12 option, but we believe that the negotiated sale 13 process that I just talked about is the way that 14 we should approach it. That's how the vast 15 majority of public debt issuances are done in the 16 market, whether they're securitization bonds or 17 new, kind of general corporate bonds. 18 Thank you. 19 COMMISSIONER GRAY: That's all my questions 20 now. 21 CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. Commissioner 22 Clodfelter? 23 COMMISSIONER CLODFELTER: Yes. Thank you. 24 EXAMINATION BY COMMISSIONER CLODFELTER:

Mr. Heath, can you hear me fine? 1 Q 2 Yes, Commissioner, I can. Α 3 Okay. Thank you. I have just a couple of 4 questions. I want to ask a couple of things 5 about the option to use the grantor trust structure. And I can draw some inferences of my 6 7 own, but I want to hear you talk about it rather than me speculate about. Talk about what 8 9 considerations would come into play that would 10 cause you to determine that the use of a combined 11 issue through the grantor trust structure is the 12 way to go as opposed to separate issues by the 13 two SPEs. And when would you choose -- when 14 would you choose to go the grantor trust route? 15 So we have it as an option today. Again, as I Α 16 mentioned, we're not -- you know, we haven't 17 decided that's the way to go. But we would need 18 to continue to research it. We would like to 19 have underwriters involved and get their opinion 20 on the best way to execute looking at, you know, 21 everything that's out in the market at that time. 22 I mean, I think we're talking about a 23 realistically kind of a mid-2021 issuance, so, I 24 mean, I would -- I mean, really I think the

decision has to be made a couple of months probably in advance of that just from the standpoint of you've got transaction documents to put together and things that, you know, you really need to just know which way you're headed, whether it's combined issuances or separate issuances. So it's, you know, I would speculate a couple months prior to really being in the market. You got to know what you're asking the rating agencies to rate and that has to come before you're in the market.

Q

Well, I appreciate that. I guess let me go to really the core of what I want to explore with you. Let's suppose that you're in that process and you conclude that there is benefit to one of the two SPEs from a combined issue and a different level of benefit or maybe no benefit at all to the other. I mean, you've got different sizes here. You've got -- DEP has got a much larger nut that it wants to crack here than DEC does. And let's assume that you conclude that it's a benefit to DEC to tag along and have a combined issue, but maybe that's not so beneficial to DEP. Maybe it's not really

important one way or the other for DEP, take it or leave, and you conclude that there's a differential there. How do you allocate -- how do you propose -- and this is -- maybe it's in the documents, but I'm not deep enough in the documents to know the answer, so I'll ask you. So how do you propose then to allocate the incremental costs associated with the combined issuance through a grantor trust as between the 10 two entities, the DEP entity and the DEC entity? 11 How do you allocate those costs? 12 That's an excellent question. And what we've 13 laid out in my exhibits is we do show upfront 14 transaction costs, you know, assuming an SRB 15 issuance to try to give clarity. And so those 16 incremental costs today we have allocated kind of 17 on a pro rata basis of the issuance, right? 18 we're talking about over 700 million for DEC --19 or DEP and roughly 200 million or a little bit 20 more for DEC, so we've allocated based on those 21 percentages. But yes, as we go through time and 22 continue to evaluate this, I mean, I think 23 there's clearly a benefit to DEC. I think 24 there's a slight benefit to DEP. But as we go

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through that analysis and if we see that DEP 1 2 would get no better deal than if it just went out 3 on its own and all the benefit of that combined issuance economically is DEC's, we would 4 5 definitely consider giving all of those incremental fees to DEC. 6 7 You would consider it and that's -- I appreciate Q 8 that, I respect that, and I accept that. You 9 know, I guess the old phrase was "trust but 10 verify". So how in the world would that be built 11 into the structure to ensure that that occurred? 12 How could we reasonably -- how could we 13 reasonably ensure that that occurred? 14 Α Sure. So we contemplate in our -- in our initial 15 proposal as well as in our kind of revised 16 proposal that we laid out in our rebuttal 17 testimony that there is a -- there is certainly a 18 means for the Commission to stay involved 19 throughout this process and it's really up to the 20 Commission to decide how involved it wants to be. 21 So at a minimum in our initial proposal we were 22 laying out an issuance advice letter process, so 23 where we would deliver to the Commission a -- you 24 know, in advance of going into the market, a

letter that showed expected pricing on the bonds as well as an updated estimate of transaction expenses and if we -- we would -- and we would have that either allocated to DEC and DEP if we believed both benefited and we would have some discussion about that. If it was strictly a DEC benefit, we would show that in those updated exhibits and the Commission would have clear insight into which way we're thinking. If we -- go ahead.

- Q Thank you. That addresses I think the point I was driving at is that when we get the issuance advice letter, we're not just getting the final outputs this is the pricing, this is the structure but we get the undergirding, the rationale that supports that. We get the back up. In other words, how you arrived at that and why you arrived at that.
- A Right.

Q I'll let that stand for now. That's good enough for present purposes. Let me ask you another question and really it's about market timing. You said you're anticipating right now perhaps something in the order of mid-2021 to go to

market with these. As I understand the Statute, and I think I'm reading it correctly, is there really is no limit on the timing. You can go to market when you want to go if ever -- if ever -- or you can go when you want to go if ever.

And as I read the Statute, too, you went through this with Mr. Creech, one of the two financing conditions or structuring conditions is that you need to -- we need to find that your pricing will result in the lowest storm recovery charge consistent with market conditions at the time. So as long as you're at or better than market at the time you go to market, you've met that condition. My question to you really is what kind of protection do we have about you mistiming when you go to market?

If you go into a bad market or a less favorable market and suddenly we find that the net present value differential to the ratepayers has shrunk. It's no longer 30 million. It's only 15 million now because you mistimed the market. You've met the statutory condition because you are selling into the market at a price and structure that is the best in the

market conditions at that time. You've met the 1 2 condition, but you just mistimed. What's my 3 protection there? What's my protection? 4 the ratepayer's protection? 5 I'm sorry. What's the ratepayer's 6 protection? I'm a ratepayer. I'm a ratepayer. 7 Well, I am too, but --Α 8 What's the ratepayer's protection? 0 9 Α It's really with -- you know, so as we --10 especially as we've laid out in this bond team 11 where the Company and the Commission -designated Commissioner or Commission staff 12 13 member are the decision makers, that would be the 14 way that we would, you know, we'd consider all of 15 that as much as how we structure, market, and 16 price the bonds, but when do we go into the 17 market and figuring out the most optimal time. I think in the other manner it 18 19 would really be through the issuance advice that 20 we would give you information and say here's why 21 we -- here's why we think, you know, the timing 22 is appropriate now. 23 All right. I want to think on that one some. Q 24 I'll take that answer, but I'll need to think

some about that whether that works. But let me ask this question on the same topic but ask it this way. We're in a fairly decent market right What if the Financing Order had as a now. condition that you had to use it or lose it by some date certain in the future? How would that affect things? I guess we would have to know what that date were, right? And I'll just -- I'll give you a little -- an understanding of what the runway leading up to an issuance is. I think we've talked about this a little bit in testimony. we've committed in our testimony to get into the market or to pursue rather, having promised to pursue, an appropriately aggressive approach timeline rather to get to market after the receipt of the Financing Order. But as we talked

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So this is a brand new issuing entity, so they're -- the first step is you've got to get this entity rated with the SEC. We've got to get the bonds rated, so we've got to know

about in my cross examination, the issuer on

these bonds is the SPE. The Utilities are

co-registrants there.

what the structure is that we're asking rating agencies to rate. Those aren't necessarily -they're not strictly lock step kind of decisions
like you don't have to -- you don't do the
rating, and then when that's done, move -- or you
don't do the registration and then move the
rating. You can do some of that on a, you know,
joint timeline. And then you have to go out and
talk to your investors. And we would envision
doing some sort of road show or phone call
meetings with investors.

So, I mean, you know, what we laid out in our schedule was, you know, receipt of Financing Order in March, kind of being in the market late June, early July, so that, you know, four months — three and a half, four months kind of timeframe is really what we will need at a minimum from the time the Financing Order is issued.

And so I think you could -- there may be some ability, I mean, I think that would be up to the Commission to put some time parameter on it, but I just want to lay that kind of timeframe out, but if it were less than six

months it would be very difficult to ensure that 1 2 we would be able to get to market in that 3 timeframe. 4 Some familiarity with the issuance process, so I Q 5 understand that it cannot be too short. 6 understand that. But I really was asking more 7 conceptually is -- would it impair your ability to go forward if there was a end date for the 8 9 ability to exercise the Financing Order? 10 As I think about it, I can't think of a practical Α 11 reason, but I guess I would have to defer to my 12 legal counsel to say whether there is really a 13 problem with that or not. 14 Q Okay. Well, let's leave that then for now. Ι 15 think we've explored that. I think most of the 16 other things -- questions I would've asked you 17 would have been answered or you've responded to 18 them on others but let me just be sure on one. 19 I want to make sure I'm making an 20 assumption you don't disagree with. And my 21 assumption is that you would not choose a 22 floating rate issue unless the all-in costs 23 including the cost of the swaps to hedge was 24 better -- gave you a better pricing than a

I'm correct in making that 1 fix-rate issue. 2 assumption, right? 3 Yes, certainly. But I also think that from my 4 familiarity in the market, the floating rate 5 issuance for -- you know, I think we agreed in our Settlement for up to 20 years -- I'm not sure 6 7 you can have a floating rate product in the public markets for 20 years. So -- but yeah, 8

that -- and conceptually, yeah, you would have
to -- you would have to evaluate and analyze that
floating rate with a swap back to fixed is more

beneficial than the fixed rate you could get in

the market. Absolutely.

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Q That's fine. I did think of one other thing I wanted to just hear you talk a little bit about is the Companies have elected in this round not to use the permission the Statute gives to set up a reserve fund and to finance that reserve fund or defund it out of proceeds from the securitization. And obviously if you did set that up, you'd have a larger issue that might affect the terms, the structure and the pricing and so forth. I understand all of that. But it also would give you some protection -- give the

ratepayers some protection against pancaking in the future as we get hurricanes and storms going down the road.

Talk to me a little bit about what considerations went into the Companies' thinking about why not to -- why not to include a reserve component in this issue.

- A My understanding from talking with our regulatory folks back when we were drafting the Petition was that we already have, you know, some level of kind of base storm recovery cost in base rates, and so we take this kind of deductible we call it every time we have storms up to that level before we start deferring anything for future recovery. So I think that kind of that normalized level in base rates kind of obviates the need for a reserve at this point.
- That's a satisfactory response. I appreciate that. I just was curious to know if there was any other thinking going on behind why you chose not to use that authority.

I think that covers it. Those are all the questions I have. Thank you, Mr. Heath.

THE WITNESS: Thank you.

CHAIR MITCHELL: Commissioner Duffley? 1 2 EXAMINATION BY COMMISSIONER DUFFLEY: 3 Good morning, Mr. Heath. I'd like to follow up 4 on some of Commissioner Clodfelter and 5 Commissioner Brown-Bland's questions. And it has to do with the timing. And so is the current 6 7 position of the Companies to issue these bonds within the next year? 8 9 Α Yes. Our current proposal is that we -- after 10 receipt of a financing order, we put together a 11 calendar that would get us into the market this 12 year, within this calendar year. 13 And then hypothetically if an uncompleted Q transaction scenario occurred, how long would you 14 15 attempt the securitization process before turning 16 back to the rider which hasn't been approved or 17 disapproved, but going back to a traditional 18 process? 19 It's hard to say, but, I mean, I think we would Α 20 have to think about it collectively - the treasury and our regulatory group, our 21 22 attorneys - to figure out, you know, how long we 23 would do that if we would go -- we would try to 24 go to market again. But I do think that that,

1		you know, if we tried to go in July and we didn't
2		have a successful transaction, I mean, just the
3		way I think about it today, I think it's really
4		later in the year before we would even try again.
5	Q	And then my last question I'm going to switch
6		gears on you. Thank you for that answer. With
7		respect to the I understand the benefits of
8		allowing flexibility or what the benefits of
9		allowing the flexibility regarding the
10		structuring, and pricing, and marketing. But
11		what in your opinion would be the pitfalls or
12		negative aspects of the flexibility that you're
13		requesting?
14	А	I mean, I guess it's some thought of loss of
15		control, right, that you don't have clear insight
16		
		into what we're thinking, but I think we propose
17		into what we're thinking, but I think we propose to mitigate that through issuance advice letter
17 18		
		to mitigate that through issuance advice letter
18		to mitigate that through issuance advice letter process and potentially a bond team with the
18 19		to mitigate that through issuance advice letter process and potentially a bond team with the Commission as a joint decision maker. So I
18 19 20		to mitigate that through issuance advice letter process and potentially a bond team with the Commission as a joint decision maker. So I think, you know, one or either of those
18 19 20 21	Q	to mitigate that through issuance advice letter process and potentially a bond team with the Commission as a joint decision maker. So I think, you know, one or either of those approaches can help mitigate that that

1 questions. 2 CHAIR MITCHELL: Commissioner Hughes? 3 COMMISSIONER HUGHES: No additional 4 questions at this time. 5 CHAIR MITCHELL: Commissioner McKissick? 6 COMMISSIONER McKISSICK: I have a couple of 7 questions, Madam Chair. 8 EXAMINATION BY COMMISSIONER McKISSICK: 9 Mr. Heath, could you contrast and compare the 10 advantages of going private placement group 11 versus selling the bonds in a more traditional 12 way? 13 Α Sure. I mean the -- and to make sure that I 14 understand what you're asking in terms of private 15 placement. So there's the -- kind of the private 16 placement provision in the SEC registration 17 documents versus this kind of negotiated, or not negotiated, but auction-type deal I described in 18 19 Florida, so I want to make sure I understand 20 which one you're asking about there? 21 Well, I know that what you're asking for is Q 22 authority from what I gather to go private 23 placement route, and are you limiting it to 24 simply the way that Florida does it or are you

looking at the way the SEC would do it? You know, I'm just trying to understand fully what it is that is being proposed as the model that we would embrace in North Carolina and contrast that otherwise. Uh-huh.

A Okay. So what we're proposing is a fully negotiated publicly registered and marketed deal to all investors that are out in the public market and to the institutional investors. You know, these are insurance companies, money managers, you know, all those sorts of parties where we go out and this deal is publicly announced and we have underwriters who have a list of investors that they go out and call upon to bring into this deal and so that is, you know, kind of the broadest marketing you can do, is like you go out and reach out to everyone.

If you are doing a private placement that's available in the -- under the SEC rules, you're talking with a much narrower audience of people, investors. And then if you're doing something like FP&L did where you're doing this auction process with a group of banks, you're talking to an even smaller subset of

people.

So we believe that the fully registered and marketed approach will bring the biggest -- the broadest interest which helps to drive pricing down.

- Q Okay. Now, let me ask you this, assuming there's a bond team and the bond team is in place, what role do you see them playing in terms of say coming up with say a marketing plan for the way that these bonds might be offered to potential investors?
- A That's a great question. So I want to, again, kind of preface my discussion about a bond team as being a bond team that has joint decision-making authority that is in the hands of the Company and the designated Commissioner or member of Commission staff, not in the hands of the Public Staff, an intervening party.

And so we would -- that bond team would then further have kind of advisory members if you want to call it that, the underwriters, potentially the Public Staff and its consultants, and others who can give feedback on different documents and approaches to things.

So we would -- our approach similar to Florida would be that we would ask the banks to put together a detailed marketing plan. How would they go out and talk to accounts? Who would they target both on the short end of the maturity spectrum, you know, the one, two to three, four, five years, and then the further out periods. And those would probably be very different investors. Different investors target short term. Different investors target long term. And so we would want to understand that plan.

And so this bond team would be looking at those plans that the underwriters put together and that way -- and so if we come up with a bond team, that's what we've outlined in our rebuttal testimony, the underwriters would have those -- put those plans together. The Public Staff and other parties on that team would comment on that. But ultimately it would be the Commission -- or the Commission representative and the Company representative who would decide yeah, this is the way we want to go to market or we want to target some additional investors or we

1		don't think this plan is efficient or those kind
2		of comments. Is that what you were looking for?
3	Q	Sure. Yeah, that's exactly what I was looking
4		for. And let me ask you this, in terms of the
5		underwriters that are going to be involved, I
6		take it they're going to be identifying benchmark
7		or comparable securities that they would use to
8		measure against in terms of what this particular
9		offering would look like, you know, in terms of
10		pricing and returns and things of that sort. So,
11		I mean, to what extent do you see the
12		operators excuse me the underwriters
13		operating somewhat autonomously as opposed to
14		working with the bond team and to what extent do
15		you see the Commission playing as a part of that,
16		I mean, if there's a disagreement or there's not
17		a meeting of the minds?
18	A	Okay. So if they're so the underwriters
19		certainly would not be going off doing their own
20		thing. Not in any stretch of the imagination.
21		So their charge really in how do we approach the
22		market would have to be signed off on by the
23		joint decision makers. And again, that joint
24		decision-making authority needs to be with the

Company and with the designated Commissioner or member of Commission staff.

And so -- and you brought up the point of underwriters developing pricing expectations, right, and looking at comparable securities. That is true to some extent, but also the Company would have its opinion as well as to what those comparable securities are to make sure that the right comps are being used. Right? That we're not looking at --

Exactly.

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-- comping this to a utility first mortgage bond. This is a triple -- this will be AAA rated debt. We're comping that to other AAA instruments and potentially US Government Agency-type debt.

So we would have, you know, active feedback including the Commission as that joint decision making member on what do we believe are the right comps to use in this analysis before any conversations are had with investors.

And if there were a dispute -- if there were a dispute between those two joint decision makers, right, the Company rep and the designated Commissioner or Commission staff, we

would look for the full Commission to resolve 1 2 those. 3 Got it. And I guess --4 CHAIR MITCHELL: Commissioner McKissick, I'm 5 going to interrupt you, sir, just for a minute here. 6 We are at 12:00 -- or a little bit after 12:00 at this 7 point, so we're going to go ahead and take our break and we will be in recess until 1:30. We'll resume 8 with questions from Commissioner McKissick for the 9 10 witness. 11 COMMISSIONER McKISSICK: Thank you, Madam 12 Chair. 13 CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. Everybody 14 please turn off your cameras and mute your 15 microphones. 16 (The hearing was recessed, to be continued 17 on January 28, 2021, at 1:30 p.m.) 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

1	CERTIFICATE
2	I, KIM T. MITCHELL, DO HEREBY CERTIFY that
3	the Proceedings in the above-captioned matter were
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5	shorthand the Proceedings set forth herein, and the
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AFFIRMATION

I affirm, under the penalties for perjury, that the foregoing representations are true.

Steven Heller

Saber Partners, Consultants

Indiana Office of Utility Consumer Counselor

Friday July 29, 2022 Date

Cause No. 45722

CenterPoint Energy Indiana

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that a copy of the *OUCC's Testimony* has been served upon the following parties of record in the captioned proceeding by electronic service on August 3, 2022.

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